The Grammars of the Old Age Problem: From Activity Theory to Alzheimer\u27s Disease by Lynott, Robert Joseph
Loyola University Chicago 
Loyola eCommons 
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 
1986 
The Grammars of the Old Age Problem: From Activity Theory to 
Alzheimer's Disease 
Robert Joseph Lynott 
Loyola University Chicago 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss 
 Part of the Sociology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lynott, Robert Joseph, "The Grammars of the Old Age Problem: From Activity Theory to Alzheimer's 
Disease" (1986). Dissertations. 2488. 
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2488 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more 
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. 
Copyright © 1986 Robert Joseph Lynott 
THE GRAMMARS OF THE OLD AGE PROBLEM: 
FROM ACTIVITY THEORY TO ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE 
by 
Robert Joseph Lynott 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
November 
1986 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First, I want to thank Helena Lopata, chair of my 
dissertation committee, for her ongoing support and 
enthusiasm while I wrote this dissertation. Thanks also 
go to the other members of the committee--Judy Wittner, 
Jay Gubrium, Phil Nyden--for their many helpful comments 
during the dissertation process. 
I am grateful to my family and Bill Leonard for 
"coming through" for me during my graduate years when 
money was very tight. Thanks go to the Midwest Council 
for Social Research on Aging for the predoctoral 
fellowship and Loyola University for the Schmitt 
Fellowship Award as well. 
I also want to thank the many patients of 
Alzheimer's and their caregivers for allowing me to share 
in their experience. The staff at the hospital studied 
also were supportive during the research. 
The one person I most want to thank is Patty 
Passuth. She not only typed all the dissertation and 
edited parts of it, but also has been a continual source 
of intellectual and emotional support throughout the 
entire dissertation process. You were always there when 
I needed you. I can't find the words to thank you 
ii 
for all you've done and put up with during this long 
ordeal. To you, I dedicate the following piece of work. 
iii 
VITA 
The author, Robert Joseph Lynott, is the son of the 
late Edward Alexander Lynott and Ellen (Kennedy) Lynott. 
He was born on December 11, 1956, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. 
Mr. Lynott attended Loras College from August, 1975 
to May, 1979. He received the degree of Bachelor of Arts 
in Sociology and Bachelor of Science in Psychology, 
graduating "maxima cum laude." In August, 1979, he 
entered Marquette University and in May, 1981, was 
awarded the Master of Arts in Sociology. He began his 
doctoral studies in Sociology at Loyola University of 
Chicago in August, 1981. During his tenure, he was 
awarded a predoctoral fellowship with the Midwest Council 
for Social Research on Aging and was the recipient of the 
Arthur J. Schmitt Fellowship. He was also selected as a 
Junior Scholar for the XIIIth International Congress of 
Gerontology. 
Mr. Lynott has presented papers at a number of 
professional conferences, including the annual meetings 
of the Midwest Sociological Society and the Society for 
the study of Social Problems. In addition, he has 
authored several articles dealing with a variety of aging 
and family issues. They include the following: 
iv 
1985 
1985 
1983 
1983 
1982 
"Family Rhetoric as Social Order" (with J. 
Gubrium). Journal of Family Issues 5:129-52. 
"Alzheimer's Disease as Biographical Work" 
(with J. Gubrium). In Warren A. Peterson and 
Jill S. Quadagno (eds.), Social Bonds in Later 
Life: Aging and Interdependence. Beverly 
Hills: Sage. 
"Alzheimer's Disease and Institutionalization: 
The Ongoing Construction of a Decision." 
Journal of Family Issues 4:559-74. 
"Rethinking Life Satisfaction" (with J. 
Gubrium). Human Organization 42:30-38. 
reprinted in: 
Beth B. Hess and Elizabeth w. Markson (eds.), 
Growing Old in America, 3rd edition. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984. 
"Considerations on a Theory of Descriptive 
Activity" (with J. Gubrium and D. Buckholdt). 
Mid-American Review of Sociology 7:17-35. 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . 
VITA . 
LIST OF FIGURES . . 
CONTENTS OF APPENDICES 
INTRODUCTION 
Grammar/Method . . . . . . . 
In Relation to Fieldwork 
Significance for Grammars of 
Old Age . . . . . . . . 
Analysis of the Alzheimer's Data . 
Dissertation Outline . . . . 
PART I "Normal" Aging 
ACTIVITY THEORY AND LIFE SATISFACTION . . 
Page 
ii 
iv 
ix 
X 
1 
3 
5 
10 
12 
16 
18 
19 
Agency . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 
Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 
Amount and Sequence of Role Loss. . 25 
Type of Role Gain . . . . . . . 26 
Continuity of Life Span . . . . . . . . 29 
Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
ALTERNATE GRAMMARS OF LIFE SATISFACTION . 36 
The Range of Life Satisfaction Grammars 37 
Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
Macro-Sources . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
Mid-Continuum Sources . . . . . . . . . 48 
Micro-Sources . . . . . . . 57 
Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
Macro-Timings . . . . . . . 63 
Mid-Continuum Timings . . . . . . . 75 
Micro-Timings . . . . . . . 81 
vi 
Responsibility . • 
Macro-Policy 
Mid-Continuum 
Micro-Policy 
Policy 
BEYOND LIFE SATISFACTION: POLITICAL ECONOMY 
AND SOCIAL PHENOMENOLOGY . . . . . 
The Grammars in the Scheme of Things . 
Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Political Economy . • . 
Social Phenomenology 
Timing . . . . . . . . . . . 
Political Economy . . . . 
Social Phenomenology . . . 
Responsibility . . . • . . . . 
Political Economy . . 
Social Phenomenology . . . . 
PART II. Pathological Aging 
NORMAL AGING VERSUS DISEASE: THE QUESTION 
OF AGENCY • . • . • . • . . • . 
The Biological Source: Reading 
86 
86 
91 
94 
98 
98 
102 
102 
108 
112 
112 
117 
124 
124 
127 
129 
130 
Neuropathology . • . • . • . . . . . . 133 
The Behavioral Source: Reading Dementia 146 
ONSET AND COURSE OF ILLNESS: THE QUESTION 
OF TIMING . . . . . • . . . . . 
The Rational Vision . . . . 
The Question of Onset • . 
The Course of Progress 
Measurement • 
Exemplars . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Application • • . . . . . . . . 
When Did it Begin? • . . 
Where Does it Go? . 
What is the Response? . . . 
THE PUBLIC AND THE PERSONAL: THE QUESTION 
OF RESPONSIBILITY . • . . . . . . . 
Public Responsibility . 
Personal Responsibility . 
vii 
163 
164 
164 
167 
174 
177 
184 
185 
189 
199 
206 
. . 206 
. . 220 
CONCLUSION o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 232 
Summary and Assessment o 0 o o o o 
The Broader Implication o 0 o o o 
REFERENCES o o 
APPENDIX A o 
APPENDIX B 
viii 
0 232 
0 236 
0 0 0 245 
0 259 
. 261 
Figure 
1. 
2. 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Socio-Environmental Approach 
Aging and Modernization 
3. Aging and Cohorts Over Time 
ix 
Page 
50 
70 
72 
APPENDIX A 
APPENDIX B 
CONTENTS OF APPENDICES 
Topic Guide for Informal 
Interviews of Caregivers . 
Burden Interview . . . . 
X 
Page 
259 
261 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a study of the place of image or vision in 
the interpretation of experience (cf. Goffman, 1974). 
The experience considered is aging, in particular, the 
old age problem. It is argued that to understand the 
meaning of old age and the problem of aging, one must 
look beyond the fact of growing old, to the ways growing 
old and its facts are envisioned. The various approaches 
that cast the aging experience in one form or another can 
be thought of as "perception rules," or ways of actually 
seeing aging. As virtual cognitive languages, the 
approaches serve as grammars for articulating and 
perceiving the facts of old age and its problems. 
Following the argument, I shall use grammar to signify 
and denote the reality-constructive feature of the 
approaches. Each approach is, then, a grammar generating 
a language of experience. Each grammar constructs the 
observables believed to be the problem of old age. 
In examining each of the approaches, or grammars, I 
shall consider three questions. One, the question of 
agency, refers to the source of the old age problem as 
defined in an approach. A second, the question of 
timing, refers to the pattern by which an approach lays 
1 
2 
out the emergence of the old age problem. The third, the 
question of responsibility, addresses the issue of who or 
what is held accountable for the problem, given a 
particular view of agency and timing. 
The following approaches are considered: activity 
theory, disengagement theory, the modernization approach, 
age stratification, socio-environmentalism, the social-
career view, subcultural theory, exchange theory, 
developmentalism, the continuity approach. Since the 
late seventies, a new grammar has emerged in medical 
form, defining the old age problem as disease, 
Alzheimer's disease. What was heretofore an old age 
problem secured in the normal troubles of aging has now 
become one expressed in pathology. Old age is not just a 
range of troubled experiences fueled by such agents as 
unequal exchange, discontinuity, and falling status, but 
is also articulated by illness. 
Intervention, scholarship, and research are 
substantively tied to negative construals of aging. As 
such, if old age were redefined in positive terms 
distinct to itself, those who are responsible for 
servicing elders and their problems, from geriatricians 
to social workers would, in effect, lose the objects of 
their labors. It is the negative definition, implied in 
the various approaches to old age, which makes it 
reasonable to search for solutions to what each sees as 
the old age problem. 
GRAMMAR/METHOD 
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I have chosen the term "grammar" as a way of 
referencing the variety of approaches to the aging 
experience. The concept is akin to what Kuhn (1962) 
calls "paradigms." A paradigm, he asserts, is not just a 
theory but an all-encompassing way of looking at, and 
doing, things. Kuhn argues that paradigm changes do not 
come about through the gradual accumulation of bits of 
information which eventually form a more accurate picture 
of the part of nature under discussion. Instead, he sees 
1 paradigm as both theory and method and, in the final 
analysis, as a world of data and experience. 
The term grammar accords partially with Kuhn's 
analysis in that it emphasizes rules and realities 
(paradigms and communities), less historical emergence. 
It stresses the discrete, experientially "generative" 
basis of knowledge, in this case, how theoretical 
languages in use construe experience in line with their 
assumptions about it. Webster's New World Dictionary of 
the American Language (1978), for example, defines 
grammar as "a body of rules for speaking and writing a 
given language." The Random House Dictionary of the 
English Language (1973) defines generative grammar as "a 
device, as a body of rules, whose output is all of the 
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sentences that are permissable in a given language, while 
excluding all those that are not permissable." The 
concept of grammar, then, suggests separate languages, 
rules for actually seeing and organizing experiences a 
particular way. 
The theories of aging considered are not only 
explanatory, but present those concerned with complete 
worlds of data to which they individually belong. Each 
theory is as rhetorical as it is descriptive of the aging 
experience. Each persuades us of its own interpretation, 
pressing adherents to convey the "facts" of aging taken 
for granted to be relevant ones, others being extraneous. 
So it is with the Alzheimer's disease experience, where 
the ostensible facts of the disease can just as easily, 
with a shift in grammar (perception rules), present us 
with the inevitable facts of aging. The issue under 
consideration is not whether the facts can be accounted 
for, but rather how facts are literally read into 
experience in accordance with a working vision (grammar) 
of them. 
As such, each of the varied approaches to the aging 
experience produces a body of data that are by-products 
of its own documentation (Garfinkel, 1967). The 
different sets of data are not as mutually critical of 
one another as they are about different visions of aging. 
In this regard, the famous activity/disengagement 
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controversy is virtually a kind of "talking past each 
other," their respective grammars referencing entirely 
different realities--social systemic and individualistic 
objects of concern. Strictly speaking, then, it is not 
so much that the various grammars, in their broad range, 
additively reveal separate parts of the aging experience 
but, rather, that each grammar displays the entire 
experience in accordance with its own system of 
relevancies. 
In Relation to Fieldwork 
The concept of grammar serves to firmly link the 
domains of theory and data. The distinction mirrors some 
rather recent commentary by Schwartz and Jacobs (1979) 
and Emerson (1981; 1983) concerning the epistemological 
status of qualitative analysis. The authors distinguish 
between two completely separate forms of inquiry in terms 
of the conception of the nature of knowledge being 
produced: a positivistic one and an interpretive 
conception. The two conceptions represent different 
theoretical interests, the first informed by symbolic 
interactionism and human ecological arguments, the second 
by ethnomethodological ones. I highlight the difference 
in the two in terms of what each considers to be the 
researcher's sense of the reality at stake. 
From the positivistic point of view, social objects 
and events are treated as existing "out there," as it 
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were, separate from one's attention to them. In this 
regard, it takes for granted that there is something 
locatable, called "the field," and that its contents can 
be accurately described and fully accounted for. This 
conceptualization represents what could be called a 
geographic metaphor (Schwartz and Jacobs, 1979). The 
metaphor is implicit in the fieldwork literature linked 
with the Chicago School, both in the way ethnographic 
data are described in monographs and in methodological 
discussions and/or advocacy on behalf of fieldwork (e.g., 
Becker, 1958; Becker and Geer, 1960; Bogdan and Taylor, 
1975; Rabenstein, 1970; Gold, 1958; Thomas, 1923; Whyte, 
1943; Zorbaugh, 1929). 
When fieldworkers describe themselves or are 
described as entering a field site and observing it 
firsthand, the sense of what is being observed is not 
seriously challenged as problematic in its own right. 
Instead, fieldworkers are implored to go to the field, to 
the place wherein they discover the facts of interest to 
them. The idea is that the data of interest are located 
in some delimited arena of human interaction, that once 
having entered it, the data would become available. One 
simply has to gain entry (something perhaps not so simple 
in its own right) and, having accomplished that, to 
observe the facts located there. The major 
methodological problem centers on gaining entry and role-
7 
making. When, in effect, one enters and presumably takes 
his or her place, the data that "anyone can plainly see 
before his very own eyes" is gatherable. 
The formal methodology of this conception of the 
field is presented in Glaser and Strauss' (1967} book, 
The Discovery of Grounded Theory. As their analysis 
shows, it is not the field itself that is of interest but 
rather its contents, a fairly clear separation being made 
between them. Thinking geographically, social facts and 
formations are more or less established and available for 
observation and discovery. 
It is evident, from this approach, that the field is 
a research-related concept. That is, the concept of the 
field is the researcher's way of delimiting what he 
considers to be the relevant facts of interest to him. 
{The facts obtained, after all, are located in the various 
scenes observed. The primary task of the researcher is 
to make those scenes available to him--as might be urged, 
to "get out there and get the facts." 
The interpretive point of view coincides with 
ethnomethodological interests (Buckholdt and Gubrium, 
1979; Cicourel, 1968; Cicourel et al., 1974; Douglas, 
1970; Garfinkel, 1967; Leiter, 1980; McHugh, 1968; Mehan 
and Wood, 1975; Phohl, 1978; Wieder, 1974), and to some 
degree, with Goffman's (1959; 1974) dramaturgical 
concerns with conduct. The metaphor here ceases to be 
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geographic, becoming more linguistic and cognitive. 
Indeed, field itself becomes more a topic of interest 
than a resource for gathering information about the 
"real" objects of concern. (Ethnomethodologists have 
used the topic/resource distinction to describe their 
serious concern over their treatment of conventionally 
trivial procedural matters as important research topics 
in their own right.) In contrast, the positivistic 
approach sees the field as a resource used to contain and 
offer up to fieldworkers its contents, interest being 
centered not on the idea of field, but on what the field 
makes available. To treat field as a topic, in line with 
the interpretive conception, focuses attention on how 
contents, in effect, become contained (cognitively 
structured) so that they can be offered up for one's 
interpretation. 
The field, as such, becomes a range of visions--
someone's vision(s) or re-vision(s). Being cognitive, 
they do not exist so much in physical space as they do in 
orientation. Thus, the researcher's concern with 
entering the field is primarily limited to administrative 
details and is not as methodologically relevant in 
relation to the criteria of objectivity, as it is in the 
positivistic approach. Indeed, any geographic field can 
become an unknown number of potential cognitive fields 
(for researchers and subjects alike). As such, the field 
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does not make as much sense as which field is being taken 
up in some time and place. The field, then, is the 
research project, one question being what field is this 
to be that is being observed, how is it accomplished? 
From the positivistic approach, there is little or 
no sense that fields are the social projects of their 
members and as such that there might be variation in the 
,t 
researcher's conception of the nature of social reality 
such that the idea of the field itself might be open to 
question. With the ethnomethodological challenge, the 
field emerges as a theoretical problem. From this point 
of view, /whatever "the facts" are, are articulated by the 
researcher's sense of reality at stake. Theory, then, 
not only serves to describe events, it produces their 
very existence as well (Filmer et al., 1972). The 
recognition that the theoretical objects of one's 
attention are, in their essential qualities, always, in 
certain respects, constitutionally theoretical (Giddens, 
1979) makes it reasonable to ask what kinds of "theory" 
interpret the field. This I have tried to capture with 
the use of the term grammar. Each of the grammars 
considered, in effect, constitutes the experience of 
aging in accord with its particular sense of the facts. 
The analysis sets aside the question of what is to be the 
standard of an adequate description and takes up the 
practice of adequacy in its own right (as the 
topic/resource distinction suggests). Thus, the issue is 
not the re~~~!ve truth value of facts, but rather how 
facts are experientially generated as __ c!i.s;c!"e1::e grounds 
for evaluating~the observables in question. 
Significance for Grammars of Old Age 
The substance and style of the varied grammars of 
the old age problem are analyzed around three root 
questions: (1) the question of agency, "Who or what is 
the source of the problem?"; (2) the question of timing, 
"When or how does the source of the problem operate?"; 
and (3) the question of responsibility, "Who or what is 
to blame for the problem and what can be done about it?" 
Each of the experiential grammars, from activity theory 
to Alzheimer's disease, are virtual rules for seeing 
particular sources of, timings in, and responsible 
entities for the latter part of life. Each constructs 
the problem of old age in terms of its particular rules 
for locating problematic experiences. This is concretely 
demonstrated in the analysis of the Alzheimer's disease 
experience, where the ostensible facts of the disease can 
just as easily, with a shift in grammar, be interpreted 
as the inevitable facts of aging. 
Alzheimer's disease has come to be called the 
"disease of the century." The phrase signals the 
monumental importance of the disease for physicians, 
their patients, helping professionals, and caregivers 
11 
(usually a member of the patient's family). Alzheimer's 
is now recognized as the single most disabling illness of 
old age, producing intellectual impairment in an 
estimated 2.5 million American adults. It is an organic 
illness that results in progressive mental deterioration, 
characterized by such symptoms as forgetfulness, 
confusion, irritability, wandering and incontinence. 
There is, at present, no known cause, prevention, nor 
cure, yet the disease presents an illness and burden of 
enormous proportions and significance to those concerned. 
As part of a research project aimed at examining the 
descriptive organization of senility (see Gubrium, 1986), 
the focus of analysis is not so much to discover the 
social components and complexities of the medicalization 
of old age as it is to examine the social organization of 
two types of discourse (grammar) by which to reference, 
describe, and explain the "symptoms" of aging. The 
working question for the study is, What social processes~ " 
enter into discourse framed in terms of aging as opposed// 
to framed in terms of disease, and what sustains the 
latter as a new grammar of the old age problem? The 
transformation is not linear but, rather, oscillates on 
various levels of the experiences of those concerned in 
accordance with the descriptive needs at hand. Thus, 
medicalization, in this study, is an ongoing member 
project, not a linear and progressive process of 
12 
redefinition from old age to disease. The study, then, 
~~- J1ot a _history of medicalization 
sociology of knowledge approacl'l_t() 
as much as it 
't. ~c~ 
.1 •. t QP 
...--~\'i \ 
ANALYSIS OF THE ALZHEIMER'S DATA 
is a 
The vocabulary of Alzheimer's disease, the most 
recent grammar of aging, is analyzed from a number of 
different sources. The substance and style of the 
professional, promotional, and popular literature are 
analyzed for aging versus disease conceptions about 
senile/Alzheimer's patients. The professional literature 
includes medically-oriented texts as well as social work 
and nursing literature. The medical texts consist to a 
large degree of conference proceedings or edited 
collections of papers examining the biological andjor 
behavioral status of the disease. The nursing and social 
work literature deal primarily with problems of care 
management and adjustment. 
Data are also analyzed from the extant literature of 
the Alzheimer's Disease and Related Disorders Association 
(ADRDA). Founded in 1979, the ADRDA is a national 
network which has grown to over 120 local chapters, one 
in every major city in the country. Its purpose is to 
provide support to patients and families in the 
management and treatment of Alzheimer's and related 
disorders as well as to disseminate research information, 
educate the public, and advocate on behalf of the victims 
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of the disease. The ADRDA's national headquarters, 
located in Chicago, publishes a quarterly newsletter that 
is distributed locally to each of the chapter outlets. 
It informs members and interested outsiders of the latest 
research findings, legislative successes, and publicity 
campaigns. Many local chapters publish their own 
newsletters too, combining news from "National" with 
matters of more immediate concern to caregivers such as 
coping tips and profiles of caregiving experiences. The 
ADRDA also distributes a variety of promotional and 
informational material in the form of pamphlets and 
brochures. Similar kinds of literature are, likewise, 
offered from cooperating agencies like the National 
Institute on Aging and the National Institute of 
Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke. In 
addition, the news media features a growing number of 
popular magazine articles, newspaper features, public 
service announcements, and. broadcast programming. The 
information presented, for the most part, focuses on 
portraits of particular Alzheimer patients and the coping 
experiences of their caregivers, as well as news on 
possible "breakthroughs." 
I also gathered data by means of participant 
observation 1 including conducting fieldwork for a period 
of four months in a geriatric day hospital affiliated 
14 
with a general acute care hospital.l The day hospital 
provided a structured, therapeutic environment for two 
days a week for nine to twelve Alzheimer's disease 
patients. The hospital's day care program was conceived 
as an experiment to assess whether the degeneration 
associated with Alzheimer's disease could be stabilized. 
As a participant observer, I often assisted staff in 
their work, such as taking patients for walks, going 
bowling, or swimming with them. During the various 
activities, I was able to appreciate the frustration and 
the despair of the victim as well as the caregiver. Yet, 
at the same time, I managed to "stand back" and observe 
the cognitive tension between the two forms of discourse 
(aging versus disease) used to make sense of the variety 
of problems encountered. 
As part of the day hospital's research program, the 
primary caregivers of the patients were tested for their 
individual definitions of care burdens. Here, too, I 
recorded their perceptions of impairment and responses to 
the burden of care, which were regularly evaluated by the 
day hospital's social worker. 
Participant observation was also conducted in a 
variety of support groups. Connected to the day 
hospital's program was a weekly support group, in which 
each patient's primary caregiver participated. The 
lAll proper names and places are fictionalized. 
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session was routinely facilitated by a geriatric nurse, 
social worker, and geropsychiatrist. Nine to eleven 
caregivers attended. The ADRDA also sponsors support 
groups for caregivers in over 120 cities across the 
country, some being part of state-wide networks of 
chapters and satellites. Upon obtaining permission, I 
collected data in ADRDA-sponsored support groups in two 
cities. Support groups in one of the cities were 
regularly facilitated by service providers, commonly 
social workers; support groups in the other city were 
distinguished by their member facilitation. 
Finally, I conducted a series of unstructured but 
focused interviews with several staff members at the day 
hospital as well as sixteen caregivers in the households 
of Alzheimer's patients. The interviews dealt with 
matters concerning conceptions of the disease, its 
manifestations in particular patients, the burdens of 
care, and institutionalization, among a host of factors 
related to the disease experience (see Appendix A for the 
complete list of topics covered). Not all topics were 
discussed with every caregiver and staff member. The 
interview guide, itself, expanded as additional 
interviews were conducted, raising new issues for 
subsequent discussion. 
16 
DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
The dissertation is divided into the analysis of two 
bodies of grammar for old age, distinguished according to 
common usage in the field of aging. Social 
gerontologists regularly have contrasted their own 
studies of the problems of old age with particularly dire 
ones they have categorized as abnormal {e.g., Kuypers and 
Bengtson, 1973; Rosow, 1963). In this regard, for 
example, several volumes of the Duke University studies 
of old age are entitled: Normal Aging {Palmore, 1970), 
Normal Aging II {Palmore, 1974), Normal Aging III 
{Palmore et al., 1985). Standing in contrast to this are 
old age problems categorized as abnormal, increasingly 
relegated to the medical domain. Accordingly, part one 
of the dissertation {chapters 1 through 3) considers the 
so-called "normal" problems of old age. Part two 
{chapters 4 through 6) details abnormality--now 
pathology--as an old age problem in its own right, 
considering how select problems of aging are medically 
distinguished from nonmedical problems. 
Chapter 1 examines the grammar of the old age 
problem from the perspective of activity theory. The 
chapter addresses the activity grammar as an 
"individualizing" construal of the problem of aging, in 
terms of maladjustment or life dissatisfaction. The 
problem lies in an individual state of living that no 
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longer conforms to the ideal of adjustment reflected in 
an activity-oriented, work-related standard. 
The activity point of view, as the original theory 
of aging, set the stage for challenge by a range of 
distinct frameworks, each concertedly posing its own 
interpretation of the problem of old age. Chapter 2 
discusses alternate grammars of life satisfaction and 
individual adjustment, introducing a variety of social 
and historical factors into the understanding of personal 
well-being. Chapter 3 presents the grammars of the 
political economists and the social phenomenologists, 
shifting the focus away from attempting to explain 
individual aging to addressing more thoroughly social 
conditions--respectively, ideological and epistemological 
concerns. 
Chapters 4 through 6 examine the most recent grammar 
of the old age problem, Alzheimer's disease. The 
analysis presents, in detail, a medical understanding of 
age-related troubles, now separating pathological as 
opposed to normal old age. Chapter 4 addresses the 
question of agency regarding the distinction between 
normal aging and disease. Chapter 5 looks at the timing 
of the disease experience, considering the onset and 
course of progress. Chapter 6 examines the issue of 
responsibility in Alzheimer's, as informed by public and 
private interpretations. 
PART I 
"NORMAL" AGING 
CHAPTER 1 
ACTIVITY THEORY AND LIFE SATISFACTION 
This chapter examines activity theory, the oldest, 
but still current (see, for example, Chambre, 1984), and 
probably most widely applied grammar of aging. Activity 
theory represents the first analytic statement of the 
social process of growing old and its impact on the 
well-being of the elderly, setting the stage for the 
systematic articulation of the old age experience, its 
troubles, and problems. Best represented by two key 
works--Cavan, Burgess, Havighurst, and Goldhamer's 
Personal Adjustment in Old Age (1949) and Havighurst and 
Albrecht's Older People (1953)--the theory argues that 
the life satisfaction of old people is related to the 
amount of activity in their daily lives. The more active 
the elder, presumably the more satisfied he or she is 
with life, the higher his or her morale. 
The post World War II concern of sociologists of 
aging was organized around the concepts of "adjustment," 
"activity," and "life satisfaction." While the concepts 
represented features of the aging process, they were not 
part of a formal theoretical system, but rather centered 
on the practical problems of elderly well-being. It was 
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only later that the concern of sociologists in this 
period came to be called activity theory, with the 
emergence and direct challenge of disengagement theory 
(Cumming and Henry, 1961). As a grammar of the old age 
problem, activity theory is analyzed around the questions 
of agency, timing, and responsibility. 
AGENCY 
Activity theorists see growing old as a process of 
encountering problems of adjustment due to role changes 
in late life. The authors conceive of the source of the 
process as focally individual. Growing old is a process 
whereby individuals--not social systems, not structures 
of domination, not ideologies--hope to alter themselves 
in some way to deal satisfactorily with their 
experiences. The problem is not retirement per se, 
poverty, widowhood, and/or social isolation; these are 
the conditions, seemingly "natural" ones. While they 
referred to them as "the special problems of older 
people" (Havighurst and Albrecht, 1953:10), the 
conditions were accepted by the researchers as the way 
things were, the facts of elderly life. 
The route to individual adjustment is located in 
self-assessment, how the individual defines his or her 
own problem as well as what he or she is going to do 
about it. The problems old people face are understood to 
be social only as far as their interpersonal experiences. 
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Indeed, adjustment is defined as "the individual's 
restructuring of his attitudes and behavior in response 
to a new situation in such a way as to integrate the 
expression of his aspirations with the expectations and 
demands of society" (Cavan et al., 1949:11 [emphasis 
added]). As such, the scope of concern with the social is 
delineated by the degree that role loss is handled by 
individual elders, not how systems of roles in later life 
define personal adjustment, the latter being a 
qualitatively different grammar of the old age problem 
(cf. Chapter 2 of the dissertation). 
It is unclear, however, just how the theory views 
the organization of societal expectations or the 
mechanics by which individuals respond to them. Societal 
expectations seem to be that the elderly certainly should 
continue to engage in many activities. As Havighurst and 
Albrecht (1953:55) state, "The American formula for 
happiness in old age might be summed up in the phrase 
'keep active.'" Yet, at the same time, society poses 
restrictions on an elderly individual's activities. The 
restrictions tend to be "self-protective" for society, 
dominated by middle-aged adults, and, in cavan and 
associates' (1949:22) words, "a way of 'easing' the old 
person out of activities in order to give the adult group 
an opportunity to function." An elderly person is 
expected to stay active but not be too active. He should 
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"taper-off" or slow down to a noticeable degree, but not 
slow down too much. As a newspaper headline quoted in 
Havighurst and Albrecht (1953:36) states, "Grow Old 
Gracefully--Totter A Little." 
Likewise, just how elderly individuals are affected 
by, or what their response to these demands is, is also 
unclear. While, on the one hand, Cavan and associates 
state that an individual should conform to societal 
demands in order to be well adjusted as well as the fact 
that "personal adjustment • . • always takes place in the 
context of a social situation" (1949:14), on the other 
hand, the authors write: 
Personal adjustment is not necessarily secured by 
achieving the standards set by society, although 
social standards may have entered into the 
individual's formation of his level of aspiration. 
A person tends to be adjusted if his performance 
reaches his own level of aspiration and unadjusted 
if he fails to attain it (1949:12). 
The implication here is that continuity within ones own 
life-span may take precedence over societal standards. 
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of certain aspects of the 
theory, however, what is clear is that whatever adjusting 
needs to be done, it is the individual who will be doing 
it. In this respect, whether or not individual or 
societal standards of comparison for assessing oneself 
are used, "the individual is called on to act" (Cottrell, 
1942:618). The focus, as such, is not on individuals 
engaged in role-playing (cf. Becker, 1970) but, rather, 
23 
in "role-making," so to speak. While social in nature, 
it is individuals who make roles what they will be and 
individuals who make do in relation to the roles they 
occupy. 
Later activity literature (Cavan, 1962; Phillips, 
1957; Lemon, Bengtson, and Peterson, 1972), shifts the 
focus from individual choice of roles to the 
constellation of role relationships. The analysis gives 
greater credence to the social features of the adjustment 
process, with individual well-being more directly tied to 
role perceptions. For successful adjustment in old age 
to occur, what is now needed is an approved set of values 
and roles respected by both society and the specific 
groups with which an elderly person associates. As such, 
the informing grammar becomes societal, akin to a 
qualitatively different way of seeing old age (see 
Chapter 2). Yet, while there is a social or cultural 
factor, its independent impact on individuals is tempered 
by individual action. As Cavan (1962:535), for example, 
further states in regard to successful adjustment to old 
age: "the person must be a member of one of these groups 
and must value the group's evaluation of himself. He 
will then incorporate within himself the self image 
approved by the group." 
Like Cavan, Phillips (1957) and Lemon and associates 
(1972) describe individual adjustment in terms of role 
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definitions, examining various individual role-related 
self-conceptions. For example, in Phillips' (1957) role 
theory approach, self-conception means age-group 
identification, again something over which the individual 
has control. Phillips argues that age-identification has 
a significant impact on the relation between role changes 
and adjustment. He hypothesizes, for example, that role 
loss leads to maladjustment, but a positive age-
identification (defining oneself as young or middle age 
as opposed to old) reduces the strength of the 
relationship. Thus, while role loss--a social factor--
has an impact on adjustment, its effects can be 
conditioned by an individual's virtual redefinition of 
the role effect through varied identification. 
TIMING 
I now turn to the patterns of adjustment envisioned 
by activity theorists. Here, the question is, How long 
can one be successful or well-adjusted while aging before 
engaging the possibilities of maladjustment? Activity 
theorists do not specify a definite time point when an 
individual seriously experiences the problem of old age. 
As such, an elderly person conceivably can go from 
adjustment to unadjustment and even back to adjustment 
again. The different theoretical possibilities range 
from becoming unadjusted immediately after role losses, 
to intermittent successful aging, to continual adjustment 
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or maladjustment. For example, in assuming that elderly 
persons lose the roles they once occupied in American 
society, activity theorists predict unadjustment as soon 
as one retires, upon becoming widowed, or where other 
major role losses occur. Yet, the actual number, type, 
and sequence of losses, as well as the individual "doing 
something about it," can make for various courses of 
adjustment. Nonetheless, because role loss is considered 
inevitable, all elderly people are expected to confront, 
if not to experience, the problem of maladjustment. 
Amount and Sequence of Role Loss 
Activity theorists maintain that, though everyone 
experiences some sort of role loss in late life, not all 
experience them at the same rate. Factors such as 
physical or mental decline, death of a spouse, poverty, 
and loss of leadership of various kinds occur at a higher 
rate for some elderly individuals than for others. 
Indeed, while "old age is what the individual makes it, 
in the majority of cases" (Havighurst and Albrecht, 
1953:47), role loss can become so extreme as to virtually 
eliminate the effect of individual volition in the 
adjustment process. Yet, as Havighurst and Albrecht 
(1953:47) point out: "There appear to be few cases of 
individuals who are so ill, or so dependent financially, 
that they cannot find some reasonably satisfying roles to 
live." As a general rule, then, adjustment becomes a 
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matter of individual incentive, taking as many forms or 
having as many degrees as effort allows. 
The sequence of role loss further complicates the 
adjustment process. On the one hand, for example, the 
role loss experienced in the transition from adulthood to 
old age may be gradual, what Cavan and associates 
(1949:25) call ''one step at a time." Yet, on the other 
hand, the process may also involve several sudden 
changes, or "crises," in previously held roles 
(1949:28). The latter may even make an elderly person 
seriously maladjusted for a period of time. Depending 
upon the individual's response to his particular 
situation, again, many patterns may take shape. Indeed, 
a form of intermittent or circular adjustment may result, 
whereby one could conceivably become maladjusted at one 
time and be adjusted at some later period, only to 
subsequently experience maladjustment, should the 
conditions allow. 
Type of Role Gain 
Successful aging depends not only on being active in 
a variety of activities in everyday life, the activities 
must be socially approved forms of conduct. The 
portraits of successful aging describe small town middle 
American life, where acceptable daily life is centered on 
hobbies, volunteerism, church, family life, and so on. 
The image is quite evident in the various items of the 
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chicago Attitudes and Activities Inventory (Cavan et al., 
1949:149-159). The standard of adjustment reflects a 
stereotypic, small-town, white, Protestant, American 
lifestyle. To successfully grow old is to be 
community-involved, church-centered, club-oriented, all 
reflecting an activity-oriented, work-related lifestyle 
which serves as the standard of well-being or adjustment. 
While the general variable is activity, not all 
forms of activity appear in the vision of these 
researchers. Few of the following, for example, stand as 
portraits of successful aging: muggings, poverty, 
divorce, telephone talking (cf. Hochschild, 1973), 
small-time operators and other so-called underworld 
elderly hustlers (cf. stephens, 1976), drunkedness, and 
so on. The vision of age also does not encompass an 
earlier age in America (pre-20th century), where the 
affairs of everyday life were affected by the challenges 
of the frontier. Small town rural America is settled in 
activity theory, its way of life not continuously a 
source of dire challenges. Nor is the image in activity 
a contemporary one, encompassing the central city 
experiences of many elders, along with the portent of 
institutionalization (cf. Frankfather, 1977; Siegal, 
1978) . 
Thus, in substance, it isn't roles gained per se 
that substantiates readjustment, but the substance of 
particular roles: gardening, not bootlegging; church 
attendance, not pandering. The adjusted person is one 
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who takes on a large number and variety of "respectable" 
roles. Without mentioning this normative definition of 
role, the theorists predict that the more active the 
person, the greater his or her life satisfaction or 
adjustment in late life. 
The case of Mrs. Brodie (see Havighurst and 
Albrecht, 1953:39-43) is exemplary. She occupies several 
different roles, including mother, grandmother, wife, 
church leader, club woman, and citizen. Consider her 
typical day: 
The day starts early for Mrs. Brodie. By a 
little after six each morning, she said she 1s up 
and busy about the house. She works "like the 
dickens" until noon, doing all of her own washing 
and cleaning. Most of the afternoon she reserves 
for club work and social activities. The main meal 
of the household is at noon, and Mr. Brodie walks 
home from his office for this. Afterwards, while 
her husband stretches on the davenport, she often 
reads the paper or magazines to him for a half hour 
(1953:41). 
In their analysis of Mrs. Brodie, Havighurst and 
Albrecht (1953:41) flatly state that "It is unnecessary 
to report that nobody in Prairie City has a negative 
attitude toward Mrs. Brodie; or to say that she is a 
happy, well-adjusted woman. She fills a variety of 
generally approved social roles." 
Considering the image underlying activity theory as 
being the implicit standard for successful aging, what 
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then becomes of the nonrural, nonsmall town, nonWASP, 
elder in American society? Clearly nothing other than 
unsuccessful aging, or maladjustment, regardless of 
amount of individual effort realized. The parochial 
vision of what it means to be active sets the agenda for 
what counts as volitional activity in the first place. 
It is quite clear, for example, that such elders as 
stephens (1976) describes as being adjusted to SRO 
(single room occupancy hotel) living would not be 
qualified as adjusted in these activity theorists' 
judgments. As the scoring system of the Chicago 
Attitudes and Activities Inventory (Cavan et al., 
1949:183) illustrates, even the act of sitting and 
thinking is not considered an activity, a score of zero 
being given for this "nonactivity." Ironically, the 
researchers themselves would wind up losers on this item. 
Continuity of Life Span 
The Calvinistic aura in the work-related features 
making for successful aging also suggests that elderly 
individuals should be engaged in activities similar to 
their adult years. This implies that the type of roles 
one should engage in should have continuity with earlier 
roles. The assumption is that work-like activity in old 
age substitutes for roles typical of middle age as, for 
example, the farmer in late life turning to gardening 
illustrates (Cavan et al., 1949:16). Activity theory's 
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emphasis on the "proper" and unidimensional (work-like) 
aspect of continuity contrasts with other continuity 
research which takes continuity within one's life span, 
in whatever form it takes, as its focus instead of a 
particular kind and quality of activity as such (see 
"continuity theory" in Chapter 2 of the dissertation). 
Continuity also carries over into an individual's 
personal attributes. It is assumed that one's ability to 
adjust to role changes and crises in old age is reflected 
in an ability to do so at an earlier time in life. As 
Cavan and associates {1949:76) state: 
It is to be presumed that the person who is 
accustomed to adjusting to life's changes will 
adjust better in old age than the person who has led 
a static life; that the person accustomed to making 
rational decisions will continue to make them; that 
the person who has evaded issues will continue to 
evade them. 
The same principle is expressed in Havighurst and 
Albrecht's {1953:50) prognosis for successful aging, 
declaring that, "The best prescription for happiness in 
old age seems to be happiness in middle age." 
The continuity factor is further interpreted against 
differences in gender expectations. Consider, for 
example, Cavan and associates' {1949:23-24) remarks 
concerning society's ineptness at providing 
clearly-defined roles for the elderly: 
This failure is especially marked in the case of the 
old man, whose role was previously closely related 
to his employment and his position as chief wage 
earner in the family. For the old married woman, 
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the shift in role is less marked. In fact, such a 
shift may never be necessary if she is able to 
maintain her position as manager of her house. 
The situation of not having to experience role loss 
implies that, for some women, adjustment in old age is 
virtually automatic, something which seems to go against 
the theorists' assumption that the challenge of 
adjustment is inevitable in old age. The contradiction 
of sorts stems from the historical division of 
conceptions of acceptable male and female work roles. 
Nonetheless, for women as well as men, once role loss 
does occur, readjustment is inexorably tied to acquiring 
roles typical of middle age (see, for example, the case 
of Mrs. Herman in Cavan et al., 1949:84-86). 
The later activity literature, in giving greater 
credance to social sources as being part of the aging 
process, see the timing of adjustment as dependent on 
societal input as well as individual incentive in 
compensating for differential role loss. In contrast to 
the earlier activity formulations, the individual cannot 
as simply overcome the effects of social conditions by 
reorienting his or her investment in them, such as 
altering his or her reference group or age-
identification. 
RESPONSIBILITY 
The standard for successful aging, as described, 
portrays an elderly person as active in many roles, 
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typified by the socially "appropriate" round of life in 
proverbial small town middle America. Maladjustment, low 
morale, and life dissatisfaction are defined in 
opposition to the standard; whatever "misfits" is 
undesirable aging. What or who is to blame when 
adjustment goes awry? 
It is quite obvious in activity theory that it is 
the individual himself that is responsible for his fate 
in old age. As Cavan and associates (1949:27) state, for 
example, in regard to retirement, "It is not sufficient 
that the elderly person realizes intellectually that at 
age 65 many people are retired in the trade or profession 
that he follows. He must accept that fact as related to 
himself." As such, the first step to be taken was for 
the individual to accept the role losses that occur in 
his transition from adulthood to old age. The problem 
was not retirement per se (or any other role losses for 
that matter); this was considered to be a "natural" 
condition of life. Rather, the problem of aging was one 
of the individual accepting this "fact" and, in turn, 
adjusting to it. Consider, for example, how the authors 
(1949:27) describe the situation in which several 
unrelated changes occur simultaneously: "He [elderly 
person] undergoes a definite period of unadjustment and 
may become seriously maladjusted. Usually, however, he 
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is able to readjust by changed attitudes and activities" 
(emphasis added). 
cavan and associates (1949) describe continued 
maladjustment in terms of individual resistance. For 
these practically oriented researchers, rather than 
resisting the "facts" of old age, an individual should 
ideally prepare for them in advance and even manipulate 
the transition to avoid the crises which often occur, as 
their description of retirement illustrates: 
If he has a conviction or even a lingering hope that 
he will be one of the rare exceptions, then he has 
not faced the fact of retirement as it applies to 
himself. In all probability, he has not prepared 
himself for the change (Cavan et al., 1949:27-28). 
Responsibility is not only tied to the acceptance 
and preparation of role changes, but to certain ones at 
that. Indeed, when the "proper" roles are not chosen, it 
is still the individual's own fault. Consider, for 
example, the placement of blame in regard to the plight 
of Mrs. Egan, as opposed to Mrs. Bond. In comparing 
these two women to Mrs. Brodie's exemplary adjustment, 
Havighurst and Albrecht (1953:43) conclude: "Mrs. Egan 
and Mrs. Bond have the unfavored role of widow, but 
Mrs. Bond adds to this several acceptable and enjoyable 
roles, while Mrs. Egan makes her case worse by adding a 
number of inactive, unfavored roles." And, in an earlier 
passage, again comparing Mrs. Egan and Mrs. Bond to 
Mrs. Brodie, who has the good fortune of being able to 
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"grow old gracefully," the authors (1953:41) remark, 
"What about the people whom the aging process treats less 
pleasantly? Even for such people there are pleasant and 
favorable social roles if they will work for them" 
(emphasis added). As such, it is the individual elderly 
person's responsibility to choose and work toward 
accepting and living "active" roles in old age, in 
effect, seeking, building, and realizing social approval. 
Being responsible for his or her own plight in later 
life, the aged individual is the agent for what is to be 
done to treat or prevent maladjustment. Thus, in effect, 
intervention virtually becomes self-help. The essence of 
this is captured by that maxim of Protestant behavioral 
persuasion: "God helps those who help themselves." The 
resolution to maladjustment, then, is a matter of elderly 
persons virtually picking themselves up by their 
bootstraps and putting their lives in order. 
Provision was made, of course, for the possibility 
that elders might need help to solve their maladjustment 
(Cavan et al., 1949). This was to be located in the aid 
of what was then a relatively underdeveloped but soon to 
be a virtual "army" of service providers, whose ideas 
about social pathology fit the scheme of things very well 
(Mills, 1943). And, still, it was the individual who was 
responsible for making good on the services, taking 
advantage of the opportunities they provided. 
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The later activity literature (Cavan, 1962; Lemon, 
Bengtson, and Peterson, 1972; Phillips, 1957), in making 
greater overtures to the social nature of adjustment, 
shifts responsibility from the aging individual choosing 
roles to role-playing together with role-making. As 
cavan (1962:532-33) writes: "She (elderly individual] 
will receive a favorable reflection from her groups if 
she is courageous, if she attacks practical problems 
realistically, if she increases her civic or church work, 
and so forth." With greater emphasis on roles and role 
constraints, for successful adjustment in old age to 
occur, social forces must take over some of the 
responsibility for providing the "proper" roles and 
values for the elderly person to subsequently define 
himself. 
As the social sources of self-worth are emphasized, 
a leap into the social is not far away. But, it is 
important to note, what is at stake in the grammars 
considered in the next chapter is not a gradual turning 
to social agents of "maladjustment" but entirely new 
visions of it, lodged in social systems and structures. 
As such, the "individual" now becomes a social entity. 
CHAPTER 2 
ALTERNATE GRAMMARS OF LIFE SATISFACTION 
The analytic challenge of life satisfaction as the 
key to the problem of old age took three forms. One form 
was to maintain the focus on the aging individual, and 
life satisfaction in particular, introducing a variety of 
social and historical factors into the understanding of 
personal well-being. A second form was that of the 
political economists, who dismissed individual life 
satisfaction as a major concern and turned to power and 
privilege. A third form was social phenomenology, where 
the entire question of life satisfaction, aging, and 
individuality were themselves put to analytic scrutiny. 
In its own fashion, each form is a grammar for agency, 
timing, and social policy in regard to the problem of old 
age. This chapter focuses on the first form; the next 
chapter considers the grammars of the political 
economists and social phenomenologists. 
Included among the alternate grammars of life 
satisfaction are nine approaches, each represented here 
by particular exemplars: disengagement theory (Cumming 
and Henry, 1961); modernization theory (Cowgill and 
Holmes, 1972); age stratification (Riley, Johnson, and 
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Foner, 1972); socio-environmentalism (Gubrium, 1973); the 
social-career view (see Becker, 1970a, chapters 17 
through 20); the subcultural approach (Rose, 1965); 
exchange theory (Dowd, 1975) ; developmentalism (see 
Neugarten, 1968, chapters 6, 14, 17, 49; Erikson, 1950); 
the continuity approach (Atchley, 1972). I will first 
examine the range of the grammars. Then, with respect to 
the range, I discuss each grammar's agency, timing, and 
policy implications. 
THE RANGE OF LIFE SATISFACTION GRAMMARS 
Alternative grammars can be understood as occurring 
across a continuum of micro- to macro-social arguments. 
They range from macrosociological concerns, with causal 
emphasis placed on large-scale social structures, at one 
end, to microsociological sources, emphasizing 
intrapsychological and face-to-face encounters, at the 
other. Accordingly, as the following scheme shows, 
disengagement, modernization, and age stratification 
theories turned to large-scale social conditions to 
account for the life satisfaction of the individual. On 
the other hand, exchange, developmental, and continuity 
approaches turned to personal and interpersonal sources. 
And, mid-range, socio-environmental, social-career, and 
subcultural approaches combined the extremes in different 
ways. 
A Continuum of Life Satisfaction Grammars 
Macro-Grammars 
Disengagement 
Modernization 
Age stratification 
Combinations 
Socio-environmental 
Social-career 
Subcultural 
Micro-Grammars 
Exchange 
Developmental ism 
Continuity 
Like any classification, the attempt to achieve a 
sense of order out of a variety of perspectives 
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necessarily reduces its complications. Likewise, while 
the scheme does serve as a convenient means for comparing 
the theories at a general level, each configuration of 
theory, whether to the left, middle, or right end of the 
continuum, has its own internal considerations as well. 
In addition, each theory, in and of itself, is 
necessarily reduced in complexity to fit my general 
consideration of the alternate grammars of life 
satisfaction. It is the major focus of each theory, as 
well as the similarities within each configuration, that 
justifies the scheme. Moreover, by serving as a device 
for classifying theoretical variation, the scheme, 
itself, serves my primary purpose of distinguishing each 
major shift in the understanding of the problem of old 
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age. In this regard, for example, what separates this 
chapter from the previous one is the emphasis these 
grammars place on extra-individual sources of individual 
adjustment. Each, in its own way, stresses an ostensible 
"outside force" that affects what the individual can do, 
something in addition to the image of one simply picking 
himself up by his bootstraps. 
AGENCY 
While all the alternate grammars are concerned with 
explaining the process of individual adjustment, their 
means of explanation differ. Another way of putting it 
would be that they have a common dependent 
variable--individual well-being--but diverse independent 
variables. Thus, as far as the question of agency is 
concerned, one can distinguish between them by asking how 
each conceives of the source (the agent) of individual 
well-being. 
Macro-Sources 
Disengagement theory set the stage for the 
analytic challenge of life satisfaction, shifting the 
focus of attention away from the individual as a source 
of explanation. With the publication of a tentative 
statement in 1960 (Cumming et al.), along with Cumming 
and Henry's (1961) book, Growing Old, disengagement 
theory marks the first statement where a distinct theory 
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of aging in scientific form emerges, separate from 
practical applications, information gathering, and 
policymaking. Informed by Parsons' (1951) social 
systemic theorizing, Cumming and Henry (1961:14-15) argue 
that aging cannot be understood separate from the needs 
and characteristics of the social system in which it is 
experienced: 
In our theory, aging is an inevitable mutual 
withdrawal or disengagement, resulting in decreased 
interaction between the aging person and others in 
the social systems he belongs to. The process may 
be initiated by the individual or by others in the 
situation. The aging person may withdraw more 
markedly from some classes of people while remaining 
relatively close to others. His withdrawal may be 
accompanied from the outset by an increased 
preoccupation with himself; certain institutions in 
society may make this withdrawal easy for him. When 
the aging process is complete, the equilibrium which 
existed in middle life between the individual and 
his society has given way to a new equilibrium 
characterized by a greater distance and an altered 
type of relationship. 
While their study is composed of white, healthy, and 
economically-secure Kansas city residents, the authors 
nonetheless maintain the theory's universal status, that 
the "theory is intended to apply to the aging process in 
all societies" (Cumming and Henry, 1961:15). The aging 
process for disengagement theory involves a mutual 
withdrawal, with society virtually giving permission to 
the individual to disengage. Whether it be, for example, 
retirement for men (1961:146) or widowhood for women 
(1961:154), each is treated as the central task of the 
later adult years; the individual shows an inherent 
"readiness for disengagement" by means of these 
processes. 
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Drawing on functionalist reasoning, in which all 
behavioral patterns are construed in terms of the 
equilibrium needs of the system, the analysis of social 
interaction sees persons as being fused with society, 
wherein they become parts of, and not individuals in, 
social systems. In turning to the system and its needs 
for clues to the aging process, disengagement theory 
explains persons' actions in terms of the ongoing 
operations of the system of which they are a part. For 
example, in modern societies, with the emphasis placed on 
standards of achievement and efficiency, the social 
system, in order to be a viable one, requires its work to 
be done expeditiously and efficiently. Elderly persons, 
it is argued, do not contribute to the social system with 
the comparative efficiency of younger adults and thus 
present a burden to it. The functional maintenance of 
social systems, therefore, requires some mechanism for 
systematically disengaging the elderly from major life 
roles, roles critical to social systemic maintenance. 
While people make decisions concerning the life course, 
the choices they are assumed to make are 
normatively-defined. The individuals that exist are, 
thereby, "perfected," a quintessential individualism. As 
Cumming (1963:384) states: 
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The disengagement theory postulates that society 
withdraws from the ageing person to the same extent 
as that person withdraws from society. This is, of 
course, just another way of saying that the process 
is normatively governed and in a sense agreed upon 
by all concerned. 
In contrast to the "good citizen" in activity 
theory, which might be represented in the adage that "God 
helps those who help themselves," disengagement theory's 
"good citizen" is a complete member of his or her 
society, a dutiful sentry for system equilibrium. By 
internalizing the norms and values (becoming fully 
socialized) of society, the individual becomes the 
perfect individual, so perfect that he disappears into 
the normative fabric of the social order. He does not 
confront his society, participate in it as a member of 
some self-interested segment, nor does he dramaturgically 
manage his affairs in it. Rather, what exists in social 
life are systems of role-players, albeit individual ones, 
that articulate the functional needs of the wider system 
of which they are a part. 
While, on the one hand, disengagement theorists were 
decidedly not talking about individuals, they were still, 
on the other hand, concerned with individual adjustment 
and life satisfaction. System adjustment spawns 
satisfied individuals. Based on data generated from the 
Kansas City Study of Adult Life, wherein age-comparisons 
in levels of various kinds of social involvement and ego 
investment as well as attitudinal changes provided 
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evidence of the disengagement process, adjustment in old 
age hinged on proper system functioning. The individual 
in disengagement theory, in effect, takes it as his or 
her obligation to disengage for the benefit of the social 
order of which he or she is a part, something which 
ultimately depicts persons as being completely 
normatively governed. Indeed, to the extent one 
actualizes disengagement or becomes what Gouldner (1970) 
calls an "eager tool" of the system, he is adjusted or 
happy in old age. Cited by Cumming and Henry (1961:164), 
the case of Mr. Allen's retirement typifies the process: 
One important characteristic of Mr. Allen since we 
have known him has been his readiness to give up his 
strong bonds to work. His earlier history was one 
of competence, devotion, and pride in 
accomplishment. Yet on retiring he was able to 
alter his pattern with comparative ease, and with 
only minor twinges of guilt and feelings of loss. 
In common with many of our more successful male 
'disengagers,' Mr. Allen can point with pride to a 
past history of instrumental success, but he does 
not feel still bound to these goals. 
(See the cases of Mrs. Brown, pp. 171-179, Mrs. Clark and 
Mrs. Duncan, pp. 181-189, for similar descriptions of 
"successful" adjustment.) 
Responding to the considerable controversy generated 
by their original statement, Cumming and Henry offered 
separate revisions of their theory. This development is 
similar to the "later activity theorists'" revisions, 
except that for disengagement theorists, revision was 
more concertedly related to criticism. 
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In her article entitled, "Further Thoughts on the 
Theory of Disengagement," Cumming (1963) responded to the 
problem of differential adjustment or individual 
variations in the disengagement process. In her 
response, rather than merely acknowledging that 
variations do occur at the individual level, she offered 
a psycho-biological explanation for it, in a theory of 
temperament. Those who are temperamentally "impingers" 
are most likely to remain engaged, while "selectors" are 
most likely to disengage in later life. Aside from this 
amendment, the theory remains essentially the same. 
Henry's (1965) more extreme revision of disengagement 
theory practically abandons it in favor of a more 
expressly developmental perspective, an approach 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Cowgill (1974; Cowgill and Holmes, 1972) is the 
foremost exemplar of modernization theory. The theory 
argues that the elderly's high status held in past 
societies has declined (at least until the recent past), 
due to changes associated with industrialization. Like 
disengagement theory, the modernization approach is 
influenced by functionalism. However, whereas the former 
emphasized the normative features of social order, the 
latter focuses on structural/comparative factors, concern 
centering on the analysis of various societies at 
different stages of development. Cowgill's is not a 
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political economy of age, since he does not emphasize 
class dynamics as the force behind the changing status of 
the aged; rather, Cowgill's emphasis is on evolving 
systems of age statuses rooted in technological advances. 
Cowgill (1972) locates several variables associated 
with age, across societies, and attempts to develop a 
basis for a universal theory of aging. For example, he 
states that "the aged always constitute a minority of the 
total population" (1972:3). Additionally, he lists a 
number of age-relevant factors that vary across 
societies, such as level of technology, or degree of 
urbanization. Cross-cultural variations in income, 
urbanization, social mobility, education, and aging of 
the population, in varied combinations, ostensibly affect 
the status of the elderly. Together, these constitute 
Cowgill's (1972:2) independent variable, referred to as 
the degree of modernization, whereby "various societies 
can be arrayed on a continuum from least modernized to 
most modernized." 
Cowgill argues that in every society, the status of 
the aged is inversely related to the degree of 
modernization. As he (1972:12) writes, "The theory 
adduced here purports to be general and applicable to all 
societies." The author uses cross-cultural data that 
simulate history and thus over-determines the cause of 
change, in which all societies are assumed to follow our 
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paths. Persons are, in effect, determined by social 
structure, and one that is following a certain course at 
that. 
In his later work, Cowgill (1974) sets out to more 
explicitly define modernization by focusing on how its 
"four most salient aspects"--health technology, economic 
technology, urbanization, mass education--contribute to 
the diminishing status of the aged. (Cowgill also 
incorporates two other factors--what he calls 
"extraneous" variables-- namely, Work Ethic and Cult of 
Youth, but they are not as integral to the modernization 
process.) The four components of modernization represent 
the source of status, with individual adjustment tied to 
elders' relations to changing modes of production. 
Age stratification theory stems from the work of 
Riley and her associates (Riley, Johnson, and Foner, 
1972). It considers the historical and structural 
experiences of elders as a means of understanding 
individual adjustment. The theorists argue that age 
operates as a basis of stratification in a vein similar 
to other stratification systems, notably class. They 
conceive of social stratification in a more general 
manner than traditionally thought of, referring to it as 
any kind of hierarchy. In comparing and contrasting age 
stratification with that of class, the authors attempt to 
shoW the viable features of using a stratification 
perspective as it applies to age. 
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Riley and associates describe age stratification in 
terms of differential age cohorts, suggesting that one 
attempt to understand the individual experiences of 
growing old in terms of one's placement in the age 
structure. Treating social structure in a Mertonian 
fashion, the authors argue that an individual's location 
within a given age cohort--defined as "an aggregate of 
individuals who were born (or who entered a particular 
system) in the same time interval and who age together" 
(Riley et al., 1972:9)--determines his or her social 
allocation of roles, forming his beliefs and actions. As 
Foner (1976:17) remarks, in regard to the question of 
differential placement of individuals in strata, "a 
concise answer is that stratum membership governs the 
individual's access to the desiderata of the society and 
shapes his behavior and attitudes in myriad ways." 
The theory presents a cohort stratified society, 
where there is a configuration of events for various time 
slots or strata, experienced by select individuals--what 
Riley and associates (1972) call ''cohort centric." The 
analysis paints a determinant and mechanistic picture of 
human life: stratum membership governs and shapes the 
individual, leaving unattended the question of the 
subjectively-practical interpretation of cohort. 
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Cohorts are not described in terms of group-like 
qualities. Rather, they are taken to be statistical 
categories and categorical uniqueness stressed. The 
approach does not question how, and with what 
consequences, cohorts become groups for themselves, in 
the service of their own interests. (This, though is of 
central concern to Rose (1965), for one, whose 
subcultural theory is a theory of age-consciousness.) 
With the group-interested feature of age cohorts 
overlooked, the potential for intergenerational relations 
and conflicts is glossed over. The age stratification 
theorists, in contrast, tend to treat cohorts 
independently of each other, for analytic and research 
purposes. Their interest is in statistically contrasting 
the social and psychological characteristics of various 
cohorts historically in order to display cohort-related 
variations in them, not in how, for example, their 
concrete social relations might generate the 
differences. The source of individual age-status, as 
such, is the cohorts themselves which, in turn, make for 
personal well-being. 
Mid-Continuum Sources 
The socio-environmental approach, exemplified by 
Gubrium (1973), came as a direct challenge to both 
activity and disengagement theory. Gubrium suggested 
that the theories were too narrow in not taking into 
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account what the meaning of activity or disengagement 
(nonactivity) was for those concerned. Activity 
theorists assumed that activity was an individually 
valued conduct; disengagement theorists took the opposite 
point of view, interpreting value in terms of system 
needs. The author (1973:33), in stating that "No 
particular kind or degree of activity is an indicator of 
a specific attitude," attempted to combine the two 
approaches by directing attention to the interplay of 
individual and social contexts of the immediate 
environment of the aged as it affects a person's morale 
(see Figure 1) . 
Figure 1 shows that the socio-environmental 
perspective has three separate components. The first 
two--the individual and social components--make up a 
given old age environment, entailing both activity 
resources and activity norms. Activity resources include 
one's level of health, financial solvency, and social 
support. Activity norms are shared expectations of what 
is appropriate behavior for different social contexts. 
Each of the first two features is independent of the 
other and each can pose various constraints on the 
person, who makes up the third element of the theory. As 
Gubrium (1973:36) points out, "Environments for the aged 
are external constraints on persons' actions. The 
constraints may be social and/or individual 
Figure 1. The Socio-Environrnental Approach 
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• t • II restrl.C 1.ons. Persons, on the other hand, take into 
account the meaning their own activity resources (e.g., 
good versus ill-health) have in light of surrounding 
norms. 
In considering both the individual and social 
dimensions of his environment, and the relationship 
between the two, an elderly individual's adjustment is 
determined. As the author (1973:59) states: 
The aged take both the conditions of their 
individual resources and the conditions of their 
social world as contingencies of their 
environments. Life satisfaction or morale, as a 
state of mind, is significantly influenced by this 
two-sided environment. 
As such, the object of concern, or independent variable, 
for this theory is the combined effect of contextual 
interaction. Depending on the degree of congruence 
between them, one is either adjusted or not. 
Others have advocated a similar kind of approach to 
old age adjustment (e.g., Kahana, 1974; Kuypers and 
Bengtson, 1973), whereby the impact of different 
environments on the well-being of the aged has been 
examined. Kahana (1974), for example, has argued that 
individual adjustment in old age is contingent on 
congruency in person-environment fit, wherein the 
characteristics of the aging individual are aligned with 
environmental conditions. As she states (1974:203), "it 
is hypothesized here that a close fit between 
environmental characteristics and individual preference 
and needs should result in a sense of well-being and 
adequate functioning of the elderly individual." 
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What might be called the social-career view of aging 
(see Becker, 1970a, chapters 17 through 20) is a brand of 
symbolic interactionism in that it looks at the roles 
people engage in and how they are socially organized. 
Life change or stability is a matter of others' 
definitions of the self. The relationship between self 
and role is interactional, whereby one comes to know and 
realize himself by means of various roles (habitual forms 
of action) played (cf. Karp and Yoels, 1982). The 
situations people encounter in life provide structured 
settings that socially define the self. The self, on the 
other hand, is also an active entity that changes with 
situated interactions. The process involves taking the 
role of the other, with the self seeking others' 
definitions of its behavior and subsequent course of 
action. Accordingly, shared understandings of life 
experiences develop, making social order possible. 
The approach, like many forms of symbolic 
interactionism, stands between the micro and macro points 
of view. Becker (1970c) sees both--the analysis of 
personality components of the self as well as the proper 
instillation of societal values--as being too simplistic 
in suggesting that a single course of life change can 
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explain the many variations in the life cycle. Instead, 
he (1970c:287) argues, 
social structure creates the conditions for both 
change and stability in adult life. The structural 
characteristics of institutions and organizations 
provide the framework of the situations in which 
experience dictates the expediency of change. 
similarly, they provide the counters with which 
side-bets can be made and the links between lines of 
activity out of which commitment grows. Together, 
they enable us to arrive at general explanations of 
personal development in adult life without requiring 
us to posit unvarying characteristics of the person, 
either elements of personality or of 'value 
structure.' 
Becker's analysis is organized around the concepts 
of situational adjustment and commitment. Situational 
adjustment is used to account for variations in adult 
life (as well as life in general), whereas commitment 
explains constancy. Becker (1970c:279) states that 
people exhibit marked changes as they move through youth 
and adulthood (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, styles of 
interaction) and that concomitant situational factors 
require one "to act in a certain way or to hold certain 
beliefs." The author also asserts that situational 
adjustment is often a collective process involving a 
"batch" of people. He cites his famous study concerning 
medical students' shift in belief from a naive idealistic 
approach to one oriented towards "getting through the 
system" (see Becker et al., 1961). The self, as such, 
does not act at will, but rather is constrained by the 
actions of others or co-participants, a process "in which 
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individuals take on the characteristics required by the 
situations they participate in" (Becker, 1970c:276). 
During this process, wittingly or not, persons make 
side-bets, a process involving "a variety of commitments 
which constrain one to follow a consistent pattern of 
behavior in many areas of life" (Becker, 1970c:285). The 
concept of commitment provides for personal stability in 
light of changing situations over the life span. As 
Becker (1970b:301) explains: 
A person is committed whenever he realizes that it 
will cost him more to change his line of behavior 
than it will to continue to act in a way that is 
consistent with his past actions, and that this 
state of affairs has come about through some prior 
action of his own. So committed, he will resist 
pressures to adjust to new situations that push him 
in a contrary direction, perhaps moving out of those 
situations where that is possible or else attempting 
to change the situation so that he can continue in 
the direction of his commitment. 
Here lies the dualism of self and social structure. The 
interplay between the processual self, on the one hand, 
and the chains of roles organized over time that serve to 
define it, on the other, make for social-career lines. 
The object of concern, or independent variable, focuses 
on the social definition of careers, out of which emerges 
individual adjustment. 
Rose's (1965) subcultural theory of aging also 
incorporates macro and micro elements in its analysis. 
The perspective considers the nature and extent of 
contacts among the elderly as well as the affinity they 
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have for each other. For Rose, a subculture occurs, when 
a certain category of people interact with each other to 
a much greater extent than with other categories of 
people. The net result, in this case, is the development 
of an aged-subculture with distinctive norms and values, 
providing a new set of roles for the elderly to define 
themselves. 
It is clear that Rose is referring to one 
predominant subculture for the elderly. This is seen in 
frequent references to g subculture or the subculture of 
the aged in his descriptions of the theory. The title of 
Rose's (1965) article "The Subculture of the Aging" 
suggests the same, depicting the notion that "the aging 
subculture is a general one that cuts across other 
subcultures--those based on occupation, religion, sex, 
and possibly even ethnic identification" (1965:7). 
Rose argues that the aging subculture has both 
positive and negative aspects to it. He (1965:78) 
describes them as follows: 
The positive things are those which older people 
enjoy doing together, or which the whole society 
encourages them to do together, or which they 
interpret as being a special opportunity for those 
with their status. The negative things are those 
which the elderly do together because they find 
themselves rejected or otherwise in opposition to 
the rest of society. 
The author compares the negative aspect of the subculture 
to a counterculture in American society, much like other 
minority groups. In this respect, minority group theory 
(Streib, 1965) can be thought of as a theory of 
subcultures, in this case, a minority aged subculture. 
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Rose also claims that the status systems of older 
persons only partially reflect that of the rest of 
society. As such, the behavior of the elderly is not so 
much evaluated in terms of some overall social standard 
or norm but, rather, is tied to the meanings generated 
out of an endemic subculture, as is the case with other 
kinds of subgroups. In this regard, such factors as 
physical and mental health as well as active leadership 
in old age associations take on special importance. 
Being relatively harder to achieve, or maintain, they are 
more highly regarded and thus have higher status among 
the elderly. 
In general, the theory holds that, as soon as one 
begins to define himself or herself as old in American 
society, there comes a corresponding negative change in 
self-conception, which ultimately leads, for most elderly 
people, to disengagement and depression. However, a 
phenomenon known as ''aging group consciousness" is, 
likewise, occurring. The process involves the elderly 
seeing themselves not merely as a group of people but as 
a group conscious of itself, having its own common 
interests and associated courses of action. This enables 
a new set of meanings and evaluations of old age, such as 
group pride, to emerge. Here, then, lies the object of 
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concern, or independent variable: subcultural variations 
that provide diverse contexts, and standards, by which to 
evaluate the aging process. A subculture of age provides 
a collectively representative source of personal 
understanding and self-evaluation, specific to its 
members' unique characteristics. 
Micro-Sources 
Dowd's exchange theory (1975) argues that the 
relationship between the conduct of elderly persons and 
individual adjustment, or life satisfaction, can be 
understood against a contribution/return logic operating 
in elders' experience. In contrast to activity and 
disengagement theories, in which the author states 
(1975:585) that "neither theory •.. attempts to offer 
anything but the most perfunctory of explanations for the 
decreased social interaction itself," exchange theory's 
main concern is with the question of why elders, for the 
most part, withdraw from social life. Informed by Homans 
(1961) and Blau (1964), Dowd's analysis "views social 
interaction as basically an exchange of rewards between 
two social actors, be they individuals or groups of 
individuals" (1975:592). The language of economics is 
used to describe the contingencies of exchange. 
However, what is exchanged is not necessarily dollars or 
goods; it may include such nonmaterial returns as 
recognition, compliments, avoidance, or other valued 
rewards and aversions. 
In presenting evidence for elderly dependence 
"representing the structural realities of 
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twentieth-century industrial society," (1975:109) as well 
as cohort effects, Dowd does make overtures to macro 
elements in his theory. Yet, his exchange approach 
ultimately leads to an analysis of face-to-face 
encounters, as the following remarks show: 
Exchange theory . . . posits that the degree of 
engagement in old age is an empirical question, an 
outcome of a specific exchange relationship between 
an individual or group of individuals and the 
society in which the more powerful exchange partner 
dictates the terms of the relationship (Dowd, 
1975:593). 
Dowd presents an image of age and social integration 
built on a cost-benefit model of social participation. 
In contrast to disengagement theory, he maintains that 
the withdrawal andjor social isolation of elderly people 
are not the result of system needs or norms of mutual 
consent, but rather of an unequal exchange process in 
which older people are not "getting a fair shake." 
Adjustment is contingent on the immediate economy of 
costs and benefits that exist between persons. A 
principle of distributive justice--the balance of 
contributions and rewards--comes into play in aging such 
that, as elders find they can make fewer contributions 
because of decrepitude, they experience a decline in 
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power at not being able to justify social returns. As 
such, they begin to disengage to balance the exchange 
equation. Accordingly, Down explains life satisfactions 
and dissatisfactions. 
Developmentalists, in general, are interested in 
patterned ego changes across the life course. In regard 
to old age, the work of Neugarten, Gutmann, and others 
(Neugarten, 1964; 1968; Neugarten, Havighurst, and Tobin, 
1968; Havighurst, Neugarten, and Tobin, 1968; Neugarten 
and Gutmann, 1968; Gutmann, 1968; 1976), as well as part 
of Erikson's theory of ego/cognitive development (1950), 
are exemplary. The primary concern is with the person's 
internal or intrapsychic responses to the aging process. 
A personality type is treated, at least in principle, as 
something analytically distinct from self-regard. 
Because of this, developmentalists are able to raise 
questions about the relationship between self, on the one 
hand, and developmental type, on the other. 
The theories differ in regard to how they define 
particular elements of the developmental process. 
Concern may center on "developmental tasks," thereby 
allowing for alternative modes of personality development 
(Erikson, 1950), or on developmental styles that grow out 
of different personality types (Neugarten, 1968; 
Neugarten, Havighurst, and Tobin, 1968), as well as 
universal, intrinsic properties of growing old (Neugarten 
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and Gutmann, 1968; Gutmann, 1968; 1976). Thus, while 
some emphasize the environment in shaping growth, others 
focus in on the coping styles of types of persons across 
environments. All, nonetheless, focus on a developmental 
logic as the source of self-adjustment. 
The internal processes or personality are measured 
by either asking elderly individuals questions or having 
them interpret visual protocals (among other projective 
techniques), the answers to which provide a clue to 
adjustment. The clues also represent the particular 
stage one is at. The stages are understood to have some 
sort of im'pact on the personality, an impact that is 
universal in nature, regardless of roles inhabited. In 
effect, the particular stage one is located in determines 
the personality's adjustment in old age, as when, for 
example, one manifests an active versus passive mode of 
mastery in relating to the environment (Neugarten and 
Gutmann, 1968; Gutmann, 1968; 1976). 
Erikson's model, however, does provide for a modicum 
of freedom for the individual by allowing for 
developmental alternatives. Likewise, Neugarten and 
associates' (1968:176-77) analysis of personality types, 
called "personality continuity," sees the individual as 
one who "continues to exercise choice and to select from 
the environment in accordance with his own 
long-established needs." Yet, while addressing human 
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freedom, both schemes merely pay lip service to it, the 
focus instead being on the personality or developmental 
type arising over time. Consider, for example, how 
Neugarten and associates (1968:177) summarize their 
analysis: 
we regard personality as the pivotal dimension in 
describing patterns of aging and in predicting 
relationships between level of social role activity 
and life satisfaction. • . . in normal men and 
women, there is no sharp discontinuity of 
personality with age, but instead an increasing 
consistency. Those characteristics that have been 
central to the personality seem to become even more 
clearly delineated, and those values the individual 
has been cherishing become even more salient. In 
the personality that remains integrated--and in an 
environment that permits--patterns of overt behavior 
are likely to become increasingly consonant with the 
individual's underlying personality needs and his 
desires. 
The object of concern, or independent variable, for 
developmental theorists is located in one's personality 
or inner ego processes, the normal (successful) 
resolution or particular developmental type making for 
individual adjustment in old age. 
The continuity approach (see Atchley, 1972), while 
not presented as a formal theory of aging, has also been 
taken into account by a variety of researchers. The view 
holds that: 
in the process of becoming an adult, the individual 
develops habits, commitments, preferences, and a 
host of other dispositions that become a part of his 
personality. As the individual grows older, he is 
predisposed toward maintaining continuity in his 
habits, associations, preferences, and so on 
(Atchley, 1972:36). 
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As Atchley argues, individuals are inclined to 
maintain a consistent line of behavior in old age. In 
contrast to the developmental perspective, where the 
focus is on emerging inner-psychological life, the 
concern here is with continued patterns of behavior based 
on lifelong experiences that are repeated as one ages. 
The continuity perspective differs from activity theory 
as well, in that, rather than advocating a "normal" 
process of continuity (i.e., work-like activity) in late 
life for successful aging to occur, the focus is instead 
on continuity per se, regardless of what form it takes. 
Thus, the source of individual adjustment is the 
regularity of life conditions over the life course. 
Empirically, Townsend (1968) exemplifies the 
continuity perspective as it relates to adjustment in 
later life. The approach is a useful foil to the 
unidimensional and global views of both activity and 
disengagement theories. Specifically, Townsend had 
social regularity in mind as a critique of activity 
theory. Rather than take for granted a modal (normal) 
level of activity throughout the life cycle, the author 
focused on the regularity of any level of activity over 
the span of one's life. He found desolation (e.g., an 
irregular isolation due to the recent death of a 
spouse), and not lifelong (socially regular) isolation, 
to be the major factor affecting one's life satisfaction 
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in old age. Social regularity or continuity in lifestyle 
was the critical variable, not any particular level of 
activity. The source of adjustment, then, is continuity 
in one's lifelong style of life, what one has become 
accustomed to as personally normal. 
TIMING 
I now turn to the timing factor in the alternate 
grammars. As in the previous section, I look at the 
macro theories first, then the mid-continuum sources and, 
finally, the micro end of the continuum. 
Macro-Timings 
Disengagement theory is described as being not only 
a mutual and universal process, but also inevitable in 
later life (Cumming and Henry, 1961). The theory 
presents the adjustment process as an inexorable feature 
of old age, eventually occurring in everyones' lives, in 
all societies. While certain to happen to all, how is 
its timing explained? In other words, what is the social 
chronology of the system's adjustment process? 
Cumming and Henry (1961:221) use a rainbow metaphor 
to describe social ties across the life course, with 
childhood and old age being categorically, but not 
necessarily totally, individualistically disengaged 
relative to middle age. There is a continual and 
systematic confluence of ties with the normative 
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structure of society as one proceeds from early to middle 
age (i.e., internalizing society's norms and values); the 
opposite phenomenon occurs from middle to old age, 
whereby persons, in their readiness to disengage, become 
less and less bound to the fabric of society. Once 
begun, it "becomes a circular, or self-perpetuating, 
process" (Cumming and Henry, 1961:211). 
Besides being inevitable and systematic in its 
patterning, disengagement theory also has a structured, 
incremental decline in societal involvement to it. The 
authors (1961:134) refer to this process as involving at 
least four stages, as follows: 
Those at the beginning or first stage have none of 
the three characteristics of disengagement; namely, 
over sixty-five years of age, withdrawn object 
cathexis, or lack of a central task. The 
respondents in this category are considered fully 
engaged. Those at the second and third stages are 
considered partially disengaged and have one and two 
characteristics, respectively. Those at the fourth 
level have all three characteristics and are 
considered fully disengaged. 
Cumming and Henry (1961:211) also state that 
"Because people differ in physiology, temperament, 
personality, and life situation, disengagement occurs 
earlier for some people than for others." They point 
out, for example, that such occupations as university 
professors and preachers, by having styles "more 
compatible with the disengaged condition" (1961:146), or 
those "especially endowed biologically" (see the case of 
Mrs. Elton, pp. 196-98), are exceptions to the gradual 
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and systematic decline process. Moreover, in addressing 
disengagement as a whole, the researchers remark, on a 
number of occasions, that the precise form the process 
takes will differ for each person. Thus, at the 
individual level, the theory allows for considerable 
variation in the disengagement process, as any 
unidimensional and global theory must do. On the other 
hand, drawing on functionalist reasoning, disengagement 
theorists were not dealing with individuals per se. 
Indeed, the individual articulation of what they consider 
to be a feature of aging roles within a social system is 
another matter altogether. 
In line with their social structural argument, and 
with functionalism in general, Cumming and Henry point 
out differences in gender roles and how they affect the 
timing of disengagement. The differences are due to a 
division of labor within the system, where men are said 
to prefer instrumental paths and women socio-emotional 
ones. As a result, the transition is seen to be easier 
for women who, granted they are dutiful, may never 
experience problems of adjustment in the disengagement 
process; men, on the other hand, categorically experience 
a more abrupt transition and, as such, may be temporarily 
unadjusted. Both men and women, however, will experience 
a crisis after being removed from their central roles in 
life (work and marriage, respectively) if they are not 
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provided the proper "disengaged" roles in their gradual 
process of decline in activity in old age. The 
structural differences between men and women, within a 
given system, are similar to those between various 
systems. As the authors (1961:218) state, "Disengagement 
is a culture-free concept, but the form it takes will 
always be culture-bound." 
Cumming and Henry interpret the gender differences 
as simply involving men and women coming upon various 
stages of the disengagement process at different times, 
wherein for women, as opposed to men, "There is time to 
absorb each stage in the well-spaced transition" 
(1961:159). Indeed, in the final analysis, the two 
patterns merge into one, as both men and women "display 
in their eighties and nineties the same pattern of 
dependency, self-satisfaction, self-centeredness, and 
placidity" (1961:158). (Those who don't display these 
patterns are, likewise, said not to be adjusted or 
satisfied). And, as the authors go on to compare those 
in their eighties and up, categorically referred to as 
"the very old," to those in their seventies, assumed to 
be at an earlier stage of disengagement/adjustment, the 
continual and systematic pattern of withdrawal is further 
illustrated: 
These very old people seem inwardly directed; all 
their energy is spent in one form or another on 
self-concern, without interference from the social 
norms that once forced them to consider others. On 
67 
the other hand, our seventy-year-olds still seem to 
be in the process of being freed from these 
norms (1961:204). 
The ultimate or total form of disengagement, 
however, is death. Here lies the final end point of 
timing for disengagement theory; in time, all will 
disengage. By the same token, it follows that, in time, 
all will be adjusted. 
Death also provides further evidence for the theory 
as being both an inevitable and universal process of 
life. The process leading up to death initially involves 
a psychological shift, where individuals ready themselves 
for the actual relinquishment of roles central to 
societal functioning. Functional prerequisites require 
some means to facilitate one's removal from its 
infrastructure. As the individual withdraws from more 
and more social roles, it leads to a final preparation of 
his or her separation from the social order: "By the end 
of his life, his bonds have been all but 
severed--disengagement is complete, he is free to die, 
and death is the last logical step in the process of 
living" (Cumming and Henry, 1961:227). 
By gradually removing oneself from society and 
making room for others, one is "free to die," as such, 
without disrupting the equilibrium of the social system. 
Dying, therefore, is the final contribution one makes to 
societal functioning. Death, in time, sustains the 
ultimate efficiency of the social system. 
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In Cumming's (1963) later psychobiological analysis, 
the sense of timing remains the same. Henry's (1965) 
revision, on the other hand, takes on a developmental 
mode of timing, which is discussed later in this chapter. 
Modernization theory, like disengagement, is a 
functionalist theory of aging. The pattern individual 
adjustment takes is not the same, however. While both 
are presented as universal theories by their respective 
proponents, individual adjustment for the modernization 
perspective, in contrast to that of disengagement, is 
connected to history, to the timing of modernization. 
While disengagement theory acknowledges variations in 
forms of withdrawal that differ culturally, all, in time, 
eventually do disengage. Modernization theory, on the 
other hand, sees a direct link between the rapidity of 
social change and elderly adjustment. As Cowgill 
(1972:13) states, "the role and status of the aged varies 
systematically with the degree of modernization of 
society" 
Each of Cowgill's salient variables--health 
technology, economic technology, urbanization, 
education--begins a set of changes adversely affecting 
elderly adjustment. As he (1974:140) explains, 
"Selecting the four most salient aspects of 
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modernization, we have sought to delineate the causal 
chain linking each with the ultimate outcome--diminished 
status for the aged." Consider, for example, the health 
technology factor, as it sets in motion a linear, 
straightforward sequence of events leading to lower 
status for the elderly. The process begins with the 
increased longevity of older people. This, combined with 
the lowering of the birth rate, results in the aging of 
the population. The greater proportion of older people 
causes intergenerational competition in the work place 
which leads to the elderly being forced out, thus 
decreasing their status. The other three variables 
(economic technology, urbanization, and education) 
similarly trigger their own sequences of events, all 
ultimately resulting in the elderly's falling status, 
Cowgill's term for maladjustment (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2 depicts individual adjustment as a 
long-term phenomenon, tied to the timing of modernizing 
influences within all societies. Modernization theory's 
global and linear pattern leaves unattended the differing 
effects industrialization has had on elderly people (cf. 
Quadagno, 1982). The approach's linearity is not 
inevitable, however, but rather represents an ideology of 
developed countries. Modernization is but a glorified 
expression of the Western model toward which all 
societies ostensibly move ''in time." 
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Palmore and Manton's (1973) additional evidence 
shows that educational and occupational differences 
between the elderly and other aged groups tends to level 
off in more advanced stages of modernization. As such, 
the pattern of adjustment is curvilinear or, more 
specifically, J-shaped, where early industrialization 
depresses the status of the aged, later industrialization 
increasing it somewhat. This accords with cowgill's 
(1974:142) version of change where he states that, 
while modernization is detrimental to the status and 
interests of the aged in is (sic) early stages this 
trend may "bottom out" in later stages of 
modernization and from then on there is some 
comparative improvement in the status and condition 
of older people. 
Age stratification's sense of timing also 
focuses on long-term adjustment patterns, the particular 
forms taken being linked to cohort/historical components 
(see Figure 3). 
Figure 3 shows that the aging process takes place in 
a chronological fashion: one grows older, not younger. 
Simultaneously, groups of cohorts, taken together (age 
strata), "age" at the same time, a pattern that is both 
continuous and unchanging. As Riley and others (1972:9) 
state, "The succession of cohorts . . . is an inevitable 
and irreversible process." 
The critical time element making up individual 
adjustment in old age is the historical dimension, 
expressed through cohort analysis. Each cohort enters 
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Figure 3. Aging and Cohorts Over Time 
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and proceeds through the age strata with a particular set 
of historical experiences. The various experiences one 
may encounter, in turn, make for differential patterns of 
adjustment. As Riley and associates (1972:11) explain: 
patterns of aging can differ, not only from one 
society to another and from one century to another 
• . . but also among successive cohorts in a single 
society. For any given cohort, the pattern of aging 
will reflect the unique historical background of the 
cohort, and the special patterns of its 
compositional segments." 
Various demographic characteristics such as race and 
sex composition as well as differential patterns of 
longevity, both within and between cohorts, along with 
one's historical situation, make for a given pattern of 
adjustment in old age. Thus, the timing of adjustment is 
cohort-specific. In this regard, Riley and her 
associates' work, like cowgill's, features a structured 
time component. 
The authors (1972:524) use an escalator metaphor in 
analyzing the structured flow of cohorts over time: 
imagine an escalator rising through the several 
floors (which bound the age strata) of a building. 
All entrants to the building move directly onto the 
bottom of this escalator (are born), ride steadily 
upward (grow older), and exit from the building once 
they reach the top (die). One the way up, the 
riders can view the scenes on each of the several 
floors. 
They go on to describe what they call a "stable 
situation," which entails homogeneous successive cohorts 
on the escalator, versus a "flexible situation," where 
the size and composition of cohorts both entering the 
escalator and riding upward varies, and how such 
variations make for differences in the age structure. 
The authors then bring in the historical dimension to 
display how successive cohorts may differ in the aging 
process. As they (1972:525) state: 
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Perhaps the scene on some of the floors is 
undergoing continual alteration. Then different 
riders, even though arriving at the same floor, are 
exposed to widely varied experiences on that floor 
depending on the time of their arrival. This is the 
temporal feature of cohort succession that links the 
population processes to history. 
Thus, it is argued that elderly people's evaluation 
of life--whether life satisfaction, morale, depression, 
hopefulness, optimism, conservatism--can only be 
understood by looking at historical and cohort 
experiences as a way to understand individual adjustment 
(Riley, 1973). Various examples such as living through 
the Great Depression, increased longevity, and changing 
women's roles are cited as evidence of differential 
cohort effects. For example, it has been argued that, as 
elderly people age, they become more parochial in their 
thinking, preferring more conservative lifestyles and 
taking a reserved view of political and economic change. 
While much data has supported the proposition, Riley and 
associates would maintain that this may indeed be a 
cohort effect. If age experiences were stratified into 
age cohorts, the foregoing support might only apply to a 
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particular one. And, at some other historical times, for 
some other cohorts, the relationship could be reversed. 
The timing of individual adjustment, then, rather 
than being universal, inevitable, and irreversible, is 
bound (cohort centric) by a particular time and place. 
While the aging process (chronological aging) is 
presented as universal, inevitable, and irreversible, 
being bound to cohorts and, as such, history, makes for 
variability in patterns of individual adjustment. To the 
degree time and place are diverse (i.e., flexible 
situation) so, too, are patterns of individual 
adjustment. Similarly, more similar conditions produce 
the opposite effect (i.e., stable situation). 
Still, the pattern of adjustment in old age, while 
infinite to the extent different historical periods are 
unique, is nonetheless limited in its duration. The 
finitude of cohorts was shown in the earlier quote about 
the escalator, where all "passengers" leave the building 
after their ride through life, regardless of the form 
adjustment takes. Thus, in time, all eventually do 
become maladjusted, but in different ways. As such, 
while particular cohort experiences are historically 
specific, history has a general course of increment. 
Mid-Continuum Timings 
Gubrium's (1973) socio-environmental approach sees 
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the timing of individual adjustment as situationally 
problematic. As he puts it: 
From the socio-environmental point of view, persons 
and their self-dispositions or attitudes shall be 
taken as situationally and actively variable. The 
action of persons is contingent on the significant 
expectations of others within particular contexts of 
social interaction. Attitudes toward self vary with 
changes in the contexts of social interaction and 
emerge out of the individual and social 
contingencies of these contexts (1973:34). 
Activity resources and activity norms are the two 
socially contingent factors most prominent in old age. 
Depending on one's health and economic state, as well as 
degree of social support, an elderly person will either 
have the activity resources for being very active or, its 
opposite, very inactive. As the author (1973:39) states, 
"Depending on their potential, activity resources 
determine the flexibility to decide upon a course of 
action that persons have at their disposal." These 
resources are also influenced by the activity norms of a 
person's environment. In the same manner that people are 
constrained by the extent of their activity resources so, 
too, are they confronted by certain expectations in a 
given environment. As such, depending on one's activity 
resources as well as the norms for interpreting them, 
there are either positive or negative consequences for 
adjustment in old age. 
The constraining features of old age environments 
make for relatively stable self attitudes, or life 
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satisfaction, over time. Nonetheless, it is conceivable 
for there to be many patterns of adjustment in old age, 
each stable over time. As Gubrium (1973:43) writes, 
"there are at least as many potential states of high 
morale as there are legitimized degrees and kinds of 
activity which are fulfilled by the elderly." The same, 
of course, holds true for unadjustment in old age. As 
such, maladjustment is not as much a process in time but 
one that, depending on the stability of its social and 
individual contexts, has some or no timing at all. 
The social-career view also entails problematic 
adjustment patterns. The interplay between the emerging 
self and the variety of social roles that serve to define 
it make for a number of different possible timings. 
Becker's concepts of situational adjustment and 
commitment not only make up social career lines but, at 
the same time, provide for diversity in its structure 
over time. On the one hand, career lines can be very 
unstable and erratic, which "re~ult from situations which 
do not permit people to become committed because they 
deny to them the means, the chips, with ·which to make 
side-bets of any importance" (Becker, 1970c:285). 
(Becker cites, as examples, students' medical training 
and their increasing divorce rate.) Other conditions, on 
the other hand, foster consistent lines of behavior: 
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Commitment can only occur when there are things 
present in the environment which are valuable enough 
that their loss constitutes a real loss. But 
objects acquire that kind of value only through the 
operation of a social organization, which both 
embodies the consensus that ascribes major value to 
them and creates the structural conditions under 
which they achieve the necessary attribute of 
scarcity (Becker, 1970b:301). 
The degree to which social structure provides these 
mechanisms varies not only at the individual level, but 
also in more institutionalized settings, where side-bets 
tend to be formalized. Becker and Strauss (1970) 
describe such patterns in their analysis of career lines 
in work organizations. Organizational career lines can 
range from the ideal (which is never fully realized), 
whereby "recruits enter at the bottom in positions of 
least prestige and move up through the ranks as they gain 
in age, skill, and experience" (1970:246), to any number 
of social configurations. The authors (1970:246) use the 
metaphor of escalators to describe the patterns: 
The flow of personnel through an organization . . . 
[involves] ... a number of streams; that is, there 
may be several routes to the posts of high prestige 
and responsibility. These may be thought of as 
escalators. 
In applying the metaphor, Becker and strauss 
maintain that, while some career lines may be fairly well 
laid out, in which "higher positions are routinely filled 
from aspirants at the next lower level" (1970:247), 
others involve a pattern much more complicated in time 
and space. The movement of a career line, for example, 
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need not be upward, but may also be downward, as well as 
lateral, where one switches to another escalator 
(switching careers). The speed or pace at which one 
advances might also vary; for example, sudden vacancies 
or "being at the right place at the right time" make for 
rapid movement, while opposite situations such as lack of 
skills may lead to being "frozen" at a certain level. 
Indeed, "some people never set foot on a work escalator 
but move from low job to low job" (1970:255). 
While any number of situational possibilities can 
make for differential career line patterns, such as 
recruitment and replacement, training, group allegiance, 
career interdependence, as well as the changing work 
world, the focus remains on g developing career over 
time. This involves various organizational as well as 
personal side-bets. For example, organizations may 
provide a set sequence of positions and skills related to 
a person's age, along with monetary and other rewards, to 
provide incentives for a certain type of career 
movement. Individuals, too, may have invested time and 
money, as well as perso~al loyalties, along a career 
route. The particular side-bets involved, which vary by 
organization, help make for stability. As such, the 
timing of the particular path a career line takes is 
related in large measure to the type of structural 
side-bets. Progress in the course and value of 
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self-references making up individual adjustment develops 
accordingly, for better or worse, as selves become 
committed to certain situated definitions to the 
exclusion of others. Applied to later life, aging is 
confronted in terms of the investments and divestments 
experienced in varied careers of the life course. This 
makes it possible to relate varied careers to success in 
the later years. 
For subcultural theory, the timing of individual 
adjustment is linked with an emerging collective 
consciousness, although exhibited by different degrees of 
involvement among the elderly. As Rose (1965:3) states, 
"the aging subculture is developing." While 
acknowledging the process has a ways to go in that there 
are certain influences (e.g., mass media, elderly 
employment) which have kept the aged "in touch" with the 
rest of society, Rose (1965:74) nonetheless maintains 
that, "There are certain trends occurring in our society 
which are tending to create some of the conditions 
necessary for the development of a subculture." These 
trends include demographic, ecological, and social 
organizational processes. The aging of the population, 
the increase in age-segregated housing, the creation of 
social welfare programs targeted for the elderly, and the 
growth of old age organizations, among other factors, 
combine to produce distinct "aged" conditions (e.g., 
mandatory retirement) as well as isolate them, as a 
group, from other age groups. 
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In so doing, the cultural trends serve both to 
promote interaction among older persons and maximize 
their exclusion from the population in 
general--increasing their chances of forming, in Rose's 
phrase, "aging group consciousness." Various factors 
related to elderly involvement, however, such as those 
who continue to accept middle-age values, those who 
become isolated from all of society except for family, 
and those who were never "engaged" in the first place, 
make forecasting the future uncertain. 
Micro-Timings 
In exchange theory, the timing of individual 
adjustment is linked with continued social involvement 
which, in turn, is inextricably tied to the rewards one 
receives in interaction with others. As Dowd (1975:586) 
states, "Certain patterns of interaction among social 
actors (either groups or individuals) are sustained over 
time . . . because men find such interaction 
rewarding--for whatever reasons." Depending on the 
structure of social rewards, interaction is either 
pursued or avoided. 
In regard to the elderly, Dowd argues that, as 
persons age, their conduct presents a burden to ongoing 
interaction with others. It takes greater and greater 
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effort to supplement an individual's shortcomings in a 
style taken for granted by one's co-participants. With 
each attempt to maintain a prior lifestyle, an 
individual's contribution to it, with decreasing 
competence, shortchanges what others get in return. The 
benefits to the others outweigh the costs to his 
continual participation; for example, an older worker's 
outmoded skills force him to accept a demotion in his 
job, because he can no longer contribute according to 
expectations. On the one hand, the elderly person 
confronts the cost of growing dependence and compliance; 
on the other hand, others experience the cost of a 
growing burden of support. The dissatisfaction 
associated with this leaves the elderly person no other 
choice but to withdraw or disengage from others. 
While Dowd's major concern is with the conditions of 
disengagement between the elderly and the rest of society 
(including other elderly persons), by the same token, 
using the logic of exchange theory, he would also 
describe the conditions of continued engagement. Dowd 
would argue that when exchange costs and benefits in the 
interaction between elderly individuals and others are at 
least equal, or better, profitable, such elderly persons 
do not disengage. Likewise, in analyzing the aged as a 
whole, the author (1975:116) asserts that the unbalanced 
exchange relationship between them and society "reflects 
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current realities and need not, therefore, be 
characteristic of aging in the future" when more 
favorable educational and economic factors could change 
power resources. Maladjustment in old age, therefore, is 
not inevitable but, rather, is linked to the net return 
of ongoing exchange transactions. As Dowd (1975:118) 
states, 
an exchange theory of aging predicts outcomes of 
variable interaction and level of engagement in old 
age depending upon the relative power of the 
individual older person or group of older persons 
vis-a-vis the source of the rewarding interaction, 
society. 
Accordingly, for exchange theory, an infinite number 
of adjustment timings are possible, depending on the 
structure of costs and rewards in one's everyday 
experiences. Individual adjustment among the aged 
becomes, in effect, a matter of the relative costs versus 
benefits received in social interaction. 
Developmental theorists share a linear concern for 
the organization of life experiences, typically, a life 
course with distinct stages or patterns of development. 
While acknowledging that every individual is different or 
unique, the perspective assumes that all follow a certain 
developmental course. The explanations for how and at 
what pace the self proceeds is one way to represent the 
variety of theorists (see, for example, Gergen, 1980). 
Depending on whether, for example, stages are conceived 
of as transitional (Neugarten and Gutmann, 1968; Gutmann, 
84 
1968; 1976) or problematic (Erikson, 1950) the self 
experiences, respectively, what he inherently goes 
through, or encounters options related to developmental 
tasks in what he can go through and become. 
The concept of development, conceived of in an 
orderly and progressive manner, is the dimension that 
ties age-related experiences together. Consider, for 
example, the way in which Neugarten and Gutmann (1968) 
conceive of an ego psychology of adjustment in old age. 
The process involves three major stages, called mastery 
styles, which characterize the inner workings of the ego 
in relation to its outer world. Stage 1 entails active 
mastery or control of the ego over his world. stage 2, 
passive mastery, involves an accommodation process of the 
ego with his world. And, stage 3, magical mastery, 
occurs with ego regressing to non-instrumental actions 
with his world. According to the authors, these are 
age-related, although there are significant 
gender-dependent timings affecting their progress. 
The personality, in its own right, is also conceived 
of as having distinct patterns as it develops over time. 
As suggested in the title of their article, "Personality 
and Patterns of Aging," Neugarten and associates (1968) 
analyze distinct patterns, or developmental styles, of 
personality in old age that grow out of different 
personality types. To take from an earlier quote, the 
authors conclude that, in the normal aging process, 
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there is no sharp discontinuity of personality with 
age, but instead an increasing consistency. Those 
characteristics that have been central to the 
personality seem to become even more clearly 
delineated, and those values the individual has been 
cherishing become even more salient (1968:177). 
The key to adjustment, then, is tied to the 
particular personality type formed (e.g., "integrated" 
versus "passive-dependent"). Whatever the element of 
concern--particular personality type (Neugarten, 
Havighurst, and Tobin, 1968), intrinsic property of aging 
(Neugarten and Gutmann, 1968), features of societal 
structure (Neugarten, 1964), developmental tasks 
(Erikson, 1950)--the timing of individual adjustment for 
developmentalists has a fixed set of possible patterns. 
They relate to an orderly sequence of growth, of 
"becoming," as it were. While differences in the pace of 
development occur from theory to theory, all "in time" 
are either adjusted or not. For some (e.g., Neugarten 
and Gutmann, 1968), this process is completely 
determined--all (men before women, however) are destined 
to be maladjusted-- "out of our hands," so to speak; for 
others (e.g., Erikson, 1950), it hinges on following what 
is considered to be a "normal" course of development, a 
universally set pattern allowing for successful 
adjustment in old age. 
86 
The continuity approach is based on only one 
particular pattern in the timing process of individual 
adjustment in old age, regardless of what social category 
he fits into or what conditions he faces. This pattern 
involves continuity in behavior over time. As such, what 
continuity theorists seem to be telling us is that 
changeless time itself--duration--is the key to 
adjustment. While adjustment patterns may differ from 
person to person, for each given individual, it can take 
only one form. To the extent one continues his lifelong 
personal pattern in mode of behavior or, after disruption 
(i.e., desolation), develops a new one, he remains 
adjusted in old age. 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Each of the alternative grammars has an implicit 
moral bent, wherein something is held accountable for 
adjustment in late life. Accordingly, points of 
intervention can be located and social policy enacted. 
Macro-Policy 
The macro approaches, all sharing a common focus on 
large-scale societal sources--whether structural or 
normative--as providing for individual adjustment in old 
age, see responsibility and its implied policy as a 
long-term proposition. Disengagement theory analyzes 
individual adjustment in old age by focusing on the needs 
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and requirements of the social system. Lacking the 
freedom to act "on their own," persons exist within this 
system only by virtue of carrying out behavior which is 
normatively prescribed. The process of disengagement is 
a gradual one, with continued withdrawal in later life 
the hallmark of success. Cumming and Henry (1961) show 
this in their comparison of persons eighty and over (very 
old) with those in their seventies, the former being 
described as more adjusted because of their greater 
degree of disengagement. Individuals, in effect, must 
aim toward becoming more and more "settled" in old age. 
The system, in turn, is responsible for moving them 
along. To the extent one realizes his obligation and 
withdraws from life's major rolesjactivities, the happier 
he is. As the authors (1961:209) state, "The factor with 
the greatest bearing on morale seems to be the ability to 
disengage." 
In order to operate smoothly and efficiently, the 
system must systematically disengage elderly persons from 
life. To the extent this is achieved, society remains in 
a state of equilibrium. However, when the process 
fails--when persons remain engaged in later life--it 
represents a dysfunctional infringement on system 
maintenance. It is, therefore, the system's, or 
society's, responsibility to correct the problem, 
entailing nonpurposive, evolutionary system adjustment. 
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Those unwilling to accept society's dictates make 
continued unsuccessful attempts to stay engaged and 
become unadjusted. Indeed, when one confronts his 
society or has some self investment in it, such as 
enjoyment in continuing to work in later life (see, for 
example, the case of Mr. Everett, pp. 190-96), he is 
considered to be maladjusted, a form of deviance from 
this point of view. 
These "late life engagers" represent the problem of 
old age for disengagement theory. By disrupting "social 
necessity," they present a burden to system efficiency. 
As such, the system is responsible for either providing 
room for their quirks or forcing them to disengage along 
with others, who, by and large, typify disengagement. 
At the system level, no voluntaristic type of social 
policy follows from disengagement theory. It is 
eventually system adjustments and readjustments, in a 
general disengagement process, that sustains the norm. 
Strictly speaking, individual variation is not what 
disengagement theory is about. Policy at this level, 
say, retirement consulting, would constitute patchwork 
solutions to what is essentially a nonindividual 
problem. In effect, the system's long-term equilibrating 
needs stand as its own system of adjustment. 
Modernization theory argues that social status in 
old age is tied to elder's relations to changing modes of 
89 
production. The harmful effects of technology, 
urbanization, and mass education towards the elderly have 
served to diminish their status, making for unadjustment 
in later life. As Cowgill (1972:13) states, 
"[maladjustment] is chiefly a by-product of urban, 
industrial, mass society." In particular, each of his 
four salient variables--health technology, economic 
technology, urbanization, and mass education--instigate a 
process wherein the elderly, as a whole, become 
increasingly dissatisfied. Yet, this is most apparent in 
the early stages of modernization, the later stages 
providing some improvement in their status. 
Responsibility thus lies in the transformation of 
society, individual adjustment contingent on the degree. 
In a manner similar to the "nonpolicy" implications 
of the disengagement view, one has little or no control 
over the modernization process as a whole. While varied 
institutional sectors may be concertedly modernized or 
persons "motivated to achieve" (cf. McClelland, 1961), 
the overall process is evolutionary. Thus one can only 
let things work out for themselves, wherein the elderly 
should eventually gain back at least part of their 
previously held status. 
Age stratification locates age experience within the 
context of age-graded cohorts. Treating individuals as 
being bound to them, the approach portrays an elderly 
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person who, in all the concrete times and places of his 
everyday life, acts solely as a member of his own 
particular cohort. One is, in effect, a product of his 
times, "marked by the imprint of history" (Riley, 
Johnson, and Foner, 1972:4). Likewise, location in one 
or another cohort determines individual adjustment. When 
problems in old age do occur, they are presented as 
"cohort effects," the particular cohort one belongs to 
being seen in relation to the other cohorts concurrently 
making up the age strata. Responsibility for individual 
adjustment, as such, becomes a historical/structural 
question, bound to cohort experiences. Tied to cohorts, 
one must, again, let society (cohorts) run its course. 
It is changes in the system of age stratification that 
will influence successive cohorts in the future. For 
example, higher standards of education, while lowering 
the status of elderly cohorts at one point in history, 
may make future age cohorts more compatible, or even 
reverse the relationship between education and aging. 
All in all, being a social system concern and, 
thereby, no one's particular responsibility, 
maladjustment at the macro end of the continuum is, in 
effect, something about which no effective social policy 
can be made. The result is not so much a social fatalism 
as an evolutionary optimism where, in a manner of 
speaking, nature knows best. 
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Mjd-Continuum Policy 
The mid-continuum approaches locate adjustment 
problems in the joint effects of structural and 
face-to-face factors. The socio-environmental approach 
focuses on the interplay of individual and social 
contexts of the immediate environment of the aged. 
Analysis centers on the impact of both individual 
resources and societal norms on an elderly person's well-
being. In a situation where his activity resources are 
not compatible with surrounding expectations, he is 
unadjusted. As Gubrium (1973:35) states, "(adjustment] 
becomes a salient problem among the aged because their 
activity resources so often lead to a degree of 
activeness that is at variance with social expectations. 
This variance leads to negative self-judgments." 
Responsibility for maladjustment stems from incongruency 
between persons and their environments. 
The kind of social policy suggested by the state of 
incongruency is to establish programs that meet 
particular needs and characteristics of the elderly. For 
example, the provision of certain kinds of housing for 
the elderly (e.g., age-integrated versus age-segregated), 
in which they are able to interact with others of similar 
background (e.g., health, money, family support), would 
lead to a congruent situation for them. What Kahana 
(1974) calls "person-environment fit" is an apt way to 
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describe the prevailing strategy. The consideration of 
the person is in terms of individual well-being; the 
environment at stake is face-to-face and immediate. 
The social-career view, in emphasizing the 
importance of others' definitions, focuses attention on 
social configurations of roles and their consequences for 
individual adjustment. While the effect that social 
arrangements have on the self varies with situations, 
individual behavior can be sustained over time through 
the process of commitment. As such, depending on how one 
defines himself in relation to a given configuration of 
"career" roles, one is either adjusted or not. Those who 
define their career lines negatively, as interpreted 
through other's definitions, become unadjusted, 
encountering a problematic old age. Responsibility for 
unadjustment lies in the intermingling of given 
structural arrangements and an active, meaning-seeking 
self. 
The type of policy envisioned by this perspective is 
one where social settings are organized so as to provide 
positive meanings for individuals to define themselves. 
Programs would be developed, as Becker (1970c:287) puts 
it, "[to] create situations which will coerce people into 
behaving as we want them to and then to create the 
conditions under which other rewards will become linked 
to continuing this behavior." For example, in the case 
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of occupational career lines, plans would be instituted 
incorporating upward movement in an orderly and regulated 
fashion with each next position having appropriate 
rewards. This would provide both a sense of continuity 
in one's life and an anticipation of future benefits, 
enabling persons to continue on a path of adjustment. As 
far as old age is concerned, this would serve to fill, in 
an orderly fashion, what Burgess (1960) once called a 
"roleless role." For example, by tying retirement to 
company activities, rather than separating its roles from 
work organizations, career lines would carry into old 
age. 
Subcultural theory centers on developing old age 
consciousness among the elderly. A subculture 
effectively isolates the aged from other age groups in 
society, providing a structure of age-appropriate 
meanings for self-definition. As such, rather than being 
interpreted according to societal norms, elderly behavior 
is appreciated or devalued against the background of 
expectations tuned to member characteristics. 
Ostensibly, to the extent an elder is part of an aging 
subculture, an opportunity to adjust is available to 
him. However, his behavior still must be interpreted 
according to a new set of norms and values and, in that 
regard, adjustment is personally problematic. 
Nonetheless, not being a part and as such subject to 
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society's often negative judgments, one risks structured 
unadjustment. This includes, according to Rose 
(1965:12), a shift in self attitude "as progressively 
physically and mentally handicapped, from independent to 
dependent, and from aspiring to declining." 
Responsibility is attributed to the developing age 
subculture which, while it is said to be developing, 
still has a way to go. 
Old age policy centers on the development of 
self-help or self-pride organizations. In this respect, 
old age power sentiment is notable. The organizations 
would include various senior centers and recreational 
facilities as well as political organizations fostering 
self-recognition and common interests. 
Micro-Policy 
Micro approaches see individual adjustment as the 
outcome of problems in personal or face-to-face 
experiences. Dowd's exchange theory takes the balance of 
interactions existing between the elderly and others as 
the key to personal satisfaction. Individual adjustment 
in old age hinges on contributing one's share in return 
for common values. Dowd (1975:587) describes the 
negative side of this as being a matter of "a series of 
exchange relationships in which the relative power of the 
aged vis-a-vis their social environment is gradually 
diminished until all that remains of their power 
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resources is the humble capacity to comply." 
Responsibility rests on the unequal exchange 
relationship, where the elderly are either forced to or 
willingly withdraw from social life. 
The social policy imperatives envisioned by this 
approach involve providing the kinds of resources 
necessary for the elderly to "hold their own." Programs 
would include plans for studying possible employment 
opportunities for the aged as well as lobbying groups. 
The Gray Panthers, for one, have been and continue to be 
instrumental in this regard. Whatever the details, 
programs would aim at providing for more equality in the 
exchanges made between the elders and others, thereby 
enriching their quality of life. 
Developmentalists look to the relation between 
personality and the developmental environment in 
analyzing individual adjustment in old age. The source 
of adjustment centers on a developmental life course and 
its impact on the individual. Specifically, it hinges 
on, for example, the successful completion of respective 
tasks at each stage along a particular course or on the 
development of a particular personality type. 
Responsibility for maladjustment, in these cases, is the 
particular unsuccessful path followed--from abnormal 
resolutions of, say, ego-cognition stages along the way. 
For others, the developmental path is fixed and 
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determinate, stages being intrinsic properties of aging. 
Here, problems of adjustment are inevitable in old age. 
To the extent that developmentalists "fix" course 
and stages, voluntaristic policy in unavailable. One is 
left with the inner-psychological mirror image of 
functional necessity. Those developmentalists who stress 
emergence over developmental patterning allow for 
intervention, for example, training or counseling for the 
skills or insight necessary to successfully address 
developmental tasks. 
The continuity approach, in arguing that it is not 
the absolute level of activity per se that determines 
adjustment in old age but, rather, how continuous current 
activities (lifestyles) are with earlier ones 
(lifestyles), locates the source of responsibility for 
unadjustment in discontinuity. As such, policy 
necessarily centers on the social maintenance of 
lifestyle. Researchers of institutional relocation 
(Tobin and Lieberman, 1976), for example, have advocated 
smooth as opposed to abrupt relocations, facilitated by 
individual preparation. 
The grammars in this chapter emphasize extra-
individual sources of life satisfaction as the key to the 
problem of old age, "rounding out," in a matter of 
speaking, the activity theory approach. None, however, 
rethink the individual problematic of aging, something 
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which is focally addressed in the following chapter, 
where one begins to see the possibilities for reflexive 
grammars. As such, the objects of old age themselves--
roles, the person, life satisfaction--become topics in 
their own right. For some, they are ideological; for 
others they are social constructs. 
CHAPTER 3 
BEYOND LIFE SATISFACTION: POLITICAL ECONOMY 
AND SOCIAL PHENOMENOLOGY 
In this chapter, I explore the two forms of grammars 
of the old age problem--of power and privilege and of 
social construction--which go beyond life satisfaction. 
They are radical grammars in the sense that they deny the 
central reality of the individual as the focus of the 
aging experience. Rather, individuality is conceived as 
a by-product of other social forms or processes. It is 
ideological for the political economists; it is a social 
construction for the phenomenologists. 
THE GRAMMARS IN THE SCHEME OF THINGS 
How can political-economic and phenomenological 
grammars be understood in terms of the macro/micro 
continuum presented in the previous chapter? The 
political economists (Estes, 1979; Olson, 1982; Myles, 
1984) would judge it as representing bourgeois society, 
based on a reification of individualism, in "the spirit 
of capitalism." As current gerontological theory would 
have it, the aged, as such, are a social problem (rather 
than having problems created by society) and have 
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innumerable troubles. Given this assumption, common 
theoretical practice has been to investigate the 
immediate conditions that might serve to maximize or 
minimize the troubles, conditions like level of activity, 
role loss, social isolation, and social support. 
Depending on the state of these conditions, their impact 
on adjustment and life satisfaction varies. When the 
conditions that affect the life satisfaction or 
adjustment of elders are located, solutions to 
dissatisfaction and unadjustment are thought to be 
evident. The solutions lie in the alteration of 
immediate conditions, for example, reactivating withdrawn 
elders. 
The political economists have been critical of the 
"individualistic" thinking in gerontological theory. 
Olson (1982:15), for example, writes that all preceding 
formal theories of aging--from activity to disengagement, 
developmental, socio-environmental and age 
stratification--are individualistic and, in her words, 
"represent attempts to explain existing conditions in 
terms of individual adjustment." They are what she calls 
either "free-market conservative" or "liberal 
accommodationist" views of the relationship of the state 
to its constituency. The argument is reflexive in 
recognizing that the theories are more than alternative 
formal explanations for the so-called "facts" of aging; 
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their political undertones serve to marshall select 
facts. Through research practice, they virtually work to 
establish certain facts which, upon inspection, confirm 
an implicit but alienating production process. 
The social phenomenologists (Gubrium and Buckholdt, 
1977; Hochschild, 1975; Starr, 1982-1983) would see the 
entire continuum as a construction. They would "bracket" 
it in order to investigate the reality of its components. 
The concern here is with the social production of 
individuality and individual adjustment. While focused 
on the question of age and aging as a lifespan concern, 
Gubrium and Buckholdt (1977) have been concerned with the 
nature of age as such and how it can be described. In 
examining what is conventionally understood as the life 
course and its varied stages, they describe the practical 
discourse by which interested members produce a sense of 
age andjor aging, in the data available to them, about 
select persons in and about service institutions. Age is 
treated as a product of experience, rather than as a 
resource by which to examine it. Likewise, age-related 
concepts are considered, not in terms of how they 
represent their objects, but in terms of how they assign 
meaning to them. 
The social phenomenologists have criticized theories 
of the aging process for taking the existential status of 
age for granted. While all the theories in the continuum 
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look at variations in the meaning of age and age behavior 
along, for example, historical, cohort, and exchange 
lines, the variations are accepted as background factors 
or forces operating upon the aged (what I have referred 
to as the independent variable). As such, the 
interpretation of the so-called forces and their 
transformation, in the ongoing practice of everyday life, 
is ignored. The metatheoretical feature of the argument 
is that the language of age has an intentional quality 
(Schutz, 1980), such that its use serves to construct a 
reality for subsequent observation. Being set, 
background factors andjor the conduct of elderly persons 
themselves, as studied by gerontologists, tends to 
reproduce the existing relationships envisioned. Glossed 
over is a concern for how age, agedness, and age-related 
"facts" are produced and reproduced in the first place--a 
concern for facticity over "facts" as such (Raffel, 
1979) . 
Making use of a similar argument, Hochschild (1975) 
takes up the issue of reality-production by focusing 
specifically on disengagement theory. She presents both 
a theoretical and empirical critique of cumming and 
Henry's (1961) argument. Hochschild's epistemological 
concern, however, centers on proposing a clarification of 
vaguely-defined concepts for disengagement theory, rather 
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than developing it into a full-fledged critique of the 
intentional quality of the theory. 
AGENCY 
Political Economy 
The political economists focus on the role of the 
state in shaping the social and economic conditions of 
American society and, in particular, of the elderly as a 
group. This turns them away from the problems of old 
people as largely lying, according to gerontological 
theorists, in "their private troubles" and toward the 
political economy of growing older. To apply Mills' 
(1959) language further, attention is largely centered on 
(1) the public issue of age and, less importantly, on (2) 
the relationship between public issues and private 
troubles. Political economists tend to treat private 
troubles as direct distillations of public issues, as if 
individuals automatically realize in their personal 
experiences what is defined at large. 
The sources of private troubles such as social 
isolation and role loss in old age, for political 
economists, is found in the relations between the state 
and the economy. Marxists give signal governance to the 
economy; Weberians provide for relatively independent 
state influence in social relations. Estes (1979) and, 
in a more analytic fashion, Olson (1982), reflect an 
economic emphasis. They argue that the "facts" of aging, 
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in a capitalist society, are part and parcel of the work 
requirements of a labor market controlled by the needs of 
industrial development, the state being but a handmaiden 
of capitalist interests. Myles (1984), on the other 
hand, has recently argued for greater state autonomy. In 
effect, the former analysis centers primarily on the 
social relations of production or economic sphere, while 
the latter gives greater credence to the interplay of 
both the economic and political realm. Both analyses, 
however, while differing in emphasis placed on state 
"protection" versus the dictates of the marketplace, 
agree that the primary source of concern is the social, 
political, and economic conditions of American society 
and its effect on the elderly. I will consider the 
Marxian argument first and then discuss Myles' Weberian 
"amendments." 
In her book aptly entitled, The Aging Enterprise, 
Estes (1979:2) argues that aging, in American society, 
must be understood as a business: 
In using the term aging enterprise, I hope to call 
particular attention to how the aged are often 
processed and treated as a commodity in our society 
and to the fact that the age-segregated policies 
that fuel the aging enterprise are socially divisive 
'solutions' that single out, stigmatize, and isolate 
the aged from the rest of society. 
Olson (1982) carries the message further, focally arguing 
that the aging experience cannot be understood separate 
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from its relation to the mode of production. What she 
calls "a radical theory of the state" sees: 
the origins and persistence of age-related problems 
as inherent in the normal functioning of American 
capitalism. Capitalist imperatives for unfettered 
capital accumulation and maximization of profits are 
inextricably linked with a ceaseless drive for 
growth; increasing concentration of private market 
activities; increasing socialization of production 
costs with profits appropriated privately; rising 
structural unemployment; cyclical economic crises; 
significant and growing inequalities in income, 
wealth, and power; and production for profit at the 
expense of satisfying human needs .... the 
government is committed not only to the values of 
private ownership and private profits but also to 
the necessity of economic and social inequality. 
These factors profoundly affect the distribution of 
benefits and deprivations among the population, 
including older people (1982:21). 
The government, then, rather than serving the needs of 
the masses, caters to the capitalist class, wherein "the 
primary role of the state has been to buttress capital 
accumulation and private profits" (Olson, 1982:21-22). 
Both Estes (1979) and Olson (1982) present various 
examples of "the aging enterprise" in operation. 
Consider, for example, the Older American's Act of 1965 
(OAA), which was informed by a logic of aging not far 
removed from that of contemporary gerontological theory. 
While OAA had the ideal of establishing the independence 
and well-being of the elderly, its welfare-oriented 
articulation further transformed the elderly into a 
state-dependent class, a welfare class. As Estes 
(1979:30) states: 
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The symbolic aspects of the goals of the Older 
Americans Act reassure the public that somehow the 
aged are being cared for, while policy is 
simultaneously constructed so that its material 
impact will not disrupt the ongoing functioning or 
power arrangements within society. 
The program saw the solution of the problems of aging, in 
application, largely in local planning for the 
coordination of fragmented recreation-like programs. For 
example, rather than make the elderly economically 
solvent, the strategy was to keep them happy in the 
confines of places like senior centers. Rather than make 
them independent, individual managers of their affairs, 
their very sustenance became bound to a system of 
dependence, perhaps best symbolized by nutrition programs 
(hot meals and meals-on-wheels programs). Such programs, 
Estes (1979:22) asserts, "ignore the widespread poverty 
of the aged and provide no direct economic relief. 
Instead the aged become consumers of services that simply 
feed the expanding service economy." 
What Estes and Olson are arguing is that, upon close 
inspection, such policies, rather than presenting a 
burden to a capitalist society in the form of a drain of 
surplus values, generate considerable economic expansion, 
all presumably in the "service" of elders. The army of 
experts, professionals, and service providers that have 
arisen to dole out benefits of various kinds to the elder 
population have expanded the service sector of the 
American economy. A tremendously complex welfare 
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bureaucracy that both controls and presumably benefits 
elders also provides an ever-expanding job market for the 
young. The control comes with the credentialing of job 
holders (Collins, 1979). The process results in a large 
discrepancy, on income grounds alone, when comparing the 
income of bureaucrats servicing the elders with the 
income of the elders serviced. In effect, the political 
economy of aging serves those who serve the state more 
than it serves those who are troubled by its conditions. 
Another example of the state support of those who 
benefit in the political economy of aging is the health 
care system. The medical welfare bureaucracy, in payment 
for services to largely self-controlled providers of 
health care like physicians, hospitals, and nursing 
homes, is a state-supported means of perpetuating the 
private troulbes of the elderly (Estes, 1979; Olson, 
1982). The economic support that the elderly receive is 
just enough to keep them alive and not enough to 
alleviate their extreme dependence and poverty, as a 
result of the minimal benefits. Instead, the health care 
system produces and expands the panorama of health 
problems said to be in need of care, which futher expands 
the market for the services of health care providers. In 
effect, the politics of health care feed on the very 
target of its presumed concern (Alford, 1975) . And all 
of this is periodically publicized as a problem of 
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critical prop~ions said to be a current "crisis" in the 
care-needs of the elderly (Edelman, 1977). The process 
both stimatizes the elderly and serves the interests of 
those who control the state, namely, capitalists. 
The issue of state control is seen differently by 
Myles' (1984) more recent argument on public pensions 
(see also Quadagno, 1984). Rather than simply 
representing the whims of the marketplace, he views the 
current status of the state as incorporating a democratic 
notion as well--what he (1984:4) calls, "the two main 
pillars upon which . . . [modern Western] . . . societies 
are built: a capitalist economy and a democratic polity." 
The dialectic makes up what Myles calls "the liberal 
democratic state," consisting of the two contradictory 
principles, one basing rights on the ownership of 
property and the other on persons as citizens. The 
liberal state professes the principle of "to each 
according to his or her contributions" (1984:32), 
depicted in policies that adhere to the standards of the 
marketplace (that commodity labor). The democratic state 
professes the opposite principle, "to each according to 
his or her needs" (1984:32), in which a person's needs 
are advocated (decommodifying labor). Both principles, 
embedded in the current structure of the state, are 
involved in the determination and implimentation of 
social policies for the aged. As such, rather than 
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having programs that simply feed on capitalist 
expansionist interests, as Estes and Olson would have it, 
such programs also entail requirements providing for 
certain basic needs. 
social Phenomenology 
The social phenomenologists center their attention 
on membership in various communities of discourse as the 
agent accomplishing life in general and, in this case, 
old age. Borrowing primarily from the works of Schutz 
(1962; 1964; 1967) and Garfinkel (1967), Gubrium and 
Buckholdt (1977) treat age, agedness, and other age 
categories as rhetorical/negotiated features of the 
occasions for the interpretation of such experiences. 
Members are treated as articulating the realities and 
categories considered to be immediately at stake. As the 
authors (1977:viii) explain: 
Age-related expectations are created by members of 
society as they interact with one another on varied 
occasions. They share ideas about what is real and 
what is false, practical theories about age and 
behavior in relation to themselves and others. As a 
collection of people who deal with each other in the 
affairs of everyday life, they talk about growth, 
age, maturity, regression, and the like. The 
meaning of age is presented and negotiated from 
moment to moment as people participate in sometimes 
elusive but serious conversation. Through 
statements like "act your age," "look how grown-up 
he is," and "you're too old for that kind of work," 
people invoke life course expectations and thus make 
age. When they are convincing, a life may seem to 
cycle. When they are not, a life seems problematic 
until a proper definition of age is secured. 
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From this approach, the positivistic concern with 
objectivity is eclipsed by a theoretical interest in 
facticity, the latter being the process by which objects 
gain objective quality. Gubrium and Buckholdt (1977:35) 
argue that the objects of human life are without inherent 
meaning; yet, they have experiential reality: "Whatever 
is real about the social world is located in the talk and 
work that members do to constitute it." By setting aside 
belief in the reality of objects as things separate from 
the language used to describe them, facts of aging are 
assigned and located in the use of age-related language. 
In this respect, such age-related expectations and facts 
as "growing old," "maturity," "human development," 
"stages," and "life crises" come to life in their 
assertion, invocation, realization, and utility. 
The analysis focuses on the organization of 
discourse, the reality of age lying in talk itself. As 
the authors (1977:34) state: 
Using this frame of reference, when members refer to 
such things as a 'stage' of life that they have or 
have not reached, we treat the stages as features of 
their talk--not some place or entity at which they 
have arrived or may arrive. What members consider 
to be their talk about life and living, we treat as 
talk of them. 
As such, rather than asking how developmental stages 
organize one's experiences, Gubrium and Buckholdt turn 
this around and ask how persons make use of developmental 
explanations and justifications for how they treat each 
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other. It is not as if talk has no concrete objects but, 
rather, the concreteness of things reveal objects to 
speakers only by, and through, their meaningful 
relationship to them--something which is an outcome of 
the reality-defining labor of practicioners of everyday 
life. The key here is that discourse is to be understood 
as discourse-in-use, a matter of practice. Theirs is a 
social phenomenological understanding of the language of 
age. 
Discursive organizations and transformations are 
linked with a spectrum of possibilities associated with 
stocks of knowledge and limitations in horizons of 
meaning, what Schutz (1970:237) calls one's "world within 
common reach." Worlds are, in effect, typifications of 
human conduct, providing meaning to objects in everyday 
life as well as organizing experiences. They are not 
understood as concretely isolatable and aggregatable, but 
as diffusely linked and socially emergent constructed 
types. Indeed, a given world of discursive understanding 
is not a place, a container of facts, but rather is 
productive of facts as such, any location conceivably 
organizing myriad worlds. 
Being an artifact of its accomplishment, worlds of 
everyday life are treated as process. As such, the world 
one belongs to does not make as much sense as which world 
is being accomplished for all practical purposes, each 
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accordingly organizing different experiences of conduct. 
The analytic concern becomes one of how certain times and 
places come to be treated as the locations for the 
application of certain interpretive rules in the 
accomplishment of conduct--the production of a given 
world of understanding being described in its time and 
place, the same place being productive of other worlds on 
other occasions. Consider how Gubrium and Buckholdt 
(1977:46-47) describe membership in this regard: 
Our use of the term member . . . connotes a sense of 
the world as comprising those who, in the course of 
their action, belong together at times and at other 
times not. . . . Being members of some meaningful 
occasion, people speak a common ordinary language 
that references the same taken-for-granted 
realities; they take the same natural attitude 
toward things. To be a member of a collection of 
people gathered somewhere for some purpose is to 
proceed, together with other members, to use the 
same tacit rules and understandings (for example, 
glossing practices) to "put on" that place. 
The authors' sense of the world as an occasioned, 
member-relevant condition of interpretation, is akin to 
Garfinkel's (1967) "background expectancies." The 
approach to the issue of agency is discursive and 
practical. The agent is not Q person or some structure; 
rather, it is both a sense of the source of conditions as 
well as the rules and typifications used to produce the 
sense. 
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TIMING 
Political Economy 
The political economists link their concern with 
timing to widespread social and historical change, in 
effect, the history of the state. The precise pattern 
the process takes varies somewhat, however, among the 
proponents of the approach. While Estes (1979) does not 
deal directly with history per se and, as such, does not 
significantly develop an analysis of social change, her 
approach, in general, is comparable to Olson's (1982). 
This being the case, I discuss Olson's (1982) and, in 
turn, Myles' (1984) implicit patterns of change 
concerning the social, political, and economic 
relationship of the state and the elderly. 
Following Marx, Olson (1982) places the relationship 
between the state and its constituency within the context 
of the history and structure of the social relations of 
production. The history of capitalist relations of 
production (ownersjcapitalists versus 
workers/proletariat), within the framework of Marx's 
writings (see Bottomore, 1956), is such that they are 
represented by at least two stages of development. Marx 
traces the roots of mid-nineteenth century capitalism to 
the emergence of market opportunities in combination with 
the availability of freed labor in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Early competitive capitalists took 
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advantage of new markets, inventions, and technical 
developments (not necessarily in that order) in 
establishing new means of production, more or less free 
of ongoing traditions of obligation--all aimed at 
maximizing profit and the further expansion of capital 
(Edwards et al., 1973). Combined with a growing pool of 
labor expropriated from agrarian relations by such events 
as land enclosure movements and declining agricultural 
markets, this sets the relational scene for further 
development of the capitalist system. Thus, a variety of 
forces bring together two potential classes, one in need 
of labor and one in need of wages. With the expansion of 
the capitalist system, the relations of production are 
crystalized and universalized. Consider how Olson 
(1982:27) describes the plight of the elderly in this 
regard: 
deep transformations in the American economy and 
civil society, fostered by industrial leaders to 
meet their own needs and supported by growing 
national state activities on behalf of capital, have 
had pernicious effects on the elderly. The rise of 
monopoly capitalism was accompanied by a steady 
proletarianization and de-skilling of the work 
force. These changes, along with other corporate 
and governmental practices intended to enhance 
private accumulation and profits as well as to 
control and motivate workers, generated increasing 
unemployment, forced retirement, economic 
dependency, and poverty among older people. 
Olson's (1982) sense of timing regarding the ongoing 
class relationship is abrupt and disconnected, though not 
transformational. The process is one of continual 
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conflict, involving periodic "crises" between opposed 
interest-related groups. As she (1982:3) states, 
"'Crisis' situations affecting the aged and the 
institutions serving them have erupted intermittently 
since the 1930s. During the last several decades these 
have occurred with increased frequency and intensity." 
The author's analysis depicts tension not only between 
the state and old age problems, but concrete kinds of 
confrontations where things "come to a head," so to 
speak. (Marx would see this as a struggle between the 
"relations" and "forces" of production.) While clashes 
between classes do occur, they are resolved, for the most 
part, in a manner favoring capitalist development. 
Consider, for example, the Social Security Act of 
1935. Presumably, the benefits of this program were 
directed toward the interests of old people. As a worker 
ages and becomes less and less efficient, his capacity to 
contribute to industrial production decreases, or so it 
is argued. There must be, then, a systematic means for 
retiring unproductive workers from the labor force (ala 
disengagement theory). Yet, it would be undesirable to 
produce a whole class of disenfranchised members of 
society. Thus, the social order presumably should 
provide some means of security for this problem. 
Olson (1982), in contrast, argues that the history 
of social security is the history of the ideological 
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usages of the alleged incapacities of the aged to feed 
the expansionist production needs of industrial 
capitalism. It is a means of reserving a pool of labor 
that efficiently services capitalist production. It is 
also a means of placating an increasingly restive labor 
pool that comes with downturns in economic cycles. The 
author (Olson, 1982:44) explains: 
The underlying concern of the Social Security Act 
was to control the turbulent masses who, in response 
to widespread unemployment, mortgage foreclosures, 
depletion of savings, and destitution, were raiding 
local relief agencies, mobilizing rent riots, 
participating in Communist-led marches, and 
organizing violent protests .... As growing 
numbers of people began to question the legitimacy 
of existing institutional structures, a clear threat 
to monopoly capitalism and the political system 
materialized. . . . To promote stability and restore 
confidence in the system, the Social Security Act 
aimed at mitigating economic insecurity among 
selected factors of the working class. 
As Olson describes, the years prior to the passing 
of the act were years of depression in this country, with 
high unemployment. One way to alleviate unemployment was 
to reduce the demand on available jobs, to systematically 
but "fairly" ease a portion of the labor force out of it. 
The origin of social security, as such, was not so much a 
compassionate interest in the security of the aged, as it 
was a means of dealing with unemployment, by making the 
jobs that existed available to the young while placating 
the poverty of the retirees. Social security was a big 
enough crumb to reap the gratitude of an economically and 
systematically disenfranchised segment of the labor 
market. 
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While Olson (1982) sees time in terms of "crises" 
encounters, Myles (1984) presents an evolutionary 
pattern, in a more Weberian analysis. Consider Myles' 
treatment of history. Although he writes of a similar 
process that took place as Olson (1982), his analysis 
takes on a more subdued tone. Rather than continued 
conflict, the author sees a system of compromises, a sort 
of "give and take," at work. His dialectical view of the 
relation between the state and economy, what he calls a 
"marriage between a protective state and a capitalist 
economy" (Myles, 1984:30), entails an accomodation 
process between owners (capitalists) and citizens 
(workers). This was due to an historical process 
"fraught with conflict and struggle," whereby citizenship 
achieved certain concessions, which resulted in the "two 
opposing doctrines [being] subsumed within a single 
structure, thereby producing the internal tension which 
provided the source of its own evolution and 
transformation" (Myles, 1984:30). 
It is important to note that Myles' (1984) 
evolutionary sense of time is not "evolution in time" 
(compare Cowgill, 1972) but, rather, an "achieved" time, 
as it were. The process involves institutional kinds of 
accomodations, over time, where things gradually "get 
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worked out." The evolution of social security, thus, was 
a continual struggle of compromises between the two 
principles of distribution--a protective state and a 
capitalist economy. As the author (1984:37-38) 
describes: 
Since the state was not subject to the discipline of 
the market, state pensions for the elderly could 
potentially be organized along guidelines other than 
those derived from the market. The state, however, 
was and is, subject to the discipline of the 
political process. Hence market criteria were 
frequently abandoned as politics required. What 
politics required in a formally democratic polity 
was that from time to time the claims of citizenship 
and the principle of need be acknowledged. 
Social Phenomenology 
The social phenomenologists treat time, itself, as a 
social construction. It is an assignment, a means of 
describing the time-related features of personal human 
conduct. Gubrium and Buckholdt (1977:vii) "do not assume 
that life inherently cycles in some ordered or 
progressive fashion." Rather, they argue that aging, 
growth, maturity and other developmental "facts" of life 
are products of the application of a linear, mechanical 
and temporal mode of interpretation to the diverse, 
concrete and practical experiences of the everyday 
laborers of human affairs. Following this, the authors 
argue that the use of developmentally-informed theorizing 
or related forms of gerontological thinking, in their 
concrete application, produce the facts of aging that, 
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ironically, upon their inspection, reveal them to the 
observer (a process of "objectification"). As they 
(1977:8-9) state: 
The important questions are not how people respond 
to life change or proceed through stages, but how 
they negotiate and generate the reality and meaning 
of change, stages, and development; how they come to 
have a sense of them as things separate from 
themselves . . . and how they subsequently respond 
to them as real things. 
In this regard, consider, for example, Gubrium and 
Buckholdt's (1977:187-91) analysis of Kimmel's 
developmental mode of description, in his book Adulthood 
and Aging (1974). Kimmel asked his respondents a series 
of questions about life in terms of a clock-time metaphor 
(see Hendricks and Hendricks, 1976), which he illustrates 
in several vignettes. Respondents were asked about life 
changes, particular stages, and what Kimmel refers to as 
"milestones." It was not uncommon for respondents to 
raise a number of questions and make a variety of 
comments that suggest they were answering 
developmentally-framed questions in terms of particular 
interpretations. Questions posed to respondents tacitly 
become, for the respondent, a "question-for-me." This is 
evident when the respondent asked how he should answer 
the question in relation to specific conditions in his 
life, how he felt in this or that situation, and with 
what period of time or time frame he should organize his 
response. When Kimmel's intended sense of some aspect of 
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life was accepted by a respondent, the respondent 
formulated a response. A few declared that they had not, 
or did not think of their lives in a certain way, yet 
went on trying to do so at Kimmel's behest. 
For Gubrium and Buckholdt, Kimmel's respondents were 
not simply reporting the developmental facts of their 
lives, but were doing so within the substantive purview 
of what they took to be the author's requests. Being 
tied into a clock-time chronology, once produced--being 
on the respondent's mind as it were--the metaphor 
"reasonably" organized experiences accordingly. Kimmel's 
questions, in effect, seemed to be as much a part of his 
data as was the content of his respondents' lives. From 
the social phenomenological approach, then, developmental 
discourse is not just a vehicle for symbolically 
representing realities; its usage in the practical 
activities of everyday life--whether inside or outside of 
the interview situation--is concretely productive of the 
realities. 
In a similar fashion, Gubrium and Buckholdt's (1977) 
analysis of the discourse of service providers, in 
formally organized settings, reveals that the language of 
aging, in its application, concretely produces and, with 
institutionalization, reproduces a widespread mode of 
description. Being formally organized in application, 
the discourse, while "artful" (Garfinkel, 1967) to a 
degree in its interpretive flux in respect to the 
interpretation of particular events, nonetheless 
homogenizes conduct into conventional images of 
experience--typically being longitudinal, linear, 
progressive and mechanical. 
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The authors present evidence of another vision of 
experiential interpretation, one that is at the center of 
practice but, for that reason, perhaps too obvious to 
notice. Their data reveal worlds upon worlds of time 
construction, time reversibility, time multiplicity and 
their complications. In line with this argument, Gubrium 
and Lynott (1983) have challenged one of the central 
"facts'' of concern to gerontologists, the life 
satisfaction of elders. Investigating the language of a 
variety of life satisfaction measures, analyzed 
thematically, it is suggested that to ask elders to 
represent their lives in a chronologically linear fashion 
is to ask respondents to interpret their life experiences 
accordingly. To the extent they do so, they produce a 
developmental understanding of their experiences. 
Taking from Garfinkel (1967), the authors ask what 
the facts are of life satisfaction on the occasion of its 
measurement. Life satisfaction researchers have taken 
the interview situation to be neutral, virtually 
nonsocial. But, do respondents consider it likewise? 
For them, it is a situation that, by request and 
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acquiescence, calls out an interview-appropriate set of 
interpretations of their experiences. Thus, that world 
produces a display of respondents' total life in its own 
fashion. But, other occasions, too, serve to display 
members' total lives, but in their own ways. The 
authors' use of ethnographic data reveals the occasioned 
and constructed features of life satisfactions, 
presenting us with a multifaceted view of the aging 
experience. 
In this regard, consider, for example, Frankfather's 
(1977) study of "looping" by down-and-out elders in urban 
environments, where agedness, descrepitude, and 
competency change their meanings as the elders enter into 
encounters with members or representatives of various 
types of organizations (worlds of understanding) . The 
author shows that as an elder loops from, say, a 
community residence, to encounters with the police, 
medical hospitalization, mental hospitalization, nursing 
home residence, and deinstitutionalization, his life 
fluctuates among many senses of what it is and has been. 
Life comes to be a set of "multiple and contradicting 
interpretations of the same 'facts'" (Frankfather, 
1977:15). Being satisfied with life may, as well, be a 
feature of which world is at stake in a given encounter. 
What Gubrium and Lynott (1983) are arguing is that, 
one feels old or not, behaves elderly or not, feels 
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satisfied with life or not, depending upon the background 
expectancies or relevant worlds serving to interpret the 
aging experience. Though not described by the authors, 
consider an episode cited by Matthews, drawn from her 
study, The Social World of Old Women (1979), where shifts 
in encounters typify worlds of experience. Matthews 
describes how many of her respondents stated that they 
felt old, or older than they otherwise would, whenever 
they were in new situations. The elderly women reported 
that, in their initial encounters with other persons, 
much of their interaction centered on the clues given off 
by their appearances to such things as their typical 
feelings, their typical attitudes toward things, their 
typical lifestyle, and their typical capacities and 
incapacities. As Schutz (1944) might have it, strangers 
have recourse to nothing but appearances as a means for 
initially organizing their responses to the older women 
(or anyone else, for that matter). Reasonably, the 
personal typification, culturally signified by gray hair 
and an elderly stature, made the elderly women feel old. 
This continued until other relevancies besides appearance 
entered into the interaction. As Gubrium and Buckholdt 
(1977:65) state, "Once an occurrence has been redefined 
as typically something other than previously believed, 
again, in a flash, another whole world is generated." 
Unfortunately, many episodes or encounters of everyday 
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urban life are not lengthy enough to permit much beyond 
the typifications signaled by appearances to enter into 
interaction (Karp, Stone, and Yoels, 1977). Thus older 
women, in the context of encounters with strangers who 
typify appearances accordingly, felt old among strangers. 
In time, such a world for defining age may or may not 
shift as a condition for interpreting and organizing 
behavior. 
What the phenomenological approach suggests is that, 
to the extent a form of discourse becomes 
institutionalized (becomes the organizing principle of a 
variety of formal activities), objects become systematic 
productions and reproductions of their application to 
human affairs. Yet, at the same time, worlds upon worlds 
can also be generated whereby all kinds of seemingly 
contradictory and inconsistent opinions could be 
entertained which, all in their proper perspectives 
(worlds), may seem perfectly reasonable. The analysis 
reveals the contextual and productive quality of worlds 
of discourse that serves to make the object described 
reasonable in any number of ways. As such, time is as 
stable and fixed or as fluid and changing as are ongoing 
concerns with it. 
RESPONSIBILITY 
In this section, I examine the sense of 
responsibility following the respective grammars' 
positions on agency and timing. 
Political Economy 
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The political economists argue that to understand 
the problems of the elderly, one should attend to the 
political and economic conditions surrounding them. This 
stands in stark contrast to the notion that the aged have 
problems which they are virtually blamed for--blaming the 
victim. The solution, for the latter, is for the elderly 
to "do something about it" or, as actually happened, for 
an army of experts to help them with the task. To coin a 
sixties-like phrase, the army "makes war on aging." But, 
the political economists maintain that "Older persons 
individually are powerless to alter their social status 
and condition" (Estes, 1979:15), positing that it is the 
structure of society itself that has created the problem 
of old age. Just as its proponents differ in their 
assessment of the source of the problem, so, too, they 
differ in where responsibility is to be placed. For 
Estes (1979) and Olson (1982), it is the class structure 
per se; for Myles (1984), it is the class structure and 
the political arena. I consider each in turn. 
Estes (1979) and, more forcefully, Olson (1982), 
argue that, as an ongoing condition of daily life, the 
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class structure and its social relationships prevent the 
majority of its members from enjoying a variety of 
opportunities or advantages. The rewards of a capitalist 
society, aligned with the relations, do not represent the 
relative contributions to the system of production. It 
is, on the other hand, in someone's interest to see 
economic equality and inequality as as structure of 
rewards, and thereby legitimize the ongoing relations of 
production. As such, the authors contend that, given the 
current political economic system, the solution to the 
problem of aging can only be a matter of patchwork. The 
system, after all, serves the interests of those who 
control it. Therefore, when problems arise, the issue of 
control is glossed over by the concern for the management 
of the problem. The structural source of the problem is 
ignored and replaced by less threatening causal arguments 
(cf. Chapter 2). It is in this sense that much current 
gerontological theory serves the state, is an apology for 
the status quo, and justifies the social organization of 
"help." As Estes (1979:225) remarks: 
Underlying many such approaches has been an implicit 
value bias toward social policies and programs that 
would enhance the social activity and life 
satisfaction of the aged, with far less attention 
being given to the economic, political, and social 
conditions that largely determine the quality of 
their lives. 
Estes (1979) and Olson (1982) offer a more radical 
policy, one that involves "progressive changes that move 
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society in the direction of democratic socialism" (Olson, 
1982:228). To accomplish this end, to "dismantle the 
aging experience," necessitates a change in economic 
structure, to a political economy not centered on the 
maximization of individual interests but on the maximal 
benefit of all. 
Myles (1984) places responsibility for the current 
situation of the elderly on both the economy and the 
polity. In this respect, policy is not a matter of 
radical state and structural change but, rather, is an 
evolving empirical problematic. As the author (1984:119) 
states, "whether it is possible to achieve a full-fledged 
social democracy and the total realization of citizenship 
that it entails is a question that can only be answered 
by the future." What Myles (1984) is arguing is that, in 
the ongoing evolutionary relationship between the economy 
and politics, many solutions are possible. It is, 
however, conceivable (while for now, unlikely) for the 
elderly to achieve a much desired effect. Indeed, Myles 
(1984:120) ascertains that "If the citizenship principle 
continues to evolve, the 'elderly' are likely to slowly 
disappear as a distinctive status group in a larger 
society." Whatever the future holds, for better or 
worse, it is the class and the political system that 
enter into the particular evolutionary path of age 
relations. 
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social Phenomenology 
The social phenomenologists do not deal with the 
issue of responsibility, other than its social 
attribution. The reason is that, while the approach 
generates important data about the process of social 
production, at the same time, it tends to ignore its 
structure. That is, it tends to leave off its analysis 
when the human products of the process have been 
produced, considering the product not as a configuration 
of social conditions independent and perhaps confronting 
members but, rather, in terms of its resources and 
production and reproduction--a concern for structuration 
rather than structure as such (Giddens, 1976). To treat 
the human contingencies of confrontation--where 
practitioners of everyday life come face to face with the 
products of their labors--would necessitate a more 
concrete vision of objects or social forms than the 
social phenomenological treatment. 
One sees, then, that while the political economists 
and social phenomenologists are at rather opposite poles 
in their form of analysis, they both nonetheless change 
the focus of attention away from attempting to explain 
individual aging, to addressing social conditions. The 
political economists address them in terms of the impact 
on, say, an impoverished collectivity of elders, of their 
relative relations to the mode of production and how 
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class dynamics produce poverty. (Note that the 
modernization approach links mode of production (not 
class dynamics] on the one hand, to age status, on the 
other.) The social phenomenologists entertain both the 
social and individual conditions of aging as constructs 
organized by prevailing stocks of knowledge. In both 
cases, the central focus of the alternate approaches 
presented in Chapter 2--the individual's success at 
aging--disappears and is replaced by age as a social 
form, either as a social class or category. 
PART II 
PATHOLOGICAL AGING 
CHAPTER 4 
NORMAL AGING VERSUS DISEASE: THE QUESTION OF AGENCY 
Turning to the Alzheimer's disease experience, one 
finds an entirely new grammar for defining the old age 
problem, one founded in a medical construal of growing 
older. Rather than, as in the first part of the 
dissertation, viewing the old age problem as a by-product 
of normal individual or social sources in later life, the 
old age problem here is treated as an abnormality. Not 
normal aging, the old age problem, in principle, can be 
cured. Furthermore, as "pathology", the old age problem 
has medical sources, degenerative timing, and 
nonvolitional accountability--medical specifications of 
the questions of agency, timing, and responsibility. In 
this chapter, I focus on the question of agency regarding 
the distinction between normal aging and disease. 
Chapters 5 and 6 consider the questions of timing and 
responsibility, respectively. 
Alzheimer's disease was first described in 1907 by a 
German physician named Alois Alzheimer. It did not 
emerge as an old age grammar, however, until the 1960s 
and 1970s. Before then, the disease was believed to 
chiefly affect those under the age of sixty-five and, as 
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such, was referred to as "presenile dementia." As for 
old age ("senile dementia"), itself, the common 
understanding was that it resulted from arteriosclerosis 
or "hardening of the arteries," a view which, as Reisberg 
(1981:12) notes, is still prevalent today: 
The popular image is of blood vessels which become 
progressively narrowed from fatty deposits. As the 
vessels of the brain become strangulated and 
sclerosed, less and less blood is able to reach the 
brain and provide the nourishment necessary for 
optimal functioning. Behavioral deterioration is 
thought to result from these circulatory changes. 
First, a person may begin to forget things. Later, 
the lack of blood and oxygen may cause the person to 
become entirely demented. Often the narrowing of 
the blood vessels is thought to result in strokes 
and, ultimately, in death. 
Dramatic evidence to the contrary came in the 1960s 
from a group of pathologists and psychiatrists in 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, England (Blessed, Tomlinson, and 
Roth, 1968; Tomlinson, Blessed, and Roth, 1968; 1970). 
Having compared the autopsies of fifty demented aged 
persons with twenty-eight nondemented elderly used as 
controls, the researchers reported that arteriosclerotic 
changes accounted for much less dementia than was 
thought, a much greater percentage (over 50 percent) 
attributed to certain histopathological changes 
indicative of Alzheimer's. 
The findings, along with results from pathological 
studies conducted at the Einstein College of Medicine in 
New York (Terry and Wisniewski, 1975; Terry, 1978), 
suggested that Alzheimer's was not limited to its 
132 
presenile form (as interpreted by Alois Alzheimer in 
research on a fifty-one-year-old patient), but was a 
dementia of old age as well. As Reisberg (1981:15) puts 
it: 
Hence, 'Alzheimer's disease' is now thought to be 
the same condition whether it occurs in a forty-
five-year-old person or a ninety-five-year-old 
person. The underlying pathology and the disease 
process, so far as is known, is the same, regardless 
of the age of onset. 
The new disease classification has resulted in 
considerable confusion over the terminology of 
Alzheimer's (see Reisburg, 1983:3-5). Because the term 
"dementia" is primarily a clinical disorder, originating 
from many types of organic lesions, one of them being the 
neuropathologic changes associated with Alzheimer's, the 
phrase "senile dementia of the Alzheimer type" (SDAT) is 
frequently used to distinguish the disease. 
Alzheimer's is considered to be both an organic and 
a behavioral disease, the former characterized by 
neurofibrillary tangles and senile plaques in the brain, 
the latter by memory loss and confusion. While the 
brain/behavior markers ostensibly make for a disease 
entity separate and distinct from aging in general, the 
distinction is by no means straightforward. All existing 
evidence, from neuropathological to psychological, can be 
and is garnered on behalf of both. Indeed, as published 
transcripts of medical conferences on Alzheimer's disease 
show, the fundamental factual tension of the disease is 
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its nosological (categorical) status in respect to the 
"normal" aging process. As will be shown in this 
chapter, conference proceedings display direct evidence 
of the interpretive work involved in sorting out what the 
realities at stake--disease versus normal aging--are to 
be. It is being argued that it is not the facts per se 
that serve the distinction, but how the facts are put to 
use or socially constructed. 
Alzheimer's can be devastating for the victim and 
the caregiver. Yet, what is the devastation to be? The 
devastation of premature or advanced aging--something 
which is believed to be normal--or the product of a 
disease agent? The issue is not whether people suffer, 
but to what suffering is to be assigned. Biological 
sources of the suffering is considered first, the 
behavioral sources second. 
THE BIOLOGICAL SOURCE: READING NEUROPATHOLOGY 
The neuropathological markers of Alzheimer's are 
revealed by light and electron microscopy. They include 
neurofibrillary tangles and senile plaques as well as 
granulovacuolar and other bodies. Severe cerebral 
atrophy (shrinkage) is also present, but does not serve 
differential diagnosis. Neurofibrillary tangles are the 
organic hallmark of the disease. As Reisberg (1981:17-
19) describes: 
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The most important and characteristic change is the 
appearance of unusual quantities of neurofibrils in 
certain areas of the brain. These neurofibrils have 
a characteristic shape and size. In Alzheimer's 
disease they are found predominantly in the cerebral 
cortex. They are found in particularly large 
concentration in the hippocampus, which is the part 
of the brain thought to be associated with short-
term memory, and especially in the pyramidal cells 
of the hippocampus .... 
The neurofibrillary tangles . consist of 
pairs of filaments wrapped around each other in a 
helical fashion. . . . [They) are also known as 
paired helical filaments (PHFs) because of their 
unique configuration, [and] have been found only in 
human beings, [and] are encountered in certain human 
conditions apart from Alzheimer's disease. 
Reisberg goes on to describe the two other 
histopathological changes characteristic of the disease: 
Classical senile or neuritic plaques, as they are 
also called, consist of an amyloid core surrounded 
by degenerative neuronal processes and reactive 
nonneuronal cells. The degenerative neuron 
processes are known to consist almost entirely of 
axonal terminals or perterminals. In the region of 
these degenerative neuronal processes, and to a 
lessor extent in the dendrites and synaptic endings 
outside the plaque area, one encounters the PHFs 
(1981:24). 
And the author continues: 
The third characteristic pathological change in the 
brains of patients with Alzheimer's disease is 
"granulovacoular degeneration." This is really a 
descriptive term for certain changes which appear 
inside cells. Specifically, the interior of a cell 
undergoing this form of degeneration becomes crowded 
with fluid-filled "vacuoles" as well as with 
granular material •..• An increased concentration 
of granulovacoular degeneration [is found] in 
certain areas of the hippocampus (1981:35). 
Yet, there is clear evidence of the same organic 
bodies in the brains of normal elderly persons, leading 
some researchers to be cautious about the disease 
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implication. The researchers point out that the changes 
commonly associated with Alzheimer's, as opposed to the 
normal aging process, are the basis for a quantitative, 
not a qualitative distinction. As Terry (1978:12), 
expressing his reluctance to make the disease 
distinction, explains: 
It is usually argued that there are clear 
differences, and that senility is a disease while 
normality in this sense is the absence of disease. 
This writer, however, is less than convinced on this 
point. . . . Plaques and tangles are present in area 
H2 of the hippocampus of the elderly normal and the 
SDAT specimens. This is true ofthe great majority 
of aging normal people. The difference here is 
clearly a quantitative one, since large numbers of 
these lesions elsewhere (H1) in the hippocampus and 
the neocortex correlate quite closely with the 
presence of dementia. Even the chemical changes do 
not present qualitative differences between elderly 
normals and dements. 
Given such evidence, Terry and Wisniewski (1977:3) 
conclude: 
One cannot help but wonder, then, whether we should 
consider that a pattern of continuous changes 
characterizes the passage from normalcy to that 
dreadful extreme, senile dementia. 
The nosological tension often gets repeated in 
descriptions of the neuro-organicity of Alzheimer's 
disease. For example, in Reisberg's account of the 
characteristic changes associated with Alzheimer's quoted 
earlier, the author (1981:35-36) also takes note of its 
age-related features: 
Each of these pathological hallmarks 
(neurofibrillary tangles, senile plaques, and 
granulovacuolar degeneration], individually, is 
positively associated with progressive idiopathic 
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(senile) dementia in man. Each of these pathologic 
hallmarks is also seen increasingly frequently in 
many nondemented aged individuals. 
Moreover, Tomlinson, Blessed, and Roth (1968:355), in 
their pioneering work, assert that: 
Finally it is clear that great caution is 
needed in the interpretation of 'senile' changes of 
the kind described in the pathological investigation 
of any disease in old age, since, provided they fall 
within the range described they are likely merely to 
reflect the age of the patient. 
In effect, what is tacitly being said, but at the same 
time glossed over, is that the neuropathological markers 
of Alzheimer's can be the organic hallmark both of a 
disease and of advanced (normal) old age. 
Other researchers, however, are inclined to 
interpret the facts differently. Katzman, for example, 
in a discussion following a conference paper presented by 
Terry and Wisniewski (1975), entitled "Pathology and 
Pathogenesis of Dementia," takes issue with Terry's 
quantitative interpretation. Quoting from the 
transcription: 
DR. KATZMAN: I did want to emphasize the one major 
difference in outlook between Dr. Terry and myself 
in regard to the relationship of normal aging to 
Alzheimer's disease. I have become convinced that 
Alzheimer's disease is a disease and not simply an 
acceleration of normal aging. There are, to be 
sure, pathological changes which are identical in 
the two. However, the distribution of these changes 
differs, that is, they are primarily in the temporal 
lobe and hippocampus in the nondemented patients. 
Tomlinson has reported that if you look at the 
cortex of demented and nondemented patients, there 
is clearly almost no overlap in the number and 
incidence of both plaques and tangles in the two 
population groups (Fields, 1975:147). 
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Unlike Terry, who is reluctant to distinguish the disease 
qualitatively from what is called "normal aging," Katzman 
sees the distribution of neuropathological changes in the 
brains of demented and nondemented persons as great 
enough to merit a disease distinction, a category in and 
of itself, not merely an extreme version of the aging 
process. 
Whether the observables are taken to be a disease 
entity or advanced old age, their reality-status is not 
obtainable by a mere detection of the "facts" at hand. 
Rather, the question becomes one of how the facts are to 
be interpreted. As Terry's and Katzman's statements 
show, facts "do not speak for themselves" but, rather, 
are spoken for. As such, they become facts-for-us, 
description being as much a part of the data as 
representative of it. 
While the age-related features of the organicity of 
Alzheimer's disease underpins a continuing controversy 
among medical researchers as to what exactly it is they 
are dealing with, in the final analysis, even among the 
skeptics, the disease definition prevails. Still, given 
the problematics concerning the neurological basis for 
clearly differentiating ostensibly diseased from normal 
elders, how the conceptualization of an abnormal entity 
is arrived at is not a simple and straightforward 
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process, but rather often involves considerable 
interpretive discretion. 
Published transcripts of edited discussions 
following paper presentations at medical conferences 
display the social and interpretive work that enters into 
discourse, a process of framing in terms of a disease 
grammar or framed in terms of aging. Consider, for 
example, an excerpt (Katzman, Terry, and Bick, 1978:265-
266) taken from part of the proceedings of a 1977 
conference on Alzheimer's disease, senile dementia, and 
related disorders. The conference was co-sponsored by 
the National Institute of Neurological and Communicative 
Disorders and strokes, the National Institute on Aging, 
and the National Institute of Mental Health: 
DR. SOKOLOFF: Are these plaque formations part of 
the normal aging process or part of the disease? 
DR. ROTH: Statistically they are normal. 
DR. TERRY: All normal people have a few, but I 
think that we are working at this from the wrong 
end. We still have to prove that the plaque and the 
tangle are more than simply labels, that they are 
causal. They are associated with disease, but we 
haven't proved that they cause the disease. 
DR. GRUFFERMAN: In the absence of dementia, 
wouldn't you hesitate to diagnose the living patient 
as having Alzheimer's or senile dementia just on the 
histologic diagnosis? 
DR. TERRY: No. If you gave us an opportunity to do 
the histology tests, I certainly wouldn't hesitate 
for a moment. 
DR. SOKOLOFF: Then you would call a lot of normal 
people demented. 
139 
DR. TERRY: No, because we are not counting plaques 
or tangles in the hippocampus. If you give me a 
good biopsy, we can be quite accurate on the basis 
of histology. 
DR. SCHEINBERG: The question was whether this is a 
natural aging process or a disease process. 
DR. SOKOLOFF: If it is due to normal aging, we 
certainly are not going to cure aging. 
DR. TERRY: Childbirth is a natural process, and 
physicians have had an ameliorating effect on it. 
There is no point in our arguing about this business 
as to whether it is a disease or normal. It is a 
process that diminishes the well-being of the 
public, and if we can have an effect on it, we 
should do so and not worry about whether it is 
normal or a disease. 
DR. SOKOLOFF: In what age groups do you see this? 
Do you see it in infants who died? 
DR. TERRY: No. 
DR. ROTH: Whether it is pathological or normal 
aging does not influence the desire to control the 
phenomenon if it is correlated with intellectual 
impairment and, at its extreme, with gross 
intellectual impairment. 
DR. SOKOLOFF: It may be correlated with a process 
about which I can do absolutely nothing. 
DR. ROTH: You can't assume that in advance. 
DR. SOKOLOFF: We don't know that it isn't. 
DR. ROTH: What is the purpose of deciding that in 
advance of investigating? 
DR. SOKOLOFF: That brings us back to the last 
question. Is it a disease or is it normal aging? 
DR. ROTH: Would you accept senile dementia as a 
disease? 
DR. SOKOLOFF: Yes. 
DR. ROTH: If you accept senile dementia as a 
disease, then the existing evidence, such as it is, 
shows that it is merely an extreme variant of what 
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you find in the brains of perfectly well-preserved 
people who go to their graves with plaques in their 
brains, nobody being any the wiser. If it is an 
extreme variant of that sort, there may be hope of 
influencing the factors that potentiate that change, 
and there are many factors which do: pernicious 
anemia, hyperthyroidism, head injury, and perhaps 
serious cardiac failure. If you accept that this is 
so, then we are justified in investigating the 
conditions under which the accumulation keeps you 
this side of the threshold. 
In the excerpt, the issue arises of how to define 
the neuro-organic observables under consideration. 
Initially, the researchers engage in what might be called 
a "philosophical agenda," concern focusing on what the 
objects seen before their very eyes are to be considered. 
Here caution is exercised over the evidence pertaining to 
an underlying disease structure. As Terry notes, "We 
still have to prove that the plaque and the tangle are 
more than simply labels, that they are causal" (Katzman, 
Terry, and Bick, 1978:265). Immediately following this, 
however, the "philosophical" concern is glossed over and 
the conversation shifts to a more "procedural agenda," as 
the issue of diagnosing the disease is raised. This 
leaves a pathological interpretation intact, with 
empirical discovery the primary issue. 
The shift from caution over the disease's 
existential status to disease as such is not just 
accidental but involves getting on with the task at hand, 
the reality-status of the observables being intricately 
tied to a desire to intervene in the matter. It is, 
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after all, as Terry states, "a process that diminishes 
the well-being of the public." Terry's remarks depict a 
certain impatience with dwelling on the epistemology of 
' 
the observables. Rather than debate the issue of what it 
is, he asserts that the concern should be one of doing 
something about it, it being a distinct thing about which 
something can be done. 
For these pathologists, doing something about it 
involves attempting to locate the cause or causes of a 
disease (a medical agent), treating its symptoms, and 
eventually finding a way to prevent the problem. The 
concern is with locating abnormality and disease in 
patients, not variations of normality in aging persons. 
Interest in intervention implies a disease entity, 
disease being something that can be detected and cured, 
as opposed to aging per se, a natural process of 
inevitable human variation to be accepted and cared for, 
not medically eliminated. Sokoloff's later remark that 
"It may be correlated with a process about which I can do 
absolutely nothing" shows that for his purposes, as a 
neuropathologist, to do something about it, it must be a 
disease, not normal aging--reiterating his earlier 
comments that they "certainly are not going to cure 
aging." Here again, the procedural agenda overshadows 
the philosophical issue, shown in Roth's "scientific" 
response to Sokoloff that the matter will only be solved 
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empirically, by further investigation where, eventually, 
the facts will hopefully speak for themselves. 
The philosophical issue over whether the observables 
depict a disease entity or aging itself is dismissed as 
the neuropathologists shift concern to investigating and 
ameliorating its devastating effects. As such, the 
question of what it is, is revealed in the practical and 
useful purposes it can serve, such as destroying the 
menace that "dims bright minds" and which "makes shells 
of former selves," two familiar slogans. 
The sense of urgency to intervene is repeatedly 
expressed by all those involved with the problem, a 
problem which, if not concertedly dealt with, will pose 
an even more serious threat to society in the future. 
Consider, for example, Hughes' (n.d.:10) alarm in this 
regard: 
By the year 2030 more than a third of the country's 
population will be over the age of 65 and a huge 
number will be subject to Alzheimer's disease. It 
is estimated that at this time approximately 10% of 
those over age 65 may have the disease, and if this 
percentage continues, then a large absolute number 
will need to be cared for in nursing homes and in a 
very expensive manner by the year 2030. Aside from 
needs that individual families have now, the country 
as a whole has a considerable stake in working with 
this disease process and making it amenable to 
modern medical treatment. 
Aronson (1982:7) presents in more detail the devastating 
financial costs of the disease: 
For society, the dollar cost has not been determined 
accurately. Sixty percent of all patients in 
nursing homes carry some diagnosis of dementing 
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illness. Thus, if one were to take 60% of the 
current $25 billion long term care bill, dementing 
illness would appear to cost $15 billion per year. 
However, more dementia victims--even very 
deteriorated patients--reside in the community than 
in nursing homes and other institutions, so this is 
a vast underestimate. A figure used by Drachman 
(1982) is $20,000 per patient, which would yield an 
estimate of $60 billion per year. Thus, whatever 
the actual amount, the cost to society is 
staggering. And with a demographic projection of a 
large increase in the elderly population by the year 
2000, there will be a proportionate increase in the 
number of demented individuals. Thus, dementing 
illness is a major and fast-growing medical and 
social problem which impinges on all gerontologic 
practice. 
Framed in terms of a disease grammar, the 
demographic projection warns of the expected increases in 
diseased persons. At the same time, the relationship to 
age itself is glossed over. Indeed, the costs to society 
and the alarm it generates makes those concerned flatly 
state that, "Alzheimer's disease is not a normal 
consequence of aging," as the following illustrates: 
Alzheimer's disease is a surprisingly common 
disorder that destroys certain vital cells of the 
brain. It produces intellectual disability (senile 
dementia) in more than 50 percent of all persons 
admitted to nursing homes. Consequently, over 1.5 
million American adults are affected at a cost of an 
estimated 20 billion dollars annually. This 
incidence and cost are many fold higher than those 
associated with multiple sclerosis, cystic fibrosis, 
or most of the better known lethal diseases of man. 
In fact, Alzheimer's disease is the fourth most 
common cause of death in the United States. One 
family out of three will see one of their parents 
succumb to this disease. In some cases a familial 
predisposition to the disease will occur and whole 
generations will be affected. Alzheimer's disease 
is not a normal consequence of aging (Glenner, 
1982:59 (emphasis added]). 
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As a distinct disease entity, it is reasonable to 
entertain the hope that one day it can be exposed, 
treated, and even eliminated. This has led to much 
research being conducted into the possible cause for the 
neuropathological changes associated with Alzheimer's 
disease (see Katzman, Terry, and Bick, 1978; Katzman, 
1983; Reisberg, 1983). Such factors as environmental 
toxins and trace metals (especially aluminum), viroids 
(e.g., a slow virus), and genetics have been suggested as 
ultimate causes. 
Evidence linking aluminum accumulation in the brain 
come from studies of animals, such as cats and rabbits, 
who showed progressive dementia and neurofibrillary 
degeneration after being injected with aluminum salts 
(Klatzo, Wisniewski, and Streicher, 1965; Crapper, 
Karlick, and De Boni, 1978). Yet, the evidence is 
inconclusive (Terry and Pena, 1965; Wisniewski, Sturman, 
and Shek, 1980). Studies done on humans also have 
supported the aluminum theory, showing higher levels of 
aluminum in autopsied Alzheimer's patients than in age-
matched controls (Crapper, Krishnan, and Dalton, 1973a; 
1973b; Crapper, Krishnan, and Quittkat, 1976; Trapp et 
al., 1978). Other researchers, however, found no 
significant differences in this regard (McDermott et al., 
1977; McDermott et al., 1979; Markesbury et al., 1981). 
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As the Report of the Secretary's Task Force on 
Alzheimer's Disease further notes: 
The role of aluminum ... is far from clear, since 
those with the greatest exposure to aluminum, such 
as aluminum workers and individuals on renal 
analysis, do not develop neurofibrillary tangles nor 
Alzheimer's disease. Scientists are still uncertain 
as to how aluminum actually gains access to the 
brain. The etiological role of environmental toxins 
in the pathogenesis of Alzheimer's disease remains 
unproven and controversial (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 1984:13). 
Likewise, the role that viroids and genetics play is 
inconclusive. While there is data suggesting a 
connection between slow viruses and Alzheimer's (see 
Salazar et al., 1983), attention has also been called to 
the fact that "as yet there is no direct evidence that 
slow, latent, masked, hidden, incomplete, or defective 
viruses are involved in any of the progressive 
degenerative changes usually associated with senescence" 
(Gibbs and Gajkusek, 1978:559). As for genetics, some 
findings have been produced linking families of early 
onset victims to increased susceptability (Heston et al., 
1981); the same study, however, found that late onset 
victims (70 years or over) present no greater threat in 
this regard. In addition, in their review of the 
literature, Matsuyama and Jarvik (1982:20-21) report: 
There are 11 family studies and one twin study in 
the world literature concerned with familial 
incidence of Alzheimer Disease or Senile Dementia of 
the Alzheimer Type. Increased familial incidence 
has been found but no clear genetic etiology 
established (emphasis added). 
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In the final analysis, the testimony and debate of 
those concerned suggest that the grammar of Alzheimer's 
disease is inextricably tied to the way the "facts" are 
interpreted. The very biological facts of aging 
regarding dementia can be either normal features of the 
aging brain or indicative of disease. The line 
distinguishing them is, as it was shown, a 
"philosophical" choice. Dismissing the philosophical and 
turning to facts as disease facts serves to secure the 
gaze of the concerned, from philosophical confrontation 
to empirical. 
THE BEHAVIORAL SOURCE: READING DEMENTIA 
Alzheimer's disease is recognized to be a behavioral 
entity as well as an organic illness, a brain/behavior 
condition. The neuro-organicity of the disease--marked 
by neurofibrillary tangles, senile plaques, and 
granulovacoular degeneration--has its correlate in 
dementia, a diffuse cognitive and intellectual impairment 
(Tomlinson, 1977; Wells, 1978). The characteristic 
symptoms include memory loss and confusion, as well as 
conditions such as lack of judgment, disorientation, and 
agitation. A typical clinical portrait of the disease is 
as follows: 
The behavioral hallmark of Alzheimer's disease seems 
to be memory loss, especially for recent events. 
But many other behavioral changes are caused by the 
illness. In its early stages, Alzheimer's disease 
can lead to inability to concentrate, anxiety, 
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irritability, agitation, withdrawal, or petulance. 
Later, the Alzheimer's patient may lose the ability 
to calculate, may exhibit lack of judgment, may 
become disoriented as to time and place, may be 
unable to understand jokes or cartoons. Some 
persons with Alzheimer's disease tend to wander 
about and lose their way; some become prone to 
temper tantrums; some are depressed; some forget the 
names of friends and neighbors, or forget words, or 
forget how to make change. . . . the timing and 
sequence of lost function varies from patient to 
patient .... Occasionally, though not always, 
Alzheimer's patients become incontinent in the final 
months of life (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 1980b:2-3). 
As the preceding extract shows, there is frequent 
use of indefinite terms like "can," "may," "some," and 
"occasionally" in describing the behavior of Alzheimer's 
disease patients. Such usage is found wherever 
descriptions of the stages and symptoms of the disease 
appear. This includes not only the texts and talk of 
medical researchers, but personal documents and 
conversations of caregivers, ADRDA newsletters, and the 
many pamphlets and handbooks that explain the disease and 
its management. The use of indefinite terms allows for 
the full range of conditions to be characteristic of the 
disease. It makes quite a difference, for example, to 
state that some Alzheimer's patients manifest withdrawal 
or petulance and others do not, rather than that 
Alzheimer's patients manifest withdrawal and 
nonwithdrawal or petulance and nonpetulance. The first 
is reasonable, the second contradictory. 
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The use of indefinite terms is also prevalent in 
descriptions of the problems in activities of daily 
living (ADLs) that Alzheimer's patients experience. Some 
of the impairments in ADLs commonly used to illustrate 
cognitive deficiency were presented in the preceding 
clinical portrait of the disease, such as forgetting 
names or how to make change. Other typical dysfunctions 
include the inability to use a checkbook, forgetting to 
turn off the oven, misplacing things, inability to 
control bodily functions and loss of enthusiasm, among a 
host of problems which could be considered to be ADLs, 
such as problems of sleep, exercise, personal hygiene, 
speech, self-esteem, traveling, and so on. The list of 
impairments could, conceivably, run the entire gamut of 
everyday behaviors, elaborating the disease grammar to 
include whatever problems of daily living that may occur 
among the elderly. As such, the use of indefinite terms 
provide remarkable flexibility in the selection of 
typical disease characteristics, allowing for the variety 
of experiential behaviors of old age to be underpinned by 
a single disease entity. 
Many of those whose job is to service victims of the 
disease are well aware of the "umbrella" problem. 
Consider, for example, the following remarks made by a 
geriatric clinical specialist in nursing at the day 
hospital studied: 
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There's already a lot of controversy. Like even 
between the neurologists and the regular doctors. 
Neurologists kind of like to hedge around. They're 
not too sure about Alzheimer's but regular doctors 
.•. well it's cut and dry for most of them, like a 
recipe. That's the way they approach it. You've 
got these symptoms, so it means such-and-such a 
disease. Never mind the way the symptoms show up 
against the family background or how they present 
themselves at home. They're doctors after all! And 
they know what symptoms mean! It's too bad when you 
see so much evidence that it's not that simple, 
especially in a real shady area like memory loss, 
confusion, and all the other behavioral things. 
It's not all their fault either because the whole 
system is set up so that it just can't handle all 
that uncertainty about symptoms. It's like they've 
got to mean something if they're symptoms. So you 
have this category called "Alzheimer's" and you find 
people to fit it, sometimes, I think, too well. 
The "shady area" the nurse cautions against reflects 
the well recognized observation that some sort of memory 
loss occurs in all aging persons. The question then 
becomes a matter of where to draw the line between what 
is considered normal versus pathological decline. Kral 
(1978) does make a distinction between the two, one that 
is widely shared in the medical community. With respect 
to "normal" memory loss in old age, Kral (1978:47-48) has 
coined the term "benign senescent forgetfulness" which, 
as the author states: 
can be found in aged people who are not suffering 
from Alzheimer's disease or other types of dementing 
process. Psychometric tests have demonstrated a 
lowering of memory scores in all aging individuals 
compared with young adults. Although the 
correlation between chronological age and memory 
loss is, on the whole, paralleled by the results of 
the memory tests, there is a remarkably wide range 
in scores achieved by the individual subjects within 
the unselected quinquennial subgroups. Although 
this could be explained by the initial individual 
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variability of the memory function of the subjects, 
one has also to consider the possibility that 
qualitatively different types of memory impairment 
might be hidden behind the quantitative differences 
in memory scores. 
Kral chooses to interpret the "individual 
variability" of memory loss in old age as qualitatively 
distinct "types" of decline, not as a process involving 
"more or less of the same thing," so to speak. The 
author also describes the two types of memory loss which, 
as he puts it, "might be hidden behind the quantitative 
differences." In contrast to the "amnestic syndrome" 
associated with Alzheimer's, "characterized by shortened 
retention time, an inability of the subject to recall 
events of the recent past, and an inability to recall not 
only relatively unimportant facts of an experience but 
the experience itself," Kral portrays the second type 
(benign senescent forgetfulness) as follows: 
the second type of senescent memory dysfunction is 
characterized by the inability of the subject to 
recall relatively unimportant data and parts of an 
experience (e.g., a name, a place, or a data), 
whereas the experience of which the forgotten data 
form a part can be recalled. However, the same data 
not recalled on one occasion may be retrieved at 
another time. The 'forgotten' data seem to belong 
to the remote rather than the recent past. Also the 
subjects are aware of their shortcomings and try to 
compensate by circumlocution and they may apologize 
• . • . it was proposed to term this type of 
senescent memory dysfunction 'benign' in contrast to 
the 'malignant' type, the amnestic syndrome 
(1978:48). 
Kral's use of the term "benign" and "malignant" 
clearly show his preference for a disease distinction to 
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categorically separate pathology from the aging process 
in general. They are, in effect, two separate things. 
One (benign) does not just become the other (malignant), 
either prematurely or in advanced old age; instead, one 
contracts, is stricken by, falls victim to, or is struck 
down with the latter. 
As with different interpretations regarding the 
meaning of the neuro-organic markers of the disease, 
different clinical realities are separated and assigned 
meaning. While some, such as Katzman (Katzman, Terry, 
and Bick, 1978:44; Fisk, 1979:29; Katzman and Karasu, 
1975:110-111; Fields, 1975:147), maintain that the two 
processes (symptom versus benign characteristics of 
aging) are indeed separate, others, like Terry (Katzman, 
Terry, and Bick, 1978:12; Terry and Wisniewski, 
1975:135), see the process differently, as the following 
comments illustrate: 
I would cautiously disagree in regard to the so-
called benign memory loss. I can't help but wonder 
whether there is only a quantitative rather than a 
qualitative difference between that change and the 
dementia [Alzheimer's disease] in which we are 
interested today (Terry and Wisniewski, 1975:135). 
Most medical practitioners, on the other hand, are 
not as concerned with the debate over the nosological 
problem of whether or not Alzheimer's is considered a 
disease entity separate and distinct from aging (either 
on organic or behavioral grounds), as they are with 
"successfully" accomplishing what Katzman (1982:8) calls 
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"the complex problem of diagnosis." For most, the 
disease status is largely taken for granted. As one 
physician at the day hospital flatly put it, referring to 
Alzheimer's, "It's definitely a disease. It's certainly 
not a part of the normal aging process." Still, a good 
deal of effort enters into the process of interpreting 
the diverse and related experiences presented by patients 
and family members as either Alzheimer's or not. The 
diagnosis is based primarily on clinical evidence. As 
Katzman (1982:8) explains: 
In many areas of medicine, diagnosis may be 
accomplished by a single blood test, a special 
radiological procedure, endoscopy, or other specific 
investigations. The diagnosis of dementia and of 
Alzheimer's Disease remain, however, in the domain 
of the clinician and requires a comprehensive 
workup. 
A "comprehensive workup" involves a number of 
different procedures, summarized by Kaufman (1982:2) as 
follows: 
WORKUP OF A DEMENTED PATIENT 
USE 
ALL PATIENTS SELECTIVELY 
1. History from patient 1. EEG 
and relative 
2. Mental status examination 2. Drug levels 
3. Physical examination with 3. Toxic screen 
vital signs 
4. Neurological examination 4. Brain scan 
5. CAT scan 5. Lumbar puncture 
6. Thyroid functions, serum B, 
and folic acid 
7. CXR, EKG 
8. CBC, UA, VORL & FTA, glucose, 
BUN, ca, albumin, electrolytes, 
alkaline phosphatase, ESR 
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The workup is performed to rule out diseases other 
than Alzheimer's. While said to account for fifty to 
sixty percent of all persons suffering from a progressive 
dementia (Katzman, 1982), Alzheimer's is diagnostically a 
disease of exclusion. It differs from fifty or so other 
pathological conditions that may behaviorally mimic it. 
Among them are such degenerative diseases as 
Hallervorden-Spatz and Parkinson's disease, a number of 
metabolic disorders including the liver and parathyroid 
glands as well as hypoglycemia, uremia and Cushing's 
syndrome, vitamin deficiencies, drug reactions, brain 
tumors, subdural hematoma, infections of various kinds, 
normal pressure hydrocephalus, depression, and multi-
infarct dementia (Haase, 1977). The CAT scan (computer 
assisted tomography) can be used to identify many of the 
reversible andjor treatable conditions which present as 
dementia such as brain tumors, subdural hematomas, and 
normal pressure hydrocephalus. The instrument cannot, 
however, detect the neuropathologic lesions 
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(neurofibrillary tangles and senile plaques) 
characteristic of Alzheimer's disease. As such, it is 
repeatedly noted that only upon autopsy can a definitive 
diagnostic conclusion be drawn. ostensibly, post-mortem 
neuropathological data, as revealed by the quantity and 
distribution of plaques and tangles in the brain, will 
either confirm or disconfirm a clinical diagnosis. 
(This, however, is debated by those medical researchers 
who see the Alzheimer'sjnormal aging distinction in 
quantitative rather than qualitative terms--see Katzman, 
Terry, and Bick, 1978:267). 
The differential diagnosis of Alzheimer's, as such, 
lies in both further ruling out other causes of dementia 
and, in so doing, attempting to "get at" the disease. 
Two pathological conditions that are especially difficult 
to distinguish from Alzheimer's are multi-infarct 
dementia and depression. The cognitive and intellectual 
impairment found in multi-infarct dementia (hardening of 
the arteries), the second most frequent cause of dementia 
in the aged, is similar to that of Alzheimer's. 
Moreover, it has been estimated that the two disorders 
occur together in approximately twelve percent of elders 
with a progressive dementia (Katzman, 1982). Yet, as 
Hachinski (1983:188) points out, "Clinical evaluation 
remains the single most important means of distinguishing 
AD from multi-infarct dementia." Whereas Alzheimer's 
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presents as a slow, progressive condition, multi-infarct 
dementia is frequently abrupt in onset with a stepwise 
course of progress, and with focal neurological signs. 
Hachinski (1978) has devised what he calls an "ischemic 
score," composed of the above criteria, which is commonly 
cited as a useful means of differentiating between the 
two conditions. 
Depression, or what is often called "pseudodementia" 
(Kiloh, 1961: Wells, 1979), is also at times very 
difficult to discriminate from Alzheimer's. Depression 
has not only been shown to mimic dementia to a 
considerable degree (McAllister and Price, 1982) but, as 
with multi-infarct dementia, can also occur along with 
Alzheimer's disease (Wells, 1983). These complications 
have reportedly resulted in several mistaken diagnoses 
(Nott and Fleminger, 1975; Ron, Toone, and Garralda, 
1979; Liston, 1977). Wells (1983:194) offers the 
following solution in this regard: 
The clinician who attacks these problems must do so 
largely with the tools of clinical observation; 
ancillary diagnostic procedures, though sometimes 
helpful, cannot establish the correct diagnosis for 
the clinician, and indeed they depend for their 
correct interpretation on the clinician. In most 
instances, careful attention to details of the 
history and clinical observation will lead the 
physician to the correct diagnosis. 
What Wells is suggesting is that the use of 
diagnostic aids will not yield the "true" condition of a 
patient. His is a useful caution against the common-
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practice of uncritically relying on mental status 
examinations or questionnaires (see, for example, 
Pfeiffer, 1975) ~o diagnose Alzheimer's. Wells points 
out that while these tests provide measures of cognitive 
impairment, that alone is inadequate in diagnosing a 
brain/behavior condition such as Alzheimer's disease 
(Wells, 1983; Wells and Buchanan, 1977). 
In the preceding extract, Wells also speaks of the 
considerable discretionary powers of the physician. 
While Wells provides an understanding of the complexities 
of clinical diagnosis, his concern is with providing the 
"correct interpretation" in order to get at the "correct 
diagnosis," not in impairment construction itself. He, 
like others, does not directly question the vocabulary 
and grammar of Alzheimer's disease. 
The patient's family, too, is a considerable 
resource in the diagnosis of the disease, especially in 
regard to the patient's history--what Wells, in the 
preceding quote, advocates. The information they provide 
can be quite valuable in determining, for example, 
whether the problem behaviors' onset and course was 
sudden and stepwise or gradually progressive, the former 
signalling multi-infarct dementia, the latter 
Alzheimer's. A family member or relative might also 
report that the patient "was always poor at figures" or 
"never cared a hoot about politics," challenging the 
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results of mental status questionnaires and other 
diagnostic procedures. As one social worker put it, "You 
might come across something that looks like extreme 
withdrawal but then, if you bothered to ask a family 
member, you find out that he's been that way all his life 
and all the family considers that normal." 
Yet, while the patient's family and friends provide 
much needed data, what they report is not necessarily the 
same interpretation of the patient's presenting condition 
as the physician's andjor other service providers•. A 
physician at the day hospital, for example, commented on 
families' conflicting testimony by stating that he felt 
"in most cases, the family thinks the patient is worse 
than he really is, but you also have the opposite 
situation where the family member unconsciously protects 
the patient." 
The patient's self-presentation also must be 
interpreted. Often, he or she is characterized as still 
possessing many social skills (Paulson, 1977) as well as, 
among other things, denying the impairment. As Wells 
(1977:3) describes: 
[The] lack of awareness and concern for memory loss 
in most patients with significant dementia attests 
to the effectiveness of the defense mechanisms of 
denial. 
Early in the process of dementia a variety of 
other symptoms may present and may capture the 
attention of the patient, his family, and his 
physician. Many of these early symptoms of dementia 
differ little either qualitatively or quantitatively 
from those that occur in normal, healthy individuals 
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who are exhausted, anxious, or subject to severe 
environmental pressures .... Often the patient's 
attention centers on various somatic complaints, 
previously present or arising de novo, for which no 
adequate organic cause can be found and for which 
the usual remedies provide no relief. Here only the 
physician's acumen prompts him to search beneath the 
facade of somatic symptoms for the nidus of the 
problem. 
At this juncture, the "definition of the situation" 
is perhaps most readily apparent, with what the author 
calls "the physician's acumen" taking center stage. 
While eliminating other pathological conditions at the 
same time signals a diagnosis of Alzheimer's, the 
physician also faces the task of reading the behaviors 
presented before him as dementia rather than "normal" old 
age forgetfulness. In this regard, certain experiences 
such as the inability to manage one's finances are more 
apt to be cited as a "sign" of the disease. As Katzman 
(1982:8) writes: 
The diagnosis of dementia is usually suggested by a 
history of forgetfulness, repetitiousness, losing 
one's way around; there may be loss of ability to 
perform complex tasks on the job--for example, a 
radiologist may no longer be able to interpret the 
x-ray film. In our society, one of the most 
demanding tasks is control of one's own personal 
finances and checkbook; deterioration in this 
function often heralds the development of a 
progressive dementia. 
Consider also the following remarks made by a nurse 
at the day hospital concerning one of the caregivers who 
attended their weekly support group, the adult son of a 
demented mother: 
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Don't you all think that sam has some dementia. You 
visited with him and talked for awhile. He's always 
late. You know how he forgets and sneaks in here a 
half hour and sometimes an hour late. He comes in 
and looks at me and shrugs his shoulders and • . . 
like he's saying ••. 'what can I do?' He drives 
around and is always running over curbs •..• You 
can't tell me that he couldn't get his income tax 
done. I mean he just filed for his 1980 taxes. He 
keeps writing in and getting extensions. And of 
course, he's late on his '81 taxes too. I really 
think he's got some dementia, don't you? 
While select behavioral conditions are more 
frequently described in the attempt to "spot" dementia, 
there are no simple and "ready-made" solutions which can 
be used as automatic diagnostic criteria. How, then, is 
the affair accomplished? What sort of interpretive rules 
are used in defining a presented behavioral trouble or 
troubles as pathology as opposed to normal (natural) old 
age development? 
Consider, in this regard, Katzman's (1982:8) 
definition of dementia: 
Alzheimer's Disease presents as a dementia, that is, 
as a progressive deterioration in intellectual 
capacity in an otherwise alert individual. The 
deterioration must be sufficient to interfere with 
social or occupational performance or both. This 
definition of dementia paraphrases that in the Third 
Edition of'the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
the American Psychiatric Association. This 
definition is welcomed by most physicians since it 
marks the agreement by the·psychiatric community to 
drop the awkward term 'chronic organic brain 
syndrome' for the more specific descriptive term of 
'dementia.' 
The definition, in effect, provides a working rule-
of-thumb for revealing an underlying pathology out of the 
diversity of behaviors and conditions a physician 
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confronts (see Drachman•s comments in Katzman, 1983:9-10 
for a similar definition). As Katzman puts it, while the 
disease presents as a "progressive deterioration in 
intellectual capacity in an otherwise alert individual, 
[the] deterioration must be sufficient to interfere with 
social or occupational performance or both" (emphasis 
added). By the same token, "insufficient" interference 
includes those conditions of aging that have their own, 
not incapacitating~ impact on performance, what Kral, in 
the earlier quoted extract, refers to as "benign" memory 
loss. As such, Katzman locates the differential 
diagnosis in the everyday social competence of the 
suspected patient, its particulars being detailed on the 
occasions of their consideration. This, ironically, 
brings the clinical picture of the disease experience 
back to the tacit disease;normal aging tension. As with 
the use of indefinite terms, evidence is marshalled to 
cover a wide-range of old age experiences. "Sufficient" 
deterioration, for example, may show up one way for this 
patient, another way for that patient, and take yet 
another form for the next, conceivably stretching the 
symptomatic grounds of the disease to include troubles as 
diverse as advanced old age itself--with all of the 
diversely-related particulars collectively representing 
each other as a single entity, Alzheimer's disease. 
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The nebulous features of the disease are well-
recognized by those who share the experience. It should 
be noted, however, that while many may stand to benefit 
or have special interests in the disease distinction, 
professionally-concerted deception is not the basis of 
its existence. In fact, as will be shown in Chapter 6, a 
rather strong case can be made that it is the ADRDA, 
itself, that is at the center of the disease's public 
recognition. Whatever the "hidden" intent, as such, from 
medical researchers to service providers and caregivers, 
what brings all of them together is their belief and 
concrete knowledge that something has gone wrong with 
elders of concern to them, that something ostensibly 
being Alzheimer's disease. 
It is the urgent need and active pursuit to do 
something .. about the "silent epidemic" that "dims bright 
1 
minds" that breathes life into the disease's reality-
defining existence, something which, at the same time, 
however, also creates the tension between it and old age. 
Yet, as one nurse at the day hospital, after discussing 
the shortcomings of the "medical model," exclaimed, 
"They're real problems out there begging for help .. 
You can't just sit around and do nothing." As such, in 
getting on with the task at hand, Alzheimer's, as 
evidenced by it's brain/behavior markers, is revealed by 
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the grammar that articulates what it is surely said to 
be: a disease, not a normal part of aging. 
CHAPTER 5 
ONSET AND COURSE OF ILLNESS: THE QUESTION OF TIMING 
In this chapter, I turn to the question of timing as 
a way of organizing the Alzheimer's disease experience, 
the second component of its grammar. The problematic 
that was introduced in the last chapter--the relationship 
between the experience as a disease structure, on the one 
.. 
hand, and as a configuration of aging, on the other--is 
considered here in terms of the progress of the 
experience. Focusing on onset and course of decline, I 
consider how disease as opposed to normal aging 
interpretations are applied. 
It is argued that a rational vision of timing 
organizes the experience to define it as illness, 
something which stands in considerable tension with the 
variety of symptoms encountered. While not challenging 
the reality status of the disease itself, caregivers and 
service providers nonetheless face its highly diverse 
presentation in their attempts to understand and deal 
with its "troubles." In this respect, it is further 
argued that the vision facilitates the use of formal 
assessment procedures for dealing with the feelings and 
perceptions of caregivers, the "other victims" of the 
163 
164 
disease. Finally, in conjunction with the latter, the 
decision of whether to continue home care or to seek 
institutionalization is analyzed. 
THE RATIONAL VISION 
The first step in the rationalization of the 
Alzheimer's disease experience is to give the experience 
a name, the effect of which supplies a containable 
(categorical) thing to describe. (The interpretive 
challenge posed in this regard was examined in the last 
chapter.) The "fleshing out" of the rational vision, as 
it were, produces a well-defined disease chronology, in 
principle, one with a relatively clear beginning and a 
regular course of progress (Lynott, 1983). Underpinning 
the vision is a sense of a systematic process of decline, 
where behavioral changes occur in a more or less 
preestablished manner, with associated levels of care 
burdens. 
The Question of Onset 
Consider, first, the course's point of origin. It 
is repeatedly noted in the related popular, promotional, 
and professional literature that Alzheimer's disease has 
an insidious onset, one that, as Wells (1977:3)•states 
"is often dated in retrospect and with imprecision, the 
informant being aware that things are seriously amiss at 
present but unaware just when things began to move in 
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this direction." The endeavor is further hampered due to 
the diagnostic ambiguity of the disease. As noted in the 
preceding chapter, Alzheimer's is a disease of exclusion, 
having no known detectable cause. As such, the task of 
isolating dementia presenting as Alzheimer's from the 
fifty or more "nonAlzheimer's" dementias that mimic it 
must also be dealt with. The insidious uncertainty of 
Alzheimer's disease is well illustrated in the following 
example: 
Over the period that we worked together . . . I 
became gradually aware that the fine edge of his 
intellect was becoming dulled. He was less clear in 
discussion and less quick to make the jump from a 
new piece of evidence to its possible significance. 
He spent more time over his work and achieved less; 
and he found it increasingly difficult to get his 
results ready for publication. He tended also to 
become portentous and solemn about his subject, as 
though one small corner of knowledge nearly filled 
his world, and the wider horizons were narrowing in. 
The change was so slow as to be barely perceptible, 
and the signs vanished when I tried to pin them 
down: they were like those faint stars which are 
seen more easily when they are not in the direct 
line of vision. I was left with a feeling of 
uneasiness which I could not justify •... after a 
period of absence, I looked forward with special 
pleasure to my homecoming, but when we met I knew 
with immediate certainty that I had lost the 
companion of my earlier years. The change was as 
yet mainly a loss of intellectual clarity and he 
remained himself, but a self that was subtly 
devitalised. To me it was as though a light had 
gone out, but no-one else seemed to notice anything 
amiss. 
By this time he was worried about his general 
health and attended a doctor from time to time with 
rather vague symptoms. For several years he had 
been said to have low blood-pressure, but nothing 
was found wrong apart from this, and he was 
reassured (Wells, 1977:3-4). 
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Though it may be indicated repeatedly that 
Alzheimer's disease has an insidious onset, it is, 
nonetheless, considered concrete and factual in people's 
lives, not being equally descriptive and constitutive. 
It thus becomes reasonable to search for the onset of a 
particular patient's problem in order to conclude that it 
occurred on this or that date. While caregivers and 
service providers might change their minds or disagree 
with one another over the age of onset, the differences 
are understood in terms of error, not as reconstructions. 
The insidious quality of onset, as such, is the result of 
the lack of a means of handily detecting its emergence, 
not of a missing origin per se. The search for onset, 
thus, is a reasonable, albeit perhaps difficult, pursuit. 
In discussing the preceding quote, for example, Wells 
(1977:4) notes how easily the "subtlety of presenting 
signs and symptoms . . . may be overlooked even by a 
concerned and qualified observer" (emphasis added). As 
such, while admittedly sometimes hard to detect, the 
onset of illness can be located, in principle, in 
particular aspects of people's lives, existing at some 
"objective" point in time. The "discovery" of onset as a 
discrete and self-contained entity provides a beginning 
for the disease chronology. 
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The Course of Progress 
Consider next the presented course of progress of 
the disease. The course is commonly delineated into 
stages, phases, or earlier and later parts, the former 
being part of more formal models of decline, the latter, 
less so. The divisions provide rationalized 
(systematically organized) general descriptions of a 
disease process with a common, developmental complement 
of decline. Consider, for example, Cox's widely quoted 
developmental scheme, taken from the July, 1984 issue of 
the Cleveland ADRDA Chapter's Newsletter (reprinted from 
the Tucson ADRDA Newsletter). Cox states that his model 
is explicitly directed towards "practical considerations 
which lead to decisions concerning level of care or 
degree of intervention appropriate to any particular 
stage." The stages are then presented as follows: 
• 
1. The first stage of AD is made only in 
retrospect; in other words, it is all of those 
little changes in memory, intellect and social 
function which had been observed in the early phases 
of the disease but really were overlooked or not 
thought significant until such time as the patient 
was disabled enough to require formal medical 
evaluation. Once the diagnosis is established, 
then by looking back one can tie in 'all those 
little things' with the known diagnosis and see 
how the first stage of AD is subtle indeed in many 
cases. 
2. Phase two really begins with the establishment 
of a clinical diagnosis. The degree of disability 
at this point depends largely upon the sensitivity 
of the family in terms of seeking medical help . . 
stage two goes from the time of diagnosis to the 
time of significant incontinence of bowels or 
bladder. (Incontinence is used as the dividing line 
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between stage two and stage three because it is such 
an important determinant of levels of care that most 
families find it really not feasible to care for an 
individual with significant incontinence in the 
home-setting.) 
3. Stage three goes from the time of the onset of 
incontinence to the development of a rather severely 
dependent and almost 'vegetative' stage. At this 
time, the patient may be totally unable to 
communicate, to recognize family or loved ones, to 
do any element of self-care and probably will needs 
to be bodily lifted from bed-to-chair or bed-to-
toilet. 
4. Stage four is basically the end-stage of the 
disease from the development of extreme dependency 
and noncommunicativeness until death, this latter 
usually caused by either pneumonia (from the 
inability to swallow without getting food or fluids, 
etc., into the lungs) or urinary tract infection 
usually subsequent to chronic bladder 
catheterization. 
While Cox, wittingly or not, describes the nebulous 
and discretionary features of Alzheimer's disease, 
especially its earlier manifestations which can be 
recognized "only in retrospect," what is clear is that 
the concern is with a single entity--Alzheimer's disease 
--that is being referenced. Cox presents its, the 
disease's, systematic and progressive course of 
development, noting the inexorable process of cognitive 
and, eventually, physical debility that takes place. The 
process of decline is linear and sequential, like clock 
time (see Hendricks and Hendricks, 1976). The clock-time 
understanding informs service providers' and caregivers' 
ongoing attempts to distinguish the early, middle, and 
later stages of impairment and its corresponding care 
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burdens. The disease, as such, is structured as a well-
ordered entity to permit intervention. Yet, following 
his stage descriptions denoting the "typical" path the 
disease follows, Cox informs the reader of its unordered 
and inconstant features, as follows: 
The time course through any phase is completely 
individual and variable. Whether an individual goes 
through all four stages is determined in part by the 
age of onset of the disease, by its rapidity of 
progression and by the presence or absence of other 
significant or serious medical problems which may be 
far more important in determining longevity than is 
AD. 
The homogeneous and straightforward time scheme 
depicted in Cox's stage descriptions now becomes 
heterogeneous and uncertain, having no set time pattern. 
Indeed, the temporal quality of the disease, being 
"completely individual" and having no clearcut course of 
progress, becomes as diverse as are the varied 
experiences characterizing old age. Once again, this 
time in terms of the progress of the presented disease, 
the tension between Alzheimer's as a unified and concrete 
entity in people's lives and normal age-related troubles 
is manifested. 
The descriptive tension is not unique to Cox's 
presentation but, rather, is depicted across all levels 
of concern with the disease experience. Consider, for 
example, Berger's (1980:235) "Severity Rating System," a 
six-stage classification scheme pertaining to degree of 
functional capacity. His model is also geared to those 
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servicing the disease, especially practicing physicians. 
The class ratings follow: 
Severity Class I: can function in any 
surroundings, but forgetfulness is often disruptive 
of daily activities; 
Severity Class II: can function without direction 
only in familiar surroundings; 
Severity Class III: needs direction to function even 
in familiar surroundings but can respond 
appropriately to instruction; 
severity Class IV: needs assistance to function; 
cannot respond to direction alone; 
Severity Class V: remains ambulatory, needs 
assistance to function, but cannot communicate 
verbally in a meaningful fashion; 
Severity Class VI: bedridden or confined to a chair 
and responds only to tactile stimuli. 
Berger's time scheme, like Cox's, is unilinear and 
progressive, both viewing change, either in decline or 
increasing burden, as developmental and stage-like. The 
sense of timing in Berger's (1980:235) rating system is 
further distinguished by what he calls a "core mid-
point," separating "Severity Class III, in which the 
patient must be told to pull up his pants (direction), 
and Severity Class IV, in which someone has to pull up 
his pants for him (assistance)." Later, however, the 
developmental pattern shifts to being nondevelopmental 
and irregular, as Berger (1980:235) illustrates: 
Moreover, it is not uncommon, particularly before 
serious deterioration sets in, for the picture to 
vacillate from day to day. Further, while the 
disease remains, the severity is not permanent nor 
is it forever progressive. Once the patient feels 
secure in his environment, or the superimposed 
congestive heart failure has cleared, or the 
bronchitis has subsided, the physician, the patient, 
and the loved ones may well be rewarded with a 
change from Class IV to Class II. 
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Here, again, the tension between disease versus 
normal aging interpretations is apparent. What was 
earlier described as a well-delineated, progressive time 
trajectory is now depicted as erratic and regressive. 
While the latter, idiosyncraticjnonrational view, is 
suggestive of variations in old age behavior (some 
perhaps unpleasant) due to factors such as changes in 
environmental or health conditions, for the author, "the 
disease remains," as a taken for granted, unified, and 
concrete thing, separate from its diverse presentation. 
There are still other, more elaborated, formal 
models of decline. One such scheme, presented in the 
JunejJuly 1984 issue of the Portland ADRDA Chapter's 
Newsletter, describes the "progressive phases of 
Alzheimer's disease" along three separate dimensions: 
cognitive, personality, and functional changes. Each 
component, itself, contains a detailed list of activities 
of daily living to further illustrate a given level of 
decline. The course of progress even specifies timing 
along chronological lines. Yet, while it is stated that 
the course of Alzheimer's disease is progressive and the 
"symptoms reflect a continuous decline," also noted are 
its volatile and shapeless features, where "some symptoms 
will overlap," some will "vary in sequence and the rate 
at which they progress," and "some may be absent in 
individual patients." Indeed, depending upon such 
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factors as age of onset, the condition of one's health, 
and availability of support systems, it is stated that 
the disease "may last from a few to twenty years," which 
comes close to being about as unpredictable and eccentric 
as the aging process itself. 
There are also less formal models of the disease 
course, emphasizing a beginning, middle, and end or 
earlier and later aspects. As with the more elaborate 
stage model presentations, a distinct temporal feature of 
the disease process is readily apparent--Alzheimer's has 
a course that is inexorably degenerative, leading to 
eventual institutionalization and death. Here again, 
this form of discourse structures Alzheimer's as a well-
defined disease entity, one with a relatively clear 
beginning and systematic course of progress. At the same 
time, however, the disease is said to have no coherent 
pattern, its timing being as diverse as the aging 
experiences it presumably is not. While less formal 
models of timing are found throughout the disease 
literature, they share a considerable likeness in wording 
and format. The following example, presented in a 
pamphlet published by the u.s. Department of Health and 
Human Services (1980a), is illustrative. Consider, 
first, the systematic and progressive time element 
presented: 
At first, the individual experiences only minor and 
almost imperceptible symptoms that are often 
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attributed to emotional upsets or other physical 
illnesses. Gradually, however, the person becomes 
more forgetful, particularly about recent events. 
The individual may neglect to turn off the oven, may 
misplace things, may recheck to see if a task was 
done, may take longer to complete a chore that was 
previously routine, or may repeat already answered 
questions. As the disease progresses, memory loss 
increases and other changes, such as confusion, 
irritability, restlessness, and agitation, are 
likely to appear in personality, mood, and behavior. 
Judgment, concentration, orientation, and speech may 
eventually render its victims totally incapable of 
caring for themselves. 
Immediately following, the erratic and highly diverse 
symptomatology and course of progress are pointed out: 
There are many different patterns in the type, 
severity, and sequence of changes in mental and 
neurological functioning that result from 
Alzheimer's disease. The symptoms are progressive, 
but there is great variation in the rate of change 
from person to person. 
The same cognitive tension concerning the 
grammatical status of Alzheimer's also exists in spoken 
form. Service providers and caregivers commonly make 
references to a rational understanding of the disease's 
course of progress. For the most part, descriptions of 
changes in the disease are casual and incomplete, with 
statements such as, "(the patient] is in the later 
stages" or "[the patient] is in that early, hard to 
detect, stage," without any further description. 
Rationalized understandings are most apparent when 
Alzheimer's is described as a general entity, typically 
referencing stage-like features of the disease. On other 
occasions, however, the disease is portrayed as not 
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having a distinct course of progress, because "it all 
depends so much on the circumstances and the 
personalities involved," and "no two cases are alike," 
again abrogating a disease structure. 
Measurement 
Another component in the rationalization of the 
disease experience is the formal assessment of caregiver 
tolerance or "felt burden" (Zarit, Reever, and Bach-
Peterson, 1980) . With no cure available, the medical and 
human service care of the patient is largely custodial, 
limited to symptomatic relief and behavioral management. 
As one social worker at the day hospital put it, in 
describing some of the program's scheduled activities 
patients engage in, such as "getting their daily cup of 
coffee," "feeding the fish," "playing catch with the 
ball," "helping to prepare lunch," or "taking an 
afternoon walk:" 
I don't think there's any magic about it in terms of 
the activities that we do. It could be done at 
home. I think the big thing is that somebody else 
is doing it, which also gives the caregiver a break. 
That's a big thing. Another thing is just in terms 
of the preprofessional relationships. I find it 
real difficult to tell my dad to brush his teeth. I 
think my dad would find it real difficult to accept 
those kinds of things. I think it makes it easier 
to accept those kinds of things being here than 
being with their families. 
Thus, the primary focus of attention, in terms of 
intervention, is the caregiver, who, because of the 
patient's mental demise combined with a body that is 
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often remarkably fit, faces a "funeral that never ends." 
As part of the day hospital's research program, 
assessments of caregivers' felt burden were regularly 
measured by asking them a series of questions concerning 
their personal experiences with their Alzheimer's 
patients. Part of the test format consisted of 
completing a "burden interview," comprised of twenty 
items drawn from Zarit, Reever, and Bach-Peterson's 
(1980) 29-item, self-report inventory. Caregivers were 
asked how they felt about select aspects of their 
patient's impairment, rating each of the twerity items for 
"burden" on a scale from "not at all" to "extremely." 
Following is a sample of the items (see Appendix B for 
the complete inventory): 
1. Do you feel that your spousejparent makes 
requests which you perceive to be over and above 
what he/she needs? 
2. Do you feel embarrassed over your 
spouse'sjparent's behavior? 
3. Do you feel guilty about your interactions with 
your spouse/parent? 
4. Do you feel that your spousejparent currently 
affects your relationships with other family members 
and friends in a negative way? 
5. Do you feel that the present situation with your 
spousejparent doesn't allow you as much privacy as 
you would like? 
In attempting to relate measured burdens to given 
levels of decline, service providers are again faced with 
a working tension in the disease experience. The tension 
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centers around the attempt to rationally assess burden 
and tolerance when the latter are matters of continued 
interpretation. (On formal measurement occasions, the 
il 
formality of thel. questioning, itself, "demands" answers, 
more or less definitive ones. They are demands in the 
sense that an answer is desired, a nonanswer being 
treated as useless for the most part. Comparing this 
with the flux of answering that caregivers provide and 
offer up concerning their level of tolerance on other 
occasions show that the measures seem to tap only 
crystallized moments of interpretation of the condition 
under consideration. 
The tension is resolved for the practical purposes 
at hand, in this case, for the purpose of collecting 
ostensibly precise information about the felt burden of 
care. The information gathered can be used to counsel 
family members on how best to cope personally with the 
heavy demands of patient care as well as facilitate what 
is believed to be the eventual decision to 
institutionalize. For example, when an Alzheimer patient 
is considered to be at a certain state of decline, 
service providers would then be informed of the related 
burdens of care and, depending on their express 
assessment, that a family might now seriously or not yet 
seriously seek institutionalization. 
177 
The tension between the rational, unitary vision of 
the disease course and its relationship to the diverse 
experiences of service providers and caregivers with the 
Alzheimer patient exists across all levels of concern 
with the disease experience. It was shown, for example, 
how the disease's popular, promotional, and professional 
literature, in describing the symptoms and course of 
progress of the disease, also takes precaution to mention 
', 
its varied ind~idual manifestations and chronology. 
I 
Likewise, ser\,l"'ice providers and caregivers, whether 
i 
presenting thei "typical" progress of the disease or 
attempting to assess and manage the presumed 
corresponding burdens of care, face the same problem, 
namely, recognizing temporal unity (a disease structure) 
out of the diversely-related experiences. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I show how the working tension 
is socially organized, first, by describing the role of 
exemplars in the disease experience and, then, by 
displaying its socially constructed temporal features. 
EXEMPLARS 
Part of the process of making sense of the disease 
experience involves the use of public exemplars, a means 
of transforming private troubles into public 
understandings (Mills, 1959). Celebrities who now have 
or had the disease, like Rita Hayworth, Norman Rockwell, 
and Edmond O'Brien, together with their caregivers, 
178 
combine with less renowned disease victims and caregivers 
to provide a slate of comparable exemplars by which to 
evaluate individual impairments. Rita Hayworth, the 
Hollywoood actress, is perhaps the most famous exemplar 
of the disease. Her story, entitled "The Tragedy of Rita 
Hayworth," is presented in an article written by Rosemary 
Santini and Katherine Barrett (1983) in the popular 
magazine Ladies' Home Journal. The article describes the 
onetime "glamorous movie star" as still physically 
attractive, a well-dressed older woman with "shoulder-
length red hair," and "dark brown eyes." But she now 
stares ahead fixedly, her eyes "clouded and 
uncomprehending." As Rita's daughter, Princess Yasmin 
Aga Khan (Santini and Barrett, 1983:84-85), explains: 
It's so hard to know what she's feeling, what's 
going on inside .... I don't know what she can 
understand, but there are fleeting moments when I'm 
sure that she's at least somewhat aware. 
I do know that she needs the security of my 
love, that in some way I bring her joy. And I visit 
her as often as I can because I need to be there for 
her, to tell her I love her, to tell her everything 
is all right. 
The article goes on to introduce the reader to the 
"devastating illness that has slowly been robbing Rita of 
her memory, her ability to function and, finally, her 
personality": 
It is called Alzheimer's Disease, and because 
it affects the outer layer of the brain--creating a 
chaotic tangle of nerve filaments--a patient's 
intellectual ability is eventually destroyed. Other 
victim's relatives have likened it to •a slow 
death,' a 'funeral that never ends.' Often they 
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speak of their afflicted wives or husbands or 
parents in the past tense. Like Yasmin, 33, they 
describe the agony of not being recognized, or their 
feeling that a stranger has inhabited the body of 
their loved one (Santini and Barrett, 1983:85). 
The course of Rita's disease experience is presented 
under two sections entitled "The rumors about Rita" and 
"The growing darkness." Yasmin describes Rita's "stormy" 
career, her five turbulent marriages, as well as the 
dogged coverage by the press of her alcohol problems and 
otherwise "bizarre" behavior. The article explains: 
What no one--not Yasmin, nor even Rita's doctors--
knew at the time was that the former movie star was 
already gravely ill. Only Rita herself may have 
suspected that something was wrong. An introverted 
person, she may have been worrying silently for 
years about her mind's growing darkness. When an 
interviewer asked her about a past she couldn't 
remember, or when her extreme mood changes began 
costing her longtime friends, she must have been 
terrified (Santini and Barrett, 1983:139). 
Rita is reported to be in the final stages of the "dread 
disease," her insidious onset and "slow, agonizing 
changes" having resulted in the "confusion and terror 
that still seem to remain after all other emotions and 
thoughts and memories have faded away" (Santini and 
Barrett, 1983:142). 
A portrait of the caregiver as "the other victim" is 
also presented. Resembling her mother, Yasmin is 
beautiful, "an extremely attractive woman, a classical 
singer who temporarily abandoned her own career a year 
ago to devote herself to her mother's care and to the 
Alzheimer's Disease and Related Disorders Association" 
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(1983:139). Like the title of the popular caregiver 
handbook, The 36-Hour Day, Yasmin's experience informs 
the reader of the time-consuming and emotional sacrifices 
caring for an Alzheimer patient entails. As she reports: 
This whole thing has been too grueling emotionally 
for me to devote my energies to singing .... I'll 
continue my music later. I don't resent that. This 
is a time when my mother's needs come first (Santini 
and Barrett, 1983:139). 
Yet, demanding as it is, Yasmin at least can afford 
round-the-clock care for her mother. Those less 
fortunate, who cannot so readily obtain outside help, 
seemingly face an even more difficult caregiving task. 
The Rita Hayworth story is a centerpiece for sharing 
individual disease experiences, a public mirror for 
personal reflection (Gubrium and Lynott, 1985). It is 
relayed in national and ADRDA newsletters and is 
frequently reported in the print and the broadcast media. 
Indeed, it is often stated that Alzheimer's disease is 
"Rita Hayworth's disease," or "what Rita Hayworth has." 
While Rita's victimization is the most widely recognized, 
there are many other stories that display "what it's 
like." 
Consider, for example, the portrait of a "typical" 
disease experience which first appeared in Barry 
Reisberg's (1981) book, Brain Failure, but has since been 
reprinted as a caregiver handbook and retitled A Guide to 
Alzheimer's Disease. Reisberg devotes an entire chapter 
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to Joe s., a once successful newspaperman who had always 
possessed "an enviable memory," and his "loving and 
devoted" wife, Ilia. The author (1983:101) describes 
when Ilia, Joe's writing assistant, who "knew his 
abilities and style better than anyone," first began to 
notice "a change in [his] previously enviable 
performance." Among other things, Joe's "dictations 
began to lose their customary flow" and he "seemed to 
encounter some difficulty finding exactly the proper word 
for what he wished to say." Reisberg goes on to describe 
Joe's course of decline through three separate phases of 
the disease, presented as the "forgetfulness phase," 
"confused phase," and "dementia phase." 
Early on, Reisberg informs the reader of the pace of 
Joe's initial decline, one that was more rapid than 
"many" others with the disease; one that had "symptoms 
nearly identical" to those same "many" as well. As the 
author (1981:102) states: 
Many elderly people who begin to notice 
'forgetfulness' symptoms nearly identical to those 
observed by Joe and his wife seem to live with these 
symptoms for many years without any further decline. 
Joe, as we shall see, was not so fortunate. 
Reisberg (1981:100-22) chronicles Joe's 
deterioration from his initial "distress at his loss of 
cognitive facility and his desire to 'do something about 
it,'" to "denying the extent of his impairment," to, in 
the final phase, "being unable to sit still," engaging in 
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"continuous purposeless activity." And, still later, 
Joe's condition is described as getting to a state where 
he "would become very angry and shout and verbally attack 
people without apparent provocation." The author 
provides an extensive description and cites numerous 
examples illustrating Joe's transition from stage to 
stage, at the same time, portraying the plight of Ilia, 
"the other victim" of the disease. For example, in 
presenting an instance of Joe's condition in stage three, 
the author (1981:105) describes: 
the intact energy of these dementia-phase patients 
is expressed as restlessness and rapidly changing, 
seemingly random activities. For example, when Ilia 
actually took Joe out onto the street, he 
immediately wanted to return home. Dutifully, Ilia 
would take him home, whereupon Joe would again 
insist upon leaving. Joe was like a man 
'possessed,' wanting to do things but not really 
knowing what he wanted to do. 
Unable to cope with the "36-hour" burden Joe presented, 
Ilia eventually had to place him in a nursing home--her 
almost daily visits and recurring guilt vividly 
displaying a labor of love. 
Like Hayworth's, Joe's story presents g model for 
interpreting individual experiences. There are, of 
course, other exemplary models of the disease experience. 
These include the more well-known cases of caregivers 
Bobbie Glaze, ADRDA's national chairperson for program 
development, and Jerome Stone, the organization's 
President. There are also visual portraits that 
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exemplify the disease experience, including, for example, 
the five different victims and their caregivers presented 
in the frequently shown videotape Someone I Once Knew. 
In their variety, they offer an expanded platform for 
interpreting experienced particulars. There are many 
local exemplars, too, whose stories have spread through 
the routine borrowing of news and coping items among 
ADRDA chapters, reprinted in their newsletters. Often 
without formal authors as such, the portraits further 
expand the disease's horizon. Regardless, though, of how 
familiar or of what style, exemplary presentations 
provide a considerable chronological resource, typically 
describing the disease's onset, diagnosis, course of 
progress, the decision to institutionalize, and the 
burdens of care while, at the same time too, 
communicating a recognizable means of sharing diversely-
related disease timings. 
Finally, there are the ad hoc exemplars that serve 
as temporary examples for comparing other patients' 
symptoms and courses of progress. In the day hospital's 
support group, for example, caregivers not only shared 
their personal burdens of care, but had also interacted 
with each other's patients in a weekly social and 
recreation program. Over time, caregivers witnessed 
several patients' conditions, enabling them to compare 
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firsthand what the mental and physical status of their 
own victims is "really like." 
All in all, exemplary details collectively represent 
the "typical," yet diverse disease chronologies. The 
question of which specific exemplar provides the 
semblance of particular cases, however, is not just a 
simple matter of matching exemplary onsets and courses of 
progress, and their interrelated "task burdens," with 
individual experiences with the disease. As the 
following section shows, in practice, the use of 
exemplars to display "what it's like" often entails a 
considerable amount of negotiation in its accomplishment. 
APPLICATION 
Having seen that the rational vision of the disease 
experience and its illness interpretation does not square 
with the highly diverse symptomatology and course of 
progress as well as the burdens of care, how, then, is 
the tension socially organized? How is a sense of 
temporal unity recognized out of the individual 
chronologies? In application, through the use of 
exemplars as well as other disease-related concerns that 
enter into the perception of severity, the pattern 
becomes as unilinear and systematic or varied and 
unpredictable as are disease versus aging discourse. In 
the process, timing becomes an artifact of the work that 
all concerned do to assign reasonable courses of progress 
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to the disease experience. I consider first the onset of 
the disease, then its course of progress and, finally, 
the caregiving burden. 
When did it begin? 
The arrival of a given date or period of time when 
some sort of impairment, typically memory loss, first 
occurred is something that does get achieved. Caregivers 
often discuss among themselves the particular years when 
problems began to emerge. It is not unusual, for 
example, for a wife to state that her husband's illness 
began in the summer of 1977 "when he started forgetting 
things," or some such date. As discussed earlier, the 
question of onset is important to caregivers and service 
providers because it provides a starting point or 
benchmark by which to estimate the changing needs of both 
patient and caregiver, in effect, to rationally organize 
care and treatment. 
While obtained, information about age of onset is 
retrospective and is continually sensitive to its current 
considerations (Lynott, 1983). It was not uncommon for 
caregivers in the support groups to state that they wish 
they had kept a record of events of the course of their 
patient's illness, that such a log would have helped them 
to better plan how to deal with it. As one caregiver 
remarked, "If only we had kept a diary or something, at 
least now we might know where we stand, instead of being 
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so confused about it all." But, at the same time, they 
also stated that such a record would have been impossible 
to keep since they "usually didn't know what was 
happening until much later." Indeed, caregivers 
frequently said that they thought the patient was "just 
getting old" with its accompanying limitations until a 
diagnosis of Alzheimer's was made. Only then did they 
interpret the patient's problems as disease. 
When asked about the onset of their patients• 
illness, caregivers indirectly refer to the retrospective 
nature of their estimates. They typically preface their 
responses with phrases such as "Now that I think back on 
it, I really think it began in • " or "It's hard to 
say but we [family members] were just talking about that 
and •.•. " Others remark that they really don't know 
for sure, but, upon being urged to provide a given time 
of onset, proceed to reconsider past events in terms of 
the request. 
Moreover, the times of onset that are provided are 
sensitive to ongoing exemplary comparisons. The exchange 
of information and experiences that takes place in 
interactions with others and by reading available 
literature about the disease provide a slate of exemplars 
which serve to inform caregivers' changing accounts about 
the onset of their patients' disease. For example, a 
wife who had determined the year 1976 as the age of onset 
187 
of her husband's illness might later learn of an event in 
the life of another patient said to manifest the disease, 
one that similarly occurred in her husband's life but in 
1974, and thus proceeds to reconsider the age of onset of 
her husband's illness. The work of assigning a given 
time of onset, as a concrete point in the past, is 
reconsidered time and again as exemplars enter into its 
chronology. 
Consider an example drawn from one of the support 
groups studied. One of the regular participants, Harold, 
had a rather definite sense of the onset of Alzheimer's 
in his wife Cynthia. Both in and out of the proceedings, 
he said he was certain that Cynthia's disease began about 
four years before when she started to forget where she 
had placed various items. Harold said that his wife 
began to behave much like a husband who was well-known to 
most of the local ADRDA chapter membership. Cynthia 
forgot simple things at first, such as taking off her 
wedding ring to wash the dishes and not remembering where 
she had done so. Harold began to suspect that Cynthia's 
forgetfulness was worsening, again, "just like" the 
exemplary husband. Later, still resembling the husband, 
Cynthia began the typical accusations, blaming Harold for 
misplacing her ring, even accusing him of deliberately 
hiding things from her. 
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Harold's daughter, Martha, would sometimes 
participate in the support group. While the question of 
onset was not considered at each meeting, it became a 
topic of conversation at one point when both Harold and 
Martha were in attendance. As usual, Harold described 
the disease's onset in Cynthia and compared it with the 
well-known husband. Listening, Martha respectfully 
disagreed. She then turned to her father and asked: 
Dad, don't you think that it started much earlier 
than that? Mike [her brother] and I were talking 
about this the other day and I think that Mother had 
symptoms at least ten years ago when she was still 
working. Remember how she would come home and 
complain about how everyone at work was down on her 
because of the way she filed things? Remember how 
we all blamed it on that woman she worked with, who 
we didn't much like anyhow? I really think now that 
it's more like the Rita Hayworth thing, like Mother 
had it for a long, long time but we just didn't 
notice it. 
Harold considered the possibility that his daughter, and 
his son, might be right. He stated that he hadn't really 
given their interpretation much thought. Other 
. ' careg1vers, too, addressed the alternative, continuing to 
cite various exemplars, more or less popular, in the 
negotiation of cynthia's onset. They did this until, as 
on other occasions, the issue of "when it all began" was 
settled for the time being. 
The process of determining "when it all began" might 
again later be redetermined, as it were, as caregivers 
take into account service providers' and other 
caregivers' ongoing considerations. Yet, while 
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originally a product of retrospective and practical 
considerations, the time of onset does, at some point or 
another, begin to take on a life of its own, toward which 
caregivers subsequently interpret other aspects of their 
caregiving experiences. The assigned beginnings provide 
the concrete basis for disease, not normal aging, a 
distinction which continues to be problematic in 
considering the disease's ensuing course of progress. 
Where does it go? 
The course of progress of the disease, as earlier 
examined, is encountered in two ways. One way is that 
impairment is described as increasingly progressive and 
systematic until death. As informed by the rational 
vision, this form of description is most apparent when 
caregivers and service providers engage in a 
developmental mode of reasoning, referencing stages and 
their duration. Yet, the disease also is said to be 
erratic, having no clear course of progress. The variety 
of symptoms among early onset patients is often depicted 
to be as great as among all patients. Likewise, those 
who have had the disease for years are described as 
"remarkably different." 
Consider an example of the tension as it occurred in 
one of the support groups studied. A psychologist 
attending the session, in responding to a caregiver's 
remark that, while each individual was different, "there 
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must also be some general patterns to the disease," 
cautioned about overgeneralization and then proceeded to 
describe different stages of the disease from a care 
manual she had on hand. As the psychologist described 
the different stages, the others present began to "fill 
in" their patient's respective chronologies. Upon 
hearing the characteristics of stage two, for example, 
the inquiring caregiver exclaimed, "Fantastic, I can see 
Max right there." Yet, the tension concerning the 
disease's "typical" course would soon become focal. 
Another caregiver, the middle-aged son of a demented 
mother, took issue with the presented characteristics of 
stage three--featuring aggression as one of the primary 
symptoms--stating that his mother has always been that 
way: 
I don't want to be disagreeable but my mother's been 
aggressive all through this thing. It's the first 
thing we noticed. You all know how easy-going and 
considerate she was ... well, when she started to 
bully the family, I think that's when I started to 
notice the Alzheimer's. It's been like that from 
the very beginning. 
Others, too, pointed out related stage difficulties. One 
caregiver, for example, mentioned that her demented 
husband had never shown any signs of aggression, that her 
main problem was his constant wandering. 
When asked to explain the discrepancies, the 
psychologist• reminding the caregivers of her earlier 
caution about overgeneralization, then explained how 
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"each patient's a unique individual that's different from 
the rest" and, as such, "has to be evaluated on its own 
terms." While the disease's chronology, of course, would 
again become developmentally depicted, rendering 
Alzheimer's as a structured entity, the tension was 
clearly manifested in its diverse presentation. How, 
then, faced with the dilemma, do those concerned manage 
to discuss their "common" disease experience? 
There are two significant features of the disease 
experience that enable its social chronology to be 
accomplished, each discussed in turn. The first is that 
it is never entirely clear just what a given patient's 
"actual" course of progress is, impairment being as much 
a product of ongoing interpretations and exemplary 
comparisons as it is a feature of the disease itself. 
What an earlier or later deficit is described to be often 
shifts as caregivers and service providers hear the 
details of other patients• conditions and care burdens. 
Such shifts might even occur several times in the course 
of a single support group session as participants share 
their patients' functional impairments. 
Consider an example as it occurred during one 
particular session (Gubrium and Lynott, 1986). One of 
the caregivers, Fern, the middle-aged daughter of a 
demented mother, complained about the terrible burden her 
mother was getting to be. Citing the results of mental 
192 
status examinations the patient had recently taken as 
well as her own personal experiences with the patient, 
Fern described how her mother had declined considerably 
in just the last few months. Turning to a caregiver 
seated next to her, Fern asked, "Rose, haven't you 
noticed the same thing?" Rose replied that she did 
indeed notice it, especially the mother's changing 
disposition, a woman who, most agreed, had always been 
one to laugh easily. Fern continued: 
And the worst of it is, Rosie, that I used to be 
able to stand all the other things, you know, the 
folding [of clothing] and you know how stubborn she 
can be sometimes. It wasn't as bad at least when I 
could laugh at some of the silly things she did and 
she'd laugh too. But it's not the same anymore. 
She still does all those same things but I think 
she's gotten worse because she's gloomy all the 
time. She's got that vacant look more and more, 
kind of staring ahead like they say Rita Hayworth 
does. It's a really, really heavy situation, and I 
feel it. 
When another participant remarked that a patient's 
temperament was a major factor in the illness, the 
discussion turned to the general question of the 
relationship between functional impairment and patient 
mood in the caregiving burden. A husband, for example, 
commented that his wife's lack of humor was especially 
difficult for him, that he could, in his words, "take 
twice the wandering if she'd only be happy and laugh 
again." 
Yet, the previous consensus over the relative 
importance of mood and physical functioning altered when 
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another caregiver, Milt, offered a different 
interpretation: 
I wouldn't be too sure about that if I were you. 
That's not the way I see it. I don't know if I can 
place that much faith in the person's mood. It 
isn't all it's cracked up to be. I get sick and 
tired of all that happiness stuff and that 'smile is 
your umbrella. 1 
You all know Belle [his wife, the patient] very 
well and you all can see for yourself that she's the 
real joker and tease of the group [day hospital 
patients]. She's a very social person. She's 
always been. Talking and always laughing, like you 
wouldn't believe. Well, I hate to say it, but it's 
just driving me bananas. The constant chattering 
and laughing at everything. It's gotten so's I wear 
my Walkman [radio headphones] whenever I'm at home 
and Belle's around. The only time I get any peace 
and quiet is when she comes here [the day hospital] 
twice a week. All that chatter and giddiness have 
made her a real handful. You should all thank God 
for small favors. I only wish Belle's mood were 
like your mother's. It would really lighten the 
burden. It's not me, I don't think, because any of 
you would have a time of it in time. 
The group then turned their attention to Belle's 
mood. Each member knew her well, having regularly 
interacted with her in the day hospital unit. There was 
no doubt that Belle was a happy patient. Each of the 
support group members had frequently commented on her 
mood, to the point where she came to exemplify for them 
what the happy, yet functionally impaired, patient can 
be. 
As Milt continued his argument for the real burdens 
of excessive joviality, another caregiver, Charlotte, 
whose demented husband, Phil, was perceived as happy-go-
lucky, began to reappraise Phil's impairment. Her change 
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in outlook was based on what she also saw as the general 
implausibility of a simple mood-dysfunction argument, 
considered against particular experiences with her own 
husband. Charlotte explained: 
I'll tell you. Fern, until I started to really hear 
what Milt was saying, I thought the same. Who could 
argue with that? Better a happy wanderer than a 
miserable one. Right? But you know, when I think 
of my Phil, now he's a happy enough fellow. You 
know. I don't have to explain. But it can really 
get to me, too. Like I know how it gets to Milt. I 
mean, just face it, things just aren't that funny. 
Just because Phil treats everything like it's a 
joke, it makes his restlessness twice as difficult. 
He just can't get serious about himself and it only 
makes the wandering worse, just awful sometimes, 
like he's laughing at you and kicking you in the 
behind at the same time. 
Charlotte's remarks did not convince either Fern or 
Rose. They responded that they'd much prefer Phil over 
their own patients. In support of her view of the 
composition of impairment, Rose incredulously asked all 
participants, "You mean to say that someone like that 
wandering, morose mother in that movie we saw [a popular 
documentary about five Alzheimer's patients, entitled 
"Someone I Once Knew"] is not as much a burden as Phil or 
Belle; you've got to be kidding!" Rose maintained that 
the wanderer depicted in the film was "clearly" a case of 
what any caregiver would want to avoid because, as she 
declared, "That's really what I would call a 36-hour 
burden," repeating the familiar slogan. For Rose, it was 
"plain as day," as she put it, that the patient in the 
movie was the worst kind of impairment short of being a 
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vegetable. Correcting herself, Rose noted that at least 
totally demented and bedridden victims stay put. 
A short while later, however, Fern, like Charlotte 
before, also reconsidered her own patient's impairment, 
this time describing it as "not so bad after all," in 
comparison to another caregiver's tearful story of how 
her demented husband, "once a kind and loving person," 
had recently attacked her with one of his old golf clubs. 
Addressing Rose in a lowered voice, Fern went on to 
state, "Those combative types are really the worst kind. 
We're pretty lucky after all." 
As this and other support group proceedings show, 
there was no overall consensus as to the apparent facts 
of impairment for any given case. Indeed, what for one 
caregiver was seen as nearly total impairment, for 
another was likely to be perceived much more benignly. 
Moreover, each caregiver's judgment of his or her own 
patient's concrete set of dysfunctions seemed to become 
objectively different "stages" of decline depending on 
what, and to whom, it's "task burdens" were compared. 
Yet, while a patient's "actual" course of decline 
could be transformed into greater or lesser degrees of 
impairment, at the same time, there were regular 
agreements and routine conclusions about the objective 
impairment and burden presented by each case. Different 
types of patients came to exemplify a wide-range of 
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behaviors and chronologies, from the "very rapid 
declines," "plateaued victims," and "near vegetables," to 
the "combative types," "wanderers," and those who 
periodically displayed "lucid moments." In their 
variety, exemplars served to inform caregivers' and 
service providers' changing accounts of their patient's 
presented symptoms and burdens of care, impairment having 
at least as many interpretations as exemplars. 
Moreover, the use of such terms as those or them 
(see Fern's comments above) enables caregivers and 
service providers to "bridge the gap," so to speak, 
between patients' contrasting conditions. Manifestations 
of the disease which do not conform to a particular 
patient's deficits or course of progress are explained as 
the way those patients' behave or the way they have 
declined, acknowledging that it is "them," that kind of 
patient, not mine, or some other type, that is being 
referenced. Exemplars, then, in their detailed usage, 
combine to collectively document the experiential 
particulars the disease is understood to be about. 
Those who experience the collective "details" of the 
disease experience, in their diverse presentation also, 
at times, come to question the existence of a single 
underlying disease entity. This is the second way the 
disease's varied chronology is socially organized, 
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through the elaboration of the conception of the disease. 
Consider, for example, one service provider's comments: 
Sometimes you wonder because the diagnosis of 
Alzheimer's is difficult and sometimes you look at 
other people and wonder if it's just something that 
they're displaying; is that really Alzheimer's 
disease or could dementia become something else too? 
So I don't know. I don't think I could say for sure 
that everyone in there [the day hospital] is in a 
different stage of .•. I mean they've all been 
diagnosed as Alzheimer's disease but I think there 
are probably some different types of Alzheimer's 
. . . or there could be • . . hopefully if they 
learn more about it, there would be different, 
several different types of dementia. 
Exemplars are also used to elaborate the disease's 
symptoms and course of progress by medical researchers. 
Consider, for example, how Drachman organizes his 
understanding in excerpts from a roundtable discussion of 
a 1978 conference at the Banbury Center of Cold Spring 
Harbor Laboratory in New York. Following a videotape 
presenting three exemplary-type patients in different 
stages of the disease, Drachman remarked on patients' 
contrasting conditions: 
When we have examined all this semiology--all 
the signs and symptoms--what do we do with the 
details? We have followed perhaps 150 patients 
closely in our dementia clinic, and the semiology is 
enormously variable. This is an important concept 
to get across: that, while you have seen three 
stages of dementia, there are many, many more 
clinical attributes in which demented patients may 
differ substantially (Katzman, 1983:10). 
The researcher goes on to present the diverse 
clinical features of the disease that he has encountered 
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in dealing with patients, describing several unnamed 
exemplary types in the process. For example, he writes: 
You may see patients whose dementia is early in 
onset or late. • . . 
Some patients progress rapidly, some slowly. 
Recently, I saw a woman of 84 who had had AD for 10 
years, but had retained all of her gracious 
mannerisms; at a cocktail party, you would not pick 
her out of the crowd. At the same time, I saw a 
much younger woman who had had AD for 4 years and 
was absolutely anarthric; not the slightest sound 
emerged from her mouth; and her manifestations 
included a stooped posture, tremendous paratonic 
rigidity, and excessive attentiveness to each person 
who talked, presenting the appearance of someone 
watching a tennis match (Katzman, 1983:10-11). 
After finishing his descriptions and a discussion of 
the disease's diagnosis, Drachman states that, in his 
opinion, Alzheimer's is not a single disease but, rather, 
is composed of a number of other conditions. Drachman is 
not questioning the existence of disease itself, as he is 
the existence of ~ disease's ability to accomodate the 
varied character as displayed in its exemplification. 
Rather than abandon the disease grammar as a unifying 
principle, the researcher instead elaborates its 
structure to encompass the multitude of experiential 
particulars to which it applies. As his later remarks 
illustrate, following other researchers' comments 
regarding the videotape: 
We certainly do make the assumption, though, tacit 
though it may be, that this is ~ disease. And I 
think the crucial point is that we don't know that 
at all. We don't know that this patient who had, 
perhaps, a 9-, 10-, 11-, or 12-year course until he 
was really severely disabled is quite the same as 
the individual who goes careening downhill in 3 
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years. I think that until we have made those 
observations, we need to retain a certain degree of 
uncertainty as to what the subsets are, whether 
we're severely overlooking different diseases which 
masquerade under the general rubic of AD (Katzman, 
1983:20). 
Drachman's elaboration to include different forms or 
types of the disease enables him to account for the 
diversely-related experiences, patients so much alike, 
and yet, at the same time, so very different. However 
elaborated and transformed, the characteristics of 
Alzheimer's, in their variable manifestation, take on as 
many meanings as is required by those concerned. In 
practice, through the use of exemplars, the meanings 
collectively represent a unified disease structure while, 
at the same time, displaying as many individual timings 
as there are exemplars to share the experience--as 
patterned or unpatterned as disease versus old age 
itself. 
What is the Response? 
The interpretation of the progress of the experience 
as a disease structure provides a developmental time 
frame by which to assess and, thereby, intervene into 
caregiving affairs. How does the social organization of 
measurement and the question of institutionalization fit 
with the disease's temporal quality? 
Consider, first, the social timing of assessment 
procedures. During measurement situations, caregivers' 
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comments and questions concretely display the ongoing 
practical constructions and transformations of the 
meaning of felt burden. This was quite evident when, 
completing the "burden interview," caregivers prefaced 
their responses to tolerance items with "well it 
depends," "I tolerate it sometimes but not other times," 
and "I tolerate it more now than I used to, I think." 
The levels of tolerance that caregivers do provide 
during measurement might later shift from, say, being 
overburdened and depressed by a patient's impairment, to 
feeling rather fortunate and not "so bad after all." 
Indeed, in the span of a few moments, the felt burden 
defined against what is perceived as overwhelming 
impairment might change, as it did for one caregiver, to 
"not burden really but just those daily irritations," 
when compared to the "really frightening picture" 
presented by another caregiver's patient. 
What is clear is that differences in levels of 
tolerance expressed vary with the context of their 
consideration--across testing and nontesting occasions--
not chiefly with some objective state of impairment. As 
such, the felt burden evident in any caregiver's 
experience "depends" on the occasions, situations, and 
comparisons taken into account in their interpretation, 
having as many disease-related timings as there are 
assigned meanings. 
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The same social configuration is also featured in 
the decision to institutionalize the patient (Lynott, 
1983). The decision commonly focuses on the question of 
when "it's time." The expression signals the decision in 
a variety of sources, including ADRDA chapter 
newsletters, caregiver handbooks, and support group 
discussions. Consider, for example, a poem, itself 
entitled "It's Time," written by Dorothy Hessel of the 
Detroit chapter, which lists the conditions indicating 
when one should "let go" and seek a nursing home 
placement. Following the initial question, "When should 
I give up my loved one to another's care?" among the 
conditions cited are: 
When he [patient] sits in front of me and 
objects when I talk on the phone. 
When he doesn't remember 
to use the bathroom. 
When he gets out of bed 
and runs into the night. 
When he thinks 
people are "after him." 
When he runs away and I am GLAD 
to have a few minutes to myself. 
When I DO fall asleep and I am 
too tired to respond to his needs. 
When I feel I might die first. 
Yes! It's time! 
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While these and other maxims pertaining to 
institutionalization suggest that timing is a 
straightforward process of matching patient conditions 
against caregiving capabilities, determining when to seek 
a nursing home placement is socially organized. Some 
link their readiness to the patient's vegetative state, 
as in the response, "I don't think I'm ready for that 
[nursing home] because Sara's not a vegetable." Others 
link it to family pressures. As one caregiver put it, in 
relation to placing his mother in a nursing home, "I have 
to think about my wife and how she needs me too." At 
still other times, however, caregivers say that they 
don't know when "it's time" to institutionalize the 
patient. 
Being an ongoing issue among support group members, 
the expression "it's time" is routinely heard in the 
sharing of caregiving experiences. For example, after an 
exchange of stories about the "really bad things" that 
have recently occurred, a common retort might be, as one 
caregiver put it, "Yes, you know it's time when they 
start to piddle on the floor!" Yet such statements do 
not automatically signal a decision to institutionalize, 
for timing and such unpleasant conditions as piddling are 
interpreted, compared, and reinterpreted against ongoing 
considerations, such as the loss of companionship, 
familial obligation, the shame of giving up, and even the 
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denial of one's love for the patient. such comparisons 
are part of the continuing interpretation of burden. 
Consider, for example, a series of discussions in 
one of the support groups studied (Gubrium and Lynott, 
1986), which centered on a wife's frustration over her 
demented husband's increasingly careless toilet habits. 
For two weeks, participants had been sharing what one of 
the facilitators had called "horror stories" about 
patient conduct, such as tales of midnight wanderings in 
subzero temperatures and violent outbursts in public 
places. For example, after a patient's daughter, Carol, 
told how upset she had been when her mother had mostly 
missed the toilet when the mother last defecated, another 
caregiver, Vel, whose husband had Alzheimer's, flatly 
stated: 
Look when I hear those things, I think if it comes 
to that, that's it! No way will I put up with that 
kind of thing. I love Ben dearly but I couldn't 
handle that. I'd really have to find a place for 
him. I hate to say it but that's when I'd say, 
"It's time." 
Yet Carol's response suggested that patient behavior 
and the decision to institutionalize were not simply 
linked. Carol remarked that putting her mother in a 
nursing home had, indeed, crossed her mind as she cleaned 
her and the soiled bathroom but went on to say: 
But, then, I thought, too, well it really wasn't her 
[the mother's] fault. She didn't mean it. It was 
an accident. And we all have accidents, don't we? 
Even the dog sometimes makes a mistake right there 
on my carpet and I wouldn't dream of putting him 
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away. Sure, at the time, I thought this was the 
worst thing that could happen. But, later, you 
change your mind. She could have wandered off and 
gotten hit by a car. But, thank heavens, she didn't 
[Carol knocks on wood]. 
Carol continued to discuss the incident, what it had 
meant to her then and how its meaning had changed over 
time. The incident represented a different degree of 
impairment as Carol considered her mother's related 
intentions and compared what the mother had done with 
what other impairments her mother and other patients, 
even family pets, presented. It was evident that the 
decisive impairment and felt burden were matters of 
ongoing interpretation. 
The decision to institutionalize is complicated even 
more by family obligations and concerns. Caregivers 
would frequently comment on their loyalties for the 
patient and the contrasting burdens of their care. One 
caregiver, the husband of a demented wife, described his 
feelings this way: 
I know Sophie's not the same person that I married. 
I have to be realistic about it. All I've got left 
is someone who's become a stranger to me. And you 
have to think about your own needs too. Sophie 
demands a lot of work . . . the girls [daughters] 
help. But tough as it is at times, I know what she 
was and that's all that matters. 
Other caregivers, however, especially those who had 
experienced burdens of caregiving for a long time, told 
how the disease took a toll and affected loved ones. 
They spoke of finally coming to terms with the dilemma of 
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love and hardship, and having to "face the fact" that a 
nursing home was the only answer. Consider, for example, 
the following caregiver's strong retort: 
(you have to] shake yourself and wake up to the 
realization that you've got a life of your own to 
live. You've got to face the fact that the guy 
doesn't know you, doesn't even know who he is. 
Dear, when it comes to the point where they're 
unaware of anything, then what's the difference? 
It's time to start seriously thinking about a 
nursing home. 
Even after institutionalization, decisions thought 
to be permanent are entertained, as new situations and 
sources of comparison emerge. Whatever the burden that 
was once "objectively" assessed, it is continually 
reconsidered in relation to ongoing considerations and 
experiential comparisons. 
The timing of the disease experience for all 
concerned, then, is not simply a matter of the disease 
working itself out. What is made of onset, course of 
progress, and their ensuing senses of burden and 
tolerance is a matter of social comparison, retrospective 
reconsiderations, and prospective visualizations of 
things to come. These temporal assessments of the 
disease serve to articulate its experience. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE PUBLIC AND THE PERSONAL: THE QUESTION 
OF RESPONSIBILITY 
In this chapter, I turn to the third question of the 
three that have been brought to bear on each of the 
grammars--the question of responsibility. Having 
discussed the nature of agency in the disease experience 
in Chapter 4, I now consider the moral consequences of 
locating agency in the disease as opposed to normal 
aging. Asserting and demonstrating that "Alzheimer's 
disease is not normal aging," concerned agents of the 
ADRDA aim to publicize the fact. As a medical, not a 
normal condition of aging, interpretation of "symptoms" 
shifts responsibility from personal intention to 
pathological conditions. 
PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 
Consider, first, the public side of responsibility. 
The major concern here is in "spreading the word" about 
Alzheimer's. Since its establishment in 1979 (see Stone, 
1982), the ADRDA has been the chief organizational force 
in this regard. A self-help organization with missions 
of public education, research support, advocacy, and 
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caregiving assistance (ADRDA, 1982), the ADRDA has 
engaged in continuing efforts to increase public 
awareness about the disease. It is interpersonally 
connected with other cooperating agencies like the 
National Institute on Aging, the National Institute of 
Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke, and 
the Gerontological Society of America as well as related 
professional interests in medical schools where 
Alzheimer's disease research is conducted. The ADRDA 
itself, however, "orchestrates" the disease's growing 
public recognition, a concerted attempt to expose the so-
called "silent epidemic." 
The ADRDA's success in "spreading the word" has 
proved to be far-reaching. In 1982, the organization 
persuaded Congress and the President to proclaim National 
Alzheimer's Awareness Week from November 21-27 (extended 
to include the entire month of November the next year). 
The following Spring, 1983 issue of the national ADRDA 
Newsletter reported a surge in media attention that 
resulted, noting, too, that the "ADRDA supplied the bulk 
of their source material." The newsletter goes on to 
state: "This is a major breakthrough for us; it indicates 
that our efforts have impressed the urgency of the AD 
problem upon the media." The newletter cites numerous 
examples of media exposure since the event. During that 
November, for example, "literally hundreds of newspaper 
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articles appeared around the country and nationwide TV 
coverage began." As part of the coverage, a "very 
sensitive piece was shown on the CBS Network News with 
Dan Rather." In January of 1983 the article, "The 
Tragedy of Rita Hayworth," written by Rosemary Santini 
and Katherine Barrett, appeared in the Ladies Home 
Journal. On January 18, Marion Roach, the author of the 
New York Times Magazine article "Another Name for 
Madness," appeared on NBC's Today Show and later, on 
February 11, on CBS Nightwatch. The espisode of CBS' 
Trapper John. M.D., entitled "Forget Me Not," which aired 
January 30, featured a surgeon who was "showing all the 
early symptoms" of the disease. The newsletter story 
goes on to describe still more examples of media 
attention, with the following concluding remarks: 
While Alzheimer's Disease is still not exactly 
an everyday household word, our goal of increased 
public awareness is steadily being realized. We've 
come a long way in 2 1/2 years, but still have a lot 
more work ahead. Meanwhile, Alzheimer's is a topic 
that could appear in your favorite newspaper or 
magazine or on your television screen at almost any 
time. 
The ADRDA's continued success in its publicity 
campaign is celebrated in bold headlines on the front 
page of the Spring, 1985 issue of the national ADRDA 
Newsletter, which reads: "ALZHEIMER'S NO LONGER A SILENT 
EPIDEMIC". The following column credits its success to 
the "unprecedented" media attention given to Alzheimer's 
disease during the previous six months. Most notable was 
209 
Newsweek's December 3, 1984 cover story, "The Agony of 
Alzheimer's Disease," where more than "3,000,000 readers 
were given an iri-depth view of AD." Other highly visible 
sources included nationally syndicated columnists Ann 
Landers and Bob Greene (Chicago Tribune), who "have 
brought home the message of Alzheimer's in daily 
newspaper columns which addressed common questions and 
issues surrounding AD," as well as the nationally 
televised Phil Donahue talk show, which featured Dr. 
Peter Rabins, co-author of The 36-Hour Day, actress Maria 
O'Brien, daughter of former actor Edmund O'Brien who is 
now an Alzheimer's patient, and two other family members 
of Alzheimer's patients. Documentaries and radio 
programs also are mentioned in the newsletter as 
contributing to the cause, including Group W 
Westinghouse's airing of the film "Whispering Hope," 
hosted by Jason Robards, and the radio show "Prime Time," 
which has transmitted its broadcasts from Washington, 
D.C. to more than 450 stations nationwide. 
The ADRDA's efforts are supported by a number of 
other well-known figures as well. The Fall, 1982 issue 
of National's ADRDA Newsletter reports, for example, that 
actor Jack Lemmon "helped to tell the Alzheimer's Disease 
story" in a public service announcement which Michael 
Landon directed. And the Winter, 1985 issue cites Joanne 
Woodward, whose mother has been diagnosed as having 
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Alzheimer's, as another celebrity who "has helped to 
spread awareness about AD through her moving portrayal of 
an AD victim in the television special, 'Do You Remember 
Love.'" 
Yet publicity itself is not enough to win the war 
over Alzheimer's disease. As the old saying goes, "money 
speaks louder than words." Accordingly, it is the 
public's dollars that will ultimately support the 
research needed to someday hopefully find the elusive 
cure. The ADRDA's publicity campaign, as such, is also 
intended to elicit a societal obligation to "join the 
fight against Alzheimer's disease." 
In addition to research funds, the ADRDA advocates 
for Alzheimer's victims and their caregivers, especially 
with respect to the financial burden. For example, 
because Medicare (a federal program providing medical 
insurance for the elderly) only pays for skilled nursing 
care and Alzheimer's is considered to only require 
custodial care, victims' families are not eligible for 
the assistance. Most private insurance policies also do 
not cover custodial long-term care. This leaves many 
spouses, whose assets are considered the same as the 
patient's, in the situation of having to dilute their 
savings until being able to qualify as indigents and thus 
receive Medicaid--a joint federal and state welfare 
program which covers both skilled and custodial care. 
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The ADRDA's advocay successes regularly are reported 
in its national newsletter and reprinted in the various 
chapter newsletters. Growing research dollars, from 
individual donations and contributions in memory of a 
recently deceased loved one, to much larger sums from 
grants awarded by foundations such as the Andrew Mellon, 
the Wood-Kalb, and Lauder, are welcomed, the latter often 
making front page headlines in National's ADRDA 
Newsletter. 
Legislative developments are also broadcast. The 
Winter, 1983 issue of the national ADRDA Newsletter, for 
example, under the heading "Government Responds In The 
Fight Against Alzheimer's Disease," reports how 
"government leaders put aside their political and 
ideological differences to unite behind legislation 
dealing with AD." The column emphasized the ADRDA's 
ability to get Congress to unanimously designate National 
Alzheimer's Disease Awareness Month in November of 1983 
and the President's subsequent proclamation. Other 
approved legislation includes providing additional funds 
to support research into possible causes of Alzheimer's 
disease and its treatment as well as the creation of 
specialized centers to deal with the "complex nature of 
the disease." Achievements yet to come include the 
passage of bills which would relieve some of the 
financial problems for the families of Alzheimer's 
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patients, such as reforms in Medicare and tax credits to 
caregivers. 
In addition to efforts focused at the national 
level, the ADRDA has over 120 local chapters across the 
country engaged in publicity and advocacy. The grass 
roots efforts run the entire gamut of activities, from 
fundraising events and media appearances directed towards 
greater public awareness, to sponsoring public seminars 
to educate professionals and community groups, lobbying 
for key legislative issues nationwide, and providing help 
to family members in the multitude of support groups. 
Local contributions are selectively highlighted in the 
regular "Chapter News" feature of the national 
newsletter, demonstrating the "persistent team work at 
both the Chapter and national level" in the ADRDA's 
mission of public recognition and support (national ADRDA 
Newsletter, Fall, 1985). A sample taken from the Spring, 
1982 issue illustrates the grass roots lobbying and 
educational efforts: 
ADRDA--Northern Virginia launched a telephone campaign to 
local delegates of the Virginia House of Delegates when a 
bill was being introduced in the House to appropriate 
money for Alzheimer's research. The bill passed the 
House of Delegates and contact is now being made with the 
Senate Finance Committee. The chapter wants to involve 
more members in contacting their legislatures concerning 
pending legislation. 
ADRDA--Greater Philadelphia participated in a large 
Health Fair sponsored by a major TV station at 
Independence Hall Quadrangle and also at a Health Fair 
sponsored by a local hospital. Literature has been 
mailed to all neurologists in the area, and speakers from 
the chapters have appeared before professional and 
community groups. 
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The Spring, 1984 issue reports on other kinds of local 
publicity: 
ADRDA--Omaha had an "Alzheimer's Disease Night" at an 
Omaha Royals baseball game to raise money and promote 
awareness. The Royals' general manager helped by 
printing 200 posters and 20,000 tickets. He also 
arranged for Chapter members to see Coke donated by the 
Coca Cola Company with the cooperation of the local 
concessionaire. This fundraising event was so 
successful, they are already planning for a bigger and 
better AD night at the ball park for next year. 
ADRDA--Providence has an active membership of well over 
600 families and seven support groups meeting monthly. 
The Chapter's Speaker's Bureau has been providing in-
service education to long-term care facilities as well as 
community health agencies and to hospitals for two years. 
They also speak to senior citizen and church groups. 
Local media coverage has kept the office telephones busy. 
And the Spring, 1985 issue presents continuing media 
attention, publicity events, and legislative incentive: 
ADRDA--Chicago Chapter members appeared on ABC-TV's AM 
Chicago with Oprah Winfrey, Jan. 14 and worked closely 
with WLS-TV on a 5-part series on Alzheimer's which aired 
Feb. 4-8. An AD Conference was held in Springfield, IL 
12/10 under the auspices of the Illinois House 
Appropriations II Committee and the Southern Illinois 
University School of Medicine on Alzheimer's Disease: 
Directions for State Policy. ADRDA Chapters in the state 
of Illinois are now actively involved in formulating 
legislative initiatives, in both the state House and 
Senate to benefit AD victims and their families. 
ADRDA--Cleveland is planning three major events: A 
Phonathan--Feb. 25/27 and March 3, with 25 volunteers 
staffing the phones. Our goals are to increase 
membership support for program development. A workshop 
for professionals is planned for March 31st, jointly 
sponsored by ADRDA and Cleveland State University. The 
biathlon "Race for Reason" will be May 5th which we hope 
will attract over 700 participants from Ohio and 
surrounding states, who will bike and jog in support of 
AD. Local racing clubs along with ADRDA volunteers are 
hard at work to make this event a whooping success! 
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ADRDA--Houston National AD Month activities included 
efforts which led to state and local proclamations, large 
scale distribution of posters, provision of PSAs to radio 
and TV stations. Channel 13 devoted several news program 
segments to AD and aired both the Phil Donahue show the 
"Whispering Hope." We also participated in an all-day 
workshop on AD sponsored by the Texas Department on Aging 
and Health and by local Councils on Aging. 
The ongoing need for more funds to support research 
efforts as well as alleviate the deep financial crunch 
many families face require the full effort of the 
membership. Members are encouraged to write their 
representatives in Congress requesting additional 
support. The April, 1984 issue of the Honolulu Chapter, 
for example, under the heading "News from National," 
presents the following plea to its members: 
November was National Alzheimer's Disease Month 
last year--the first every!!!! Well, this year we 
need to support this measure again to assure 
Congressional approval of AD Month, 1984! According 
to Jim Novy from the national ADRDA public relations 
office, it will be a matter of years before the 
resolution for AD Month becomes automatic. 
PLEASE--it is urgent for you to call or write 
to our Hawaii representatives in Washington and ask 
them to support National Alzheimer's Disease Month 
1984. 
The message goes on to ask for letters: 
ANOTHER IMPORTANT request from national is to write 
Congress to urge their support for ADDITIONAL 
FUNDING for RESEARCH on Alzheimer's Disease and for 
AD research CENTERS. Last year additional funds 
were approved, but NOT ENOUGH! With the aging of 
the population and with costs of AD care and 
treatment estimated to be 26 billion last year, 
goverment must increase funding! (Almost $40 
million was appropriated last year for research, 
which is an extremely small percentage of the 
rsearch dollar, especially when you consider the 
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numbers of people with the disease--an estimated 2.5 
million in the United States.) 
The column also provides the addresses and phone 
numbers of legislators as well as advice on how to 
formulate the letter and what to include in it. It ends 
with the charge: "DO IT NOW! ! TODAY! ! " Other chapter 
newsletters present completely written sample letters as 
guides for requesting money for research and aid to 
families of Alzheimer's patients. However detailed, the 
pursued goal is the same, to marshall as much support as 
possible for the Alzheimer's disease organization. 
To this end, Princess Yasman Aga Khan, on behalf of 
her mother, has written President Reagan asking for 
whatever help he might give. The letter was reprinted in 
a number of places, including the Spring, 1983 issue of 
the national newsletter. Under the heading "A Plea to 
the President," the letter reads: 
Dear Mr. President: 
My mother is the actress Rita Hayworth a woman 
known and loved throughout the world for her beauty 
and spectacular screen career. She is one of the 
1.5 million victims of Alzheimer's Disease, and 
because of this, the simple things that we all take 
for granted have slipped away from her. 
More research is needed on this silent 
epidemic. We ask that you give us your support, and 
help to persuade the public, the insurance companies 
and the representatives in our government of the 
importance of fighting this devastating disease. 
Thank you. 
Princess Yasmin Aga Khan 
The President's response to Princess Yasmin's 
letter, conveying his commitment to a growing public 
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concern over the threat of Alzheimer's disease as well as 
the dearth of funding for research, was printed in the 
summer, 1983 issue of National's ADRDA Newsletter as well 
as the chapter newsletters: 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
May 10, 1983 
Dear Princess Yasmin: 
Like most Americans, my true understanding of the 
tragedy called Alzheimer's Disease is relatively 
recent. For too long this insidious, indiscriminate 
killer of mind and life has gone undetected, while 
the families of its victims have gone unaided. 
In your letter, you asked for my help in increasing 
this awareness--among the public, insurance 
companies and governmental representatives. It is 
assistance I will provide whenever and wherever 
possible. 
You asked, too, for the commitment of additional 
research funds. I am pleased to note that Federal 
funding for this will increase by nearly 50%--from 
$17 million to $25 million--in fiscal 1984. Also, 
Secretary Margaret Heckler of the Department of 
Health and Human Services has established a task 
Force on Alzheimer's Disease to coordinate and 
promote the Department's many activities in this 
area. 
In closing, I sincerely wish to applaud your efforts 
and those of the thousands of ADRDA volunteers who 
tirelessly provide support and hope to Alzheimer's 
Families nationwide. 
Sincerely, 
Ronald Reagan 
At the other end of the spectrum, ADRDA members have 
been encouraged to share information about the disease 
with their friends and neighbors or anyone else who might 
217 
benefit or be interested in supporting the cause. The 
October, 1980 issue of the Cleveland ADRDA Chapter's 
Newsletter, for example, presents the following 
directive: 
SPREAD THE WORD 
The more people you talk with about Alzheimer's 
disease, the more support we are likely to get. By 
talking about Alzheimer's disease with your friends 
and neighbors, more people become aware of the 
disease and concerned about its cause, cure and the 
care of those afflicted. You never know when 
someone you talk with might know of someone with the 
disease whose family and friends would be grateful 
to know of our organization or someone else who 
would like to donate his time or money to our 
efforts. 
The ADRDA also takes it upon itself to inform its 
members of a variety of disease-related information to 
enable them to both better understand the disease and 
cope with its effects. The national ADRDA Newsletter 
carries regular "Research Update" and "Ask the Doctor" 
columns, which present news about the latest research 
developments and general scientific knowledge about 
Alzheimer's disease and related disorders. Care is taken 
to be as straightforward as possible, with caution 
offered against so-called advances in the disease, lest 
false hope be raised. For example, under the heading "A 
Word of caution," the Spring, 1984 issue of the national 
ADRDA Newsletter states: 
Several regimens, treatments, food substances 
and drugs have been advertised as "cures," 
"treatments," and "retardants" for Alzheimer's 
Disease. Some may have questionable value. Says 
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Dr. Robert Katzman, chairman of ADRDA's Medical and 
Scientific Advisory Board, "The fact is that at this 
moment we don't know of any drug or any other 
treatment that stops the progression of Alzheimer's 
Disease." 
A word of caution to our readers: skepticism 
can be very healthy. Before embarking on any 
program or any course of treatment, it would be wise 
to check with your family physician, ADRDA Chapter, 
local medical school, or perhaps, when in doubt, the 
Food and Drug Administration. You can then make an 
informed decision. 
Tips and advice frequently appear concerning how to 
deal with the many problems that inevitably crop up in 
the disease experience. While National's ADRDA 
Newsletter has its "Helpful Hints" and "Ask the Lawyer" 
features, chapter newsletters focus explicitly on the 
day-to-day management of concrete caregiving. Advice is 
offered· on how to manage a whole range of problems, from 
the patient's sexual behavior, eating habits, and 
incontinence to problems of vacationing, bathing, and 
communication. Assistance in obtaining power of attorney 
or conservatorship, handling financial affairs, seeking 
respite care, and institutionalizing the patient, among a 
host of considerations, are also available. 
Caregivers are frequently asked to share their 
caregiving knowledge and strategies in print, which gets 
passed on to other chapters. The following care tip, for 
example, was offered by Shirley Nimitz, a chapter member, 
in the July, 1984 issue of the Columbus ADRDA Chapter's 
Newsletter. The information is introduced with the 
statement, "Caregivers will appreciate the following 
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suggestions from one of our members who recently lost her 
husband: 
When I cared for my husband at home, it seemed to me 
that I should explain what I was trying to do, in 
the hope that he would understand and cooperate. I 
was so wrong. To explain things to a man who had 
lost his ability to understand words was useless. 
Then, I discovered that if I didn't speak, things 
went so much better. The anger, the total 
frustration, the disappointment cannot be conveyed 
by the tone of voice, if the caregiver remains 
silent. Sometimes humming a tune would help, 
sometimes other quiet music of the patient's liking 
would ease the strain. 
I also found that if my husband resisted my efforts 
to help him, that if I walked away and came back a 
few minutes later, he would be more cooperative. By 
saying, 'Are you ready to do this?' I found it was 
then his choice to do what needed doing and the 
resistance would cease. 
The following "TIPS FOR DRESSING," which originally 
appeared in the Greater New Orleans ADRDA Newsletter, and 
reprinted in the Spring, 1985 issue of the Western 
Pennsylvania ADRDA Newsletter, is an example of how 
assistance is shared by all: 
When men or women are having a hard time getting 
dressed, e.g., when patients can no longer button, 
jogging suits provide a warm, goodlooking, easy care 
and easy to get into and out of clothing. There is 
the added advantage of not requiring underwear or 
brassieres, no zippers at the waist or belts. While 
a patient can still dress himself, difficulty may 
come in deciding which clothes to wear and in what 
order to put them on. You may assist by laying out 
clothes in the correct order or by handing the 
patient one item at a time. 
While caregiving assistance is sought and received 
at many levels throughout the Alzheimer's disease 
movement and support groups continue to flourish, the 
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ultimate goal of the ADRDA is to find a means of 
prevention and cure. In the meantime, hope is 
highlighted and public awareness efforts engaged in full 
force. To this end, the disease itself has truly become 
the "disease of the century." 
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The ADRDA's diligence in generating widespread 
exposure of Alzheimer's disease has increasingly brought 
opportunities for its recognition and subsequent 
application. As the earlier quoted comments taken from 
the Spring, 1983 issue of the national ADRDA Newsletter 
pointed out, "Alzheimer's is a topic that could appear in 
[one's] favorite newspaper or magazine or on [one's] 
television screen at almost any time." The chances of 
coming across the disease, at some point or another, are 
thus quite high. 
Consider, for example, how the ADRDA helped one 
person learn of Alzheimer's, as revealed in the following 
anonymous letter taken from the March, 1981 issue of the 
Chicago ADRDA chapter's Newsletter: 
Dear Friend, 
Recently my father, 86, died. He was a victim 
of Alzheimer's Disease, but it was only the last two 
years of his life that this was known. His symptoms 
had been attributed to senility. 
No one in my family had ever heard of the 
disease. My mother, caring for my father in their 
home in Pennsylvania, had become increasingly 
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perplexed and distraught by his continuing physical 
and mental deterioration. 
Not long after the tentative diagnosis was made 
(at a gerontology clinic in Pittsburgh), there was 
an announcement in the Sunday edition of The Chicago 
Tribune of an Alzheimer's self-help group. I called 
the number listed, hoping for some sort of 
information. The response was immediate and 
personal. Every bit of information that ADRDA had 
was made available to me and I, in turn, sent it to 
my mother. 
The letter goes on to report how the knowledge 
acquired "was of great value in giving [the mother] some 
framework within which to understand" her husband's 
condition (emphasis added). Having a medical means for 
interpreting old age troubles not only provides a new way 
of seeing dementia, but has moral significance as well. 
Like the mother in the letter, a caregiver is able to 
locate the source of travail in something other than the 
person. The focus centers on pathology, not individual 
characteristics. This provides a pointable and 
referencial thing toward which to place blame. Thus, 
dementia becomes something that one, anyone, simply 
cannot help. As one caregiver described, in reference to 
the disease, "It's like sayin' someone has a heart 
attack, and that can happen to a younger person too." 
The ability to cast blame onto something other than 
the Alzheimer's patient is quite beneficial to those 
concerned. such troubles as the patient's "constant 
chattering," midnight wanderings, or even not recognizing 
a spouse of over 50 years, can be attributed to a 
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disease, not its victim. Thus the person is absolved 
from deviance, making it possible to still love and 
forgive the patient for behaviors he or she cannot 
control, while at the same time hating the disease. 
The blame function, however, is not automatic. In 
the everyday experience of living with the patient, even 
the "little things" done can weigh on the most valiant 
caregiver's attempt to be patient and understanding. 
Caregivers frequently state how, in their frustration and 
anger, they will fail to recognize that the patient is 
helpless, at times reporting that they "forget" the 
patient even has a disease. As the spouse of a demented 
husband explained, "Charlie does things that I know he 
can't help but sometimes I forget that and I really get 
mad at him . like I think he deliberately is trying 
to annoy me by forgetting and repeating everything." The 
caregiver's plight and conflicting feelings are well 
illustrated in the following poem, entitled "No Longer 
You," written by Lois Ellert of the Boulder, Colorado 
Chapter and reprinted in various chapter newsletters: 
You are no longer you; 
The body is yours, a shell, 
The head and face the same, 
But the light has gone from your eyes, 
Windows of a vacant house. 
You sit for hours, often a little unkempt, 
Nodding, dozing, or trying to put together 
The puzzle of your life; 
But many of the pieces are missing, 
And you ask me for them. 
I give them to you, 
But they will not stay in place, 
And so you ask again, 
And again---
And again---
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The daily irritations are small, 
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But like the constant dripping of water on a rock, 
They eat away at my love and patience. 
In sleep there is respite, 
In dreams a return to normalcy, 
But you jolt me back to the nightmare of reality 
By rousing me at three in the morning, 
To ask me where we are living, 
Or what time it is, 
Or if I want to make love. 
Weariness and rage overcome me; 
Angrily I tell you to go back to sleep. 
Then I am filled with remorse, 
For I know you cannot help it 
And you do not mean to be unkind. 
But there is no way I can explain 
Or make you understand 
That the marriage of our bodies, our minds, our 
spirits 
Has ceased to be. 
You are not my husband, 
Nor I your wife. 
I am only your caretaker. 
And you? 
You are no longer you. 
As the poem's message conveys, caregivers and other 
family members face extreme frustration. The pain and 
suffering of living with "someone once known" is a heavy 
toll to bear. While a mind has been stolen from them, 
they must still deal with its bodily reminder, an active, 
often remarkably fit "shell" of a former loved one. The 
annoyance of that presence easily leads to an angry 
response on the part of the caregiver who, when he or she 
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is reminded that it is a disease, not the person, that is 
the source of inappropriate conduct, guiltily "realizes" 
the patient's helplessness and lack of accountability. 
Caregivers who have experienced the same situation, 
as well as service providers and the related disease 
literature, offer support and comforting advice on how to 
feel and manage such behaviors and their responses. 
Caregivers are informed, for example, that feelings of 
anger are common reactions and that they should try not 
to feel guilty, that "it's only human" to respond that 
way at times and that the patient usually forgets the 
episode anyway. Caregivers are also told that such 
reactions on their part do not worsen the disease for the 
patient, which will run its own course in any case. 
Besides the "daily irritations", for many 
caregivers, the patient's actions and speech are often 
directed at the caregiver. Having to face such untoward 
behavior from the patient often evokes personal hurt and 
resentment. Caregivers are advised not to take such 
behaviors personally, that it is impossible to know what 
the patient's "true" feelings and thoughts really are, as 
the patient is not able to express them accurately in his 
distortion of the world around him. As the popular care 
manual The 36-Hour Day (Mace and Rabins, 1981:105-06) 
cautions, "Even though the person looks well, he actually 
has an injury to his brain." 
Caregivers are advised that it is important to 
separate the behavior of the patient from the person. 
While the patient may, say, complain or shout verbal 
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insults at a neighbor or loved one, the acts should not 
in themselves be seen as a reflection of an underlying 
intent but, rather, the frustrated expression of the 
confusion and helplessness experienced by the person 
hidden behind the ravages of the disease. For example, 
the expression "'You're cruel to me' may really mean 
'life is cruel to me"' (Mace and Rabins, 1981:106). Such 
distinctions display the patient's inability to express 
accurately the "deep down" sentiments and meanings of the 
lived experience. In this regard, those concerned are 
cautioned to appreciate and sympathize with the human 
being that still exists under the shroud of disease, one 
who, while not evident, faces his own torment and burden. 
The following poem, entitled "Advice on Caring for 
Alzheimer Patients," written by Joy Glenner of the San 
Diego Chapter and reprinted in a number of newsletters, 
illustrates the point: 
Dear Family and Friends: 
Please try to understand 
What I am now, not think of me 
As I was. 
I am alone, shut in 
With my fears 
My frustrations, 
My forgetfulness. 
Forgive me if I strike out at you. 
Why do I do that? 
What has happened to me? 
I cannot cope with this alien world. 
I feel threatened. I am frightened. 
Speak softly, approach slowly. 
Repeat again and again what you 
Want of me. 
Those twisted tangles in my brain 
Have messed up my world. 
Be patient, for 
I do love you, 
And I need your help and love 
So very, very much. 
Your Alzheimer Patient 
226 
Information such as the poem offers can be of great 
value and a source of relief to the families of 
Alzheimer's patients in coming to terms with the 
patient's combativeness. A patient who "strikes out" at 
a loved one is often the most difficult challenge to 
understand. It is here that the disease can be the most 
devastating and merciless to those who must endure its 
conditions. As such, caregivers are repeatedly reminded 
from the varied sources to try and accept such violent 
outbursts and "odd reactions" as due to the 
manifestations of the disease, not as any change the 
patient may feel towards them nor as having anything to 
do with the care they are providing. Indeed, as one 
caregiver put it, knowing that "No one is really at fault 
except for that damn disease," allows one to focus anger 
and resentment more concertedly on pathology. In that 
regard, consider the following anonymous letter printed 
in the Summer, 1984 issue of the Albuquerque ADRDA 
Chapter's Newsletter (reprinted from the Duke ADRDA 
Newsletter). Under the heading, "Coping with 
Combativeness," the letter reads: 
"Last night he hit me. This strong man, eleven 
inches taller, 80 pounds heavier than I am. He 
could have beat me to death in his sudden rage. 
This person, so familiar to me after 40 years of 
living together, this man always so confident in 
himself that he could be a gentle father and a 
tender, loving husband. 
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Yet, as I leaned over to untie his shoe so he could 
start undressing for bed, he grabbed my hair, spun 
me around, on hand fastened onto my wrist, he hit me 
with his other fist, twice, hard. How lucky, only 
on my shoulder and arm. 
My anger is so deep, I retch. At this moment I know 
I could rage and scream and claw like an animal 
myself. But my tears release me. 
If he could see himself, he'd despise his actions, 
he wouldn't believe it could happen. There is no 
remorse now, he is unaware. This morning, my anger 
is still there, my body aches, I can't forgive him--
but I can't blame him. Alzheimer's disease is the 
real enemy. 
Even though there is something other than the person 
upon which to attribute blame, as the example shows, that 
does not simultaneously get rid of the felt hurt and 
anger. such actions may be understood to be 
unintentional on the part of the patient, yet their 
effects are quite real indeed. While the physical and 
emotional pain and suffering of having to deal with the 
patient's aggression, together with the burdens of the 
day-to-day activities of caring for the patient, is very 
disturbing, as the woman in the example notes, even in 
her extreme situation, while she "can't forgive him," she 
228 
also "can't blame him," for it is Alzheimer's disease 
that is "the real enemy." 
The Alzheimer's patient's life history might also be 
morally reconstructed to absolve him or her of past 
actions, interpreted to fit the biography of a diseased 
person. Consider, for example, how the lifelong troubles 
of Rita Hayworth, the Hollywood actress discussed in the 
previous chapter, were recast. Earlier on, alcohol was 
believed to be the cause of Rita's troublesome behavior, 
including her "recurring lapses of memory" and "extreme 
mood changes," even her five difficult marriages. As the 
article in the Ladies Home Journal (Santini and Barret, 
1983:139) reports: 
Everyone seemd to agree that Rita was drinking 
heavily, and when she entered the Silver Hills 
alcoholic treatment center in Connecticut in 1977 
few people were surprised. "At that point, I also 
thought alcohol was her problem," says Yasmin 
[Rita's daughter]. "I thought it was really 
destroying her brain." 
With Rita's later diagnosis of Alzheimer's, however, 
her actions are then explained as having been all along 
"really" the manifestations of the disease. As the 
authors (1983:141) report: 
If, as Yasmin suspects, Rita began suffering from 
Alzheimer's as long ago as twenty-five years, it 
could explain a great deal about her difficult 
personal life. . • . In retrospect, it could very 
well be that because of Alzheimer's she began to 
lack the judgment to pick her friends wisely. 
Looking back, the evidence of Alzheimer's may 
already have been showing up when Yasmin was a 
child. At the time, Rita's problems weren't 
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dramatic enough to affect her career . • . but there 
were hints of the tragedy that was to come. 
Another example of retrospective interpretation 
occurred on the Phil Donahue Show, which was shown in 
Chicago on CBS in December of 1984. One of the guests 
featured on the show was Maria O'Brien, daughter of 
Edmund O'Brien, another well-known Hollywood figure 
diagnosed to have Alzheimer's disease. At one point 
during the telecast, in response to a statement made by 
Donahue concerning the initial appearance of symptoms in 
her father, Maria reflected back on how his earlier 
"fabulous memory," which allowed him to "recite reams of 
Shakespeare at will," soon failed to remember even the 
"very basic things" of the famous dramatist's work. In 
describing her attempts to understand her father's 
behavior at that time, Maria noted that, "He would sweat 
buckets just going to work and we thought it was just 
because he had this incredibly energetic and wild 
personality." Now, with the benefit of hindsight, Maria 
describes her father's "real" problem as having been an 
"early fear of not being able to cope with remembering." 
She went on to state how "we didn't understand what he 
had until about two or three years ago," during which 
time, "over a fifteen year period, he faked coping with 
reality without really any help at all," noting even 
further how she "refused to speak to him for periods of 
time because [she] thought he was so crazy." 
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A medical interpretation also affects caregiver 
reactions to the patient's appearance in front of others. 
Having a culprit, other than the individual in question, 
caregivers and other family members are able to 
acknowledge their experiences with others without 
embarrassment. Many caregivers informally interviewed 
stated that after they "really began to understand" the 
patient's problems, they were less troubled by their 
friends' and neighbors' reactions. Their previous 
attempts to cover up the patient's disease, and even 
pretend that it didn't exist, were frequently discarded, 
breaking the "conspiracy of silence." For example, the 
following caregiver described these experiences: 
Before, I used to try and hide it. When someone 
would ask him a question, I knew he wasn't going to 
answer so I used to speak up for him. And one fella 
one time says, 'Don't you ever let him talk for 
himself?' Then it hit me, oh my God, do I really do 
it that much that ... I was trying to conceal. I 
suppose I was embarrassed for him. But now I don't. 
And it's a lot easier too, knowing that it's a 
disease. People look at it differently. I just 
tell them it's what Rita Hayworth has. They can 
identify with her because she was written up in the 
paper three or four times. 
Initially, after learning of Alzheimer's, caregivers 
may still be somewhat reluctant to share their burdens 
with others or may feel awkward when the patient is 
present in social gatherings. Reminders by other 
caregivers, by service providers, and by the varied 
literature on Alzheimer's aimed at easing the burden of 
care that, as one newsletter put it, "illness is no cause 
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for shame," serve to lessen the tension. Caregivers are 
also encouraged to find out more about the disease so 
that they can better explain and share their patient's 
behavior to "outsiders." Having more knowledge about the 
disease provides caregivers with an available store of 
information by which to warrant their testimony. 
Caregivers are able to explain, for example, that their 
patient is in this or that particular stage or manifests 
this symptom as opposed to some other form of the 
disease. Those more knowledgeable about the disease and 
its treatment can also describe the disease's neuro-
organicity or the latest drugs now being used. The more 
detailed the explanation, the more the disease gets 
objectified as a discrete and concrete entity in its own 
right, separate from the person described. 
Public acknowledgment of the disease provides 
personal recognition and elaboration. The two go "hand 
in hand," so to speak, reinforcing the disease experience 
on a number of levels. In coming to see common cause 
with others, by means of and through a growing disease 
culture, those concerned see themselves in the light of 
the common knowledge and find that they share the same 
experience. A growing public response affirms a 
definition, and the limits, of personal responsibility. 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion addresses two considerations. First, 
I summarize the argument and what the approach and study 
say about the meaning of the aging experience, 
considering grammars against the so-called "facts" of 
aging. Second, I place this in a broader context, in 
terms of a general understanding of human conduct. 
SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT 
This dissertation has examined a variety of 
approaches to the old age problem, from activity, 
modernization, and exchange theories to Alzheimer's 
disease. The term grammar was used throughout the study 
to stress the separateness of the approaches considered 
regarding the reality construction of the aging 
experience. I have argued that each approach has a 
different understanding of what the old age problem is 
and interprets concrete observables accordingly. Each 
sees the problem in terms of its "perception rules" for 
locating particular agents, timings, and responsible 
entities in later life. 
Chapter 1, "Activity Theory and Life Satisfaction," 
centered on "busyness" as the arena of the good old age. 
The source of satisfaction was contingent on the 
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individual, found in an ability to stay active and 
adjusted--in effect, to "remain young." Inactivity 
signaled unsuccessful aging. 
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The distinguishing characteristics of old age 
shifted in Chapter 2. outside conditions were treated as 
independently affecting individual adjustment, even while 
the object of explanation remained the individual. 
Disengagement, modernization, and age-stratification 
theories located large-scale social conditions as sources 
of the life satisfaction of the individual. Exchange, 
developmental, and continuity approaches emphasized 
interpsychological and face-to-face encounters as 
background. And, the socio-environmental, social-
career, and subcultural approaches combined the macro and 
micro sources in different ways. 
Chapter 3 saw a further shift in focus to more 
theoretically self-conscious grammars. The approaches 
dismissed individual life satisfaction as the central 
feature of the aging experience, seeing it instead as an 
outcome of other forms or processes--respectively, 
ideological and epistemological concerns. 
Chapters 4 through 6 saw abnormality in its own 
right as a new grammar for defining the problem of old 
age. Centered in medical conditions, the old age problem 
was pathologically revealed in neurological and 
behavioral markers, in degeneration, and disease 
culpability. 
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Approaching grammars as reality-defining 
understandings, not representational of social objects, 
does not mean that they are fictive. Grammars are not 
simply labels but, rather, have concrete empirical 
referents. There are, after all, objects in the world 
that do exist. Yet, it is the meaning of the objects of 
experience that is critical. While, for example, it can 
be pointed out that those in late life experience the 
withdrawal from roles previously held, what it means to 
withdraw is entirely different depending on how it is 
framed. 
To a spokesperson of activity theory, withdrawal 
infers maladjustment. To a spokesperson of disengagement 
theory, it is precisely the opposite, adjustment on 
behalf of societal functioning. The grammar of 
continuity construes either adjustment or unadjustment 
against the backdrop of earlier life. For the socio-
environmental approach, the degree of congruence between 
personal needs and environmental conditions determine 
individual well-being. The grammar of developmentalism 
sees personality type and "growth" as the keys to success 
or failure in late life. The political economists turn 
to the capitalists, the state, and the mode of production 
to investigate a class of persons and their life 
conditions and chances. 
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The "same" conditions, then, as revealed in the 
respective grammars of the aging experience, represent 
discrete, experiential realities. Accordingly, the 
"factual" status of old age becomes as manifold as the 
variety of grammars that articulate the experience. 
The social construction of fact was concretely shown 
to be part of the Alzheimer's disease experience, what I 
have argued is the most recent grammar of aging. The 
disease was not a mere label or vested fiction for the 
parties concerned. It was clear that those affected by 
the disease's conditions experienced considerable 
suffering. The existence of the objects of turmoil--
tangles and plaques in the brain and their erratic 
behavioral correlates--were equally empirically validated 
as was the alarm they generated. Their meaning, however, 
was problematic, the realities pinpointed being tied to 
the practical usages they served. In this regard, the 
desire to ameliorate the conditions observed were part 
and parcel of Alzheimer's assigned factual status. 
Likewise, the ADRDA's instrumental efforts in spreading 
the word about what was increasingly presented as ~ 
disease's devastating effects served to transform the 
meaning of the conditions dealt with. The result was 
that "Alzheimer's disease [was] not normal aging." The 
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telltale signs of aging became a disease, the "disease of 
the century." By implication, a reality meaningfully 
came to possess its own concrete facts. 
Yet, it was clear that the ongoing assignment and 
descriptive practices of those concerned were continually 
productive of what the sense of this thing--
aging/disease--was to be for the practical purposes at 
hand. For example, in the support groups for caregivers 
of Alzheimer's patients, a condition of a patient could 
be interpreted as a sign of a late stage of the disease 
against a background of certain comparisons with others. 
That "same" condition could shift with a change in 
framework, to an interpretation of old age, or another 
stage of the disease. In this respect, there were no 
straightforward facts concerning any aspect of the 
disease experience. Rather, the facts entered into 
ongoing practical experiences as more or less useful ways 
to understand the condition and related experiences under 
consideration. 
THE BROADER IMPLICATION 
At a broader level, what does the analysis say about 
the epistemological relation between the practical use of 
facts and their objects of concern, as it relates to the 
varied grammars described in the dissertation? In his 
book, Knowledge and Human Interests (1971), Habermas 
distinguishes three kinds of cognitive interest toward 
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any world of concern. Cognitive interests are the 
general intellectual task orientation taken in describing 
a world of objects. Asking, in effect, "For what purpose 
is this knowledge?" he offers three answers, three 
cognitive interests. One he describes as an interest in 
control. From this viewpoint, in distinguishing between 
facts and what they represent, one might be interested in 
how facts, in their use, serve to reveal "natural" 
objective relations between the objects represented. The 
state of objects is delineated by variously 
"manipulating" them in order to discover how they are 
organized in relation to each other. 
Within sociology, Blumer (1969), has referred to a 
form of this as "variable analysis." (Blumer's term is 
not as radically metatheoretical as Habermas' sense of 
cognitive interest.) The aim of "variable analysis" is 
to control in two senses: (1) to control variables in 
order to display their objective organization and (2) 
with the knowledge of the organization, to control the 
organization itself, such as exists in the variety of 
ways to intervene in social affairs, as a consequence of 
policymaking. 
With the exception of the phenomenologists, whose 
cognitive interest will be discussed shortly, interest in 
control is implicit in all of the grammars described in 
this dissertation. For spokepersons of these grammars, 
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from activity theory to Alzheimer's disease, the object 
of concern is postivistic in that the conception of the 
relationship between the social phenomena of interest, on 
the one hand, and the subjects' attention to them, on the 
other, is considered to be obvious. The grammar of 
activity theory, for example, takes for granted that 
aging is an individual social problem. The researcher's 
business is to investigate its manifestations in the 
individual, to discover its variety of resolutions, and 
to offer solutions based on the facts gathered. Thus, it 
is suggested, on the basis of what are discovered to be 
the correlates of life satisfaction, that adjustment is 
the result of variables such as church attendance and 
membership in voluntary associations, among other forms 
of personal involvement. The implicit sentiments of 
researchers dealing with individual membership in the 
social order, such as allegiance, loyalty, and the moral 
obligation of self realization through hard work reveals, 
in the data, its mirror image. What these researchers 
discover to be the nature of aging--individual 
unadjustment and life satisfaction is readjustment--has 
its source in their implicit grammar of the nature of 
growing old. Their work and data reproduce the vision. 
The remaining normal grammars of the old age problem 
treat the subjects studied as, more or less, "subject to" 
the variety of conditions, forces, and other social facts 
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of their everyday world. Accordingly, they gather data 
on variables like social systems, cohorts, careers, 
stages, or the relations of production, on the one hand, 
and on variables such as self-esteem or life 
satisfaction, on the other. They then attempt to trace 
the relationship between the sets of variables. Control 
here lies in the assumption of the objective status of 
the variables whose objects they name and their 
consequent manipulation (control) in order to discover 
their "natural" variations. Once discovered, knowledge 
of their variation allows one to effectively intervene in 
the relationship, or at least to suggest alterations, in 
order to bring about desirable changes (control) in other 
aspects of the relationship. 
The research concern for these grammars is with the 
question of explanatory robustness, that is, relative 
explanatory power in respect to a select set of data. 
While this was perhaps most pronounced in the famous 
activity/disengagement debate, the other grammars, 
likewise, claim to better explain "the data", in one 
fashion or another. For example, Dowd (1975) has offered 
his exchange theoretical challenge to disengagement 
theory. Gubrium (1973) has attempted to bridge the gap 
between activity and disengagement theory in his socio-
environmental approach. Riley and her associates (1972) 
have treated social structure in a Mertonian fashion, 
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defining age stratification in terms of differential 
cohorts, suggesting that one attempt to understand the 
individual experiences of growing old by means of 
membership in the age structure. The political 
economists, while metatheoretical in their questions 
raised concerning "individualistic" thinking in 
gerontological theory--asking, in effect, "Whose 
interests are served by thinking of age in particular 
ways?"--nonetheless offer their own causal argument, 
namely, a class explanation for the helplessness of the 
position of the aged. The Alzheimer's disease grammar, 
likewise, takes for granted an obvious body of knowledge, 
having concrete consequences in its accomplishment in 
that it serves to organize its assigners' courses of 
actions. For example, the disease distinction allows 
medical researchers to search for treatments and possible 
cures that aging itself does not. Its utility function 
also serves to locate fault in pathology, not selves. As 
such, the disease grammar sets new agendas for organizing 
and altering human affairs. 
It is important to note that while spokespersons of 
these grammars are not aware of their implicit interest 
in control as such, at the same time, grammars do not 
completely dominate their users' actions. Those who 
reference grammars are free enough from them to recognize 
them as entities separate from themselves (Giddens, 
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1979). This is so whether they are useful justifications 
for one reality or another or useful apologies for 
challenges to ongoing realities. For the most part, 
however, few directly address grammars as such, for their 
concerns are with the objects of description, not 
description or discourse in its own right. 
A second cognitive interest described by Habermas is 
understanding (verstehen). From this metatheoretical 
point of view, attention turns away from that which is 
signified and toward the signs themselves, in terms of 
how objects are produced. The question here is, "How are 
'things' to be understood?" It is an interest that is 
prior to control, whose understandings are taken for 
granted by control interests. It is an entirely 
different cognitive interest and organization than the 
first one, not in any way reducible to it. 
This form of interest underlies the social 
phenomenological grammar as an interest in social forms 
and objects. The concern lies with the issue of how the 
objects of and ideas about things are understood by 
people who experience them and how these experiences 
serve to produce and reproduce themselves along certain 
lines. The product of research from this viewpoint--as 
"understandings"--is radically different from "facts" or 
"data" as products. The latter terms are only reasonable 
when cognitive interest is in control; the former is 
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reasonable when cognitive interest is in understanding. 
There is a double sense of the term "understanding" here. 
One, sometimes called "verstehen," refers to the 
researcher's discovery of his understanding; the other 
refers to what respondents offer up as their own 
understandings. Giddens (1979), in his book, Central 
Problems in Social Theory, refers to this as a "double 
hermeneutic," the interpretation of interpretation. 
A third cognitive interest specified by Habermas is 
an interest in emancipation. In contrast to the first 
cognitive interest, this one does not take for granted 
the separate and objective existence of objects, separate 
that is from those for whom they are objects. Thus, for 
example, old age, as a thing, is not treated as an entity 
ontologically distinct from those who experience it. It 
would make no sense with this interest to ask how persons 
enter into old age since the entering itself, in some 
critical sense, produces old age. On the other hand, in 
contrast to the second cognitive interest, it does not as 
totally bracket an interest in objects in the service of 
inspecting their understandings. Rather, it concerns 
itself with the processes by which socially constructive 
subjects come to encounter a world of objects. The 
interest here is in the process by which, on the one 
hand, the objects of the world like systems, 
individuality, careers, stages, and the like, get 
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produced by meaningful action and, on the other hand, how 
these productions are, upon their realization, 
encountered by actors. 
The interest in emancipation arises out of the 
understanding that all action is, on the one hand, 
productive of objects and yet, on the other hand, in the 
course of human affairs, the source of the objects gets 
lost. To be interested in revealing the manner by which 
objectivity is "the lost subject" is to free the subjects 
from objects, to reveal to him or her that the objects of 
his or her experiences are products of his or her labor. 
The research task for this cognitive interest is 
critique and thus theory becomes critical. What is 
critiqued is transformations of the relationship between 
subject and objects from being genuine to being 
alienated. Thus, a major concern for critical theorists, 
with respect to the grammars of the old age problem, 
would be how they represent a language serving to reify 
experience as something separate from those doing the 
experiencing. 
Critical theorists assail what they call "identity 
thinking," which they would apply mainly to control 
interests. For example, critical theorists would resist 
the identification of experience with the objects 
experienced. They see the relationship between signs and 
what is signified as in a state of tension. What is in 
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tension is intention, that is, the subject is seen as in 
tension with the object he or she intends, the negative 
reduction of tension being alienation, its positive form 
being emancipation. 
All description, it is assumed, is generated from 
some ground(s). Accordingly, for this dissertation, 
those grounds have been understanding and emancipation. 
The broader implication of the analysis is to shed light 
on the factual status of late life. I have argued that 
the potential realities assigned to the aging experience 
are constitutionally tied to ameliorative concerns with 
old age. The critique is the attempt to demonstrate how 
much the old age problem is a problem of our making, the 
grammars we use constructing the problems we view. 
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APPENDIX A 
APPENDIX A 
TOPIC GUIDE FOR INFORMAL INTERVIEWS 
OF CAREGIVERS 
1. Patient impairments 
2. Onset 
3. Burden of care 
4. Personal responsibility; others; family 
5. Personal feelings (history of) 
6. Coping strategies 
7. Sources of information; knowledge of disease 
8. Hospital and professional contacts 
9. Typical day 
10. Institutionalization 
11. Disease labelling 
12. Burnout 
13. Caregiver respite; daycare 
14. Association with ADRDA; resources 
15. View of future 
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APPENDIX B 
BURDEN INTERVIEW 
1. Do you feel that your parent makes requests which 
you perceive to be over and above what hejshe 
needs? 
2. Do you feel that because of your involvement with 
your parent you don't have enough time for yourself? 
3. Do you feel stressed between trying to give to your 
parent as well as to other family responsibilities, 
job, etc.? 
4. Do you feel embarrassed over your parent's behavior? 
5. Do you feel guilty about your interactions with your 
parent? 
6. Do you feel angry about your interactions with your 
parent? 
7. Do you feel that your parent currently affects your 
relationships with other family members and friends 
in a negative way? 
8. Are you afraid of what the future holds for your 
parent? 
9. Are you pleased about your interactions with your 
parents? 
10. Is it painful to watch your parent age? 
11. Do you feel that your parent is dependent on you? 
12. Do you feel strained in your interactions with your 
parent? 
13. Do you feel that your health has suffered because of 
your involvement with your parent? 
14. Do you feel that you are contributing to the well-
being of your parent? 
15. Do you feel that the present situation with your 
parent doesn't allow you as much privacy as you 
would like? 
16. Do you feel that your social life has suffered 
because of your involvement with your parent? 
17. Do you feel uncomfortable when you have friends 
over? 
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18. Do you feel that your parent seems to expect you to 
take care of him/her as if you were the only one 
he/she could depend on? 
19. Do you feel that you don't have enough money to 
support your parent in addition to the rest of your 
expenses? 
20. Do you feel that you would like to be able to 
provide more money to support your parent than you 
are able to now? 
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